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Eight chapters examine cognitive processes underlying three moral judgments: 
How much harm is acceptable for greater good, how much to help others, and how 
responsible to hold them for their successes and failures. Chapters 1-3 examine how 
judgments of actions that cause harm to achieve a greater good are sensitive to expected 
value (the ratio of good done to harm done), outcome likelihoods, and where shifts in 
outcome likelihoods occur. Findings contradict dominant dual-process theories of moral 
cognition, which posit that people either react to the harm caused by the action or to the 
net benefit resulting from it, irrespective of the specific ratio of harm done to good done. 
	 xv 
We demonstrate that moral judgments are remarkably sensitive to this ratio, in ways 
partially consistent with Prospect Theory. Chapter 4 provides further evidence for the 
interaction of affective and deliberative processes by demonstrating how incidental affect 
can shift moral risk preferences.  
Chapter 5 explores the mental representation of good deeds. The proposed Moral 
Accounting Model illustrates how moral credit from prior beneficence excuses further 
beneficence. Effort, effect, domain generalizability, temporal generalizability, and 
temporal diffusion are identified as features of moral credit. Chapter 6 identifies the 
extent to which people care about the effectiveness of their beneficence: Though donors 
prefer to give to more efficient charities of the options they are presented with, whether 
the options explicitly fail to meet or exceed efficiency standards does not affect donor 
behavior.  
Chapter 7 examines responsibility attribution, challenging a prevalent view in lay 
theory research that thinking of people as changeable is universally adaptive. It provides 
a theoretical argument for how viewing people as changeable may result in holding 
others increasingly personally responsible for their circumstances. Chapter 8 provides 
empirical evidence for this process: The same mindset inductions used to demonstrate the 
benefits of changeability are shown to increase blame of others for continual failures. 
Implications for real-world decision-making, from how to program autonomous 
vehicles to avoid collisions, to how to encourage donation to charity, to how to address 
structural barriers to achievement are discussed.
		 1 
Introduction 
Is doing harm to some for the greater good acceptable? How much should we help 
others? How responsible should we hold them for their successes and failures? 
Philosophers have debated what the answers to such questions ought to be for millennia. 
More recently, psychologists have measured the responses people give to such questions, 
and how situational factors previously thought to be irrelevant to moral judgment can 
affect their responses. This dissertation examines the cognitive processes underlying 
three kinds of moral judgment: expected value calculation in decisions involving causing 
harm for the greater good, how mental accounting of prior good deeds excuses people 
from further beneficence, and how attributing responsibility to others reflects 
changeability beliefs. The real-world implications of these processes are discussed, 
contributing to the debate on what the answers to such ethical questions ought to be. 
Probability and excepted value in moral judgment 
Chapters 1-4 examine how moral judgments involving harm to some for the 
benefit of others incorporate outcome probabilities and expected value calculation. Moral 
judgment has typically been studied by asking participants whether to engage in 
variations of actions that are certain to kill one person but will also certainly save five 
people. Most people endorse diverting a trolley onto a track with one person on it, but not 
pushing a man into the path of the trolley, to save the five ahead. Such inconsistencies 
have been taken as evidence of a dual-system model of moral cognition: an irrational, 
affective, action-focused system is thought to dominate in the “push” case, and a 
deliberative, outcome-focused system is thought to dominate in the “divert” case. 
		 2 
But what if the “push” case feels less likely to actually save the five, and more 
likely to kill the one, than the “divert” case, despite the stated certainty of outcomes? 
Across seven studies, Chapter 1 examines how intuitively-felt outcome likelihoods can 
override stated outcomes, and that these intuitive likelihoods influence moral judgment. 
Findings also suggests that some moral principles, such as the distinction between 
intended harm and foreseen harm, operate, at least in part, through the varying intuitive 
likelihood of harm each conveys. 
Varied outcome likelihoods could impact moral judgments by changing the 
action’s expected value, or the ratio of good done to harm done. The role of expected 
value in moral dilemmas has been overlooked because dominant dual-system models of 
moral cognition propose that people respond either affectively to the harm caused by the 
action, or deliberatively to the net benefit of the outcome, and as such should be 
insensitive to the exact ratio of good done to harm done, or the expected value of the 
action. In Chapter 2, seven studies establish evidence for sensitivity to expected value 
ratio and use Prospect Theory as a framework for exploring whether moral preferences 
systematically deviate from expected value when outcomes are probabilistic rather than 
certain. Moral judgments appear to not be the result of a competition between emotional 
action-based and rational outcome-based systems, as proposed by dual-system models, 
but rather the output of a single system that integrates expected value with other 
considerations. Furthermore, we observe divergent patterns of moral judgment under 
single evaluation, where a single plan is presented, and under joint evaluation, where a 
participant chooses between plans. Though judgments of plans involving probabilistic 
harm track expected value under single evaluation, under joint evaluation participants are 
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willing to endorse plans with lower expected value ratios that carry a lower likelihood of 
harm over plans with higher expected value ratios that result in certain harm. Chapter 2 
thus raises the issue of whether joint evaluation preferences or single evaluation 
preferences ought to inform questions of practical ethics. 
Chapter 3 explores whether people are sensitive to where shifts in probability 
occur. For example, is raising the risk of harm from 0% to 25% treated differently from 
raising the risk of harm from 75% to 100%? Findings indicate sensitivity to where the 
shift in harm occurs, and provide additional evidence for moral preferences under joint 
evaluation deviating further from expected value than under single evaluation. 
Chapter 4 further examines the integration of affective and deliberative paths in 
moral cognition by examining how incidental affect impacts expected value calculation 
in moral decisions. We uncover that negative incidental affect, induced by photographs of 
disgusting food, can shift moral risk preferences in an experimental paradigm based on 
the classic Asian disease problem, where participants choose between the certain deaths 
of a smaller number of individuals or risking a chance of a larger number of individuals 
dying. The comparison of the impact of incidental affect on moral risk preferences and on 
monetary risk preferences indicates that incidental affect’s influence on moral decision-
making is the result of a general process, rather than a domain-specific process. 
Current basic and applied moral cognition research is conducted with little regard 
for outcome probabilities or expected value, despite the important role Chapters 1-4 show 
ratio, outcome likelihoods, and shifts in outcome likelihoods to play. Chapters 1-4 thus 
bring the study of moral dilemmas closer to real-world decision-making, where moral 
dilemmas can involve imposing risks of harm and varied numbers of individuals. Such 
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research is relevant to a wide range of practical ethical issues, including whether to 
pursue novel technologies that promise benefits but also carry risks, how autonomous 
vehicles should be programmed to make tradeoffs between passenger and pedestrian 
safety, and public health decisions. 
Beneficence & Moral Accounting 
 The second section of the dissertation examines the cognitive representation of 
doing good deeds. While the influence of situational factors on whether an individual 
chooses to help have been studied in great detail, the role of an individual’s own prior 
behavior in deciding whether to help has received less attention outside of research on 
how good deeds can license people to subsequently behave unethically. One proposed 
explanation for this moral licensing effect is that good deeds grant moral credit. 
However, little is known about the mental representation of moral credit. Across seven 
studies, Chapter 5 proposes the Moral Accounting Model, which outlines how moral 
credit from prior good deeds excuses further beneficence: Moral credit is found to be 
luck-dependent, effort-sensitive, time-sensitive, and domain-concentrated. 
One implication of the Moral Accounting Model is that people may have fairly 
limited concern for the impact of their beneficent actions, in that the effectiveness of their 
actions is just one of many ways by which beneficence grants moral credit. Chapter 6 
examines the extent to which donors are sensitive to charity efficiency, an increasingly 
popular metric of how much of the money raised by a nonprofit is spent on administrative 
overhead, rather than the actual cause. Four studies find that people have low levels of 
concern about how charities spend the money donated to them, suggesting that the 
increased focus on charity performance metrics may not increase overall donation rates, 
		 5 
but may guide donations to charities that are presented as relatively efficient, regardless 
of whether the charities fail to meet or exceed efficiency standards. 
Changeability & Blame 
The third section of the dissertation turns from judgments of actions to judgments 
of people in examining how the attribution of responsibility to others reflects 
changeability beliefs. Two related literatures examine the representation of changeability: 
essentialism, or the belief that people and social categories have underlying immutable 
essences, and lay theories of ability, or beliefs regarding whether people’s attributes are 
either fixed or changeable through persistent effort. Though both essentialism and fixed 
lay theories are generally regarded as harmful cognitive processes that result in 
maladaptive outcomes, such as stereotyping and underachievement, Chapter 7 identifies 
an increasing number of findings that are inconsistent with the perspective that 
changeable lay theories are universally adaptive. 
Chapter 7 provides a theoretical foundation for how thinking of people and groups 
as unchangeable can provide the benefit of absolving them of personal responsibility for 
having low status, which could be particularly important in situations where structural 
barriers prevent achievement. In addition to proposing that the observed  benefits of 
changeable mindsets may result from perceiving a positive underlying core essence, 
rather than the belief in changeability itself, Chapter 7 predicts that a changeable mindset 
could cause increased blame attribution for continuous failures by ascribing increased 
personal control for the failures. 
Chapter 8 provides empirical evidence for this process: Across five studies, after a 
standard induction of either an entity (fixed) or incremental (changeable) view of various 
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traits, participants induced to view a trait as changeable blamed a person showing 
consistently maladaptive levels of the trait more than entity-induced participants did 
because they perceived the individual as having more control over her failures. Such 
findings suggest that increasingly popular mindset intervention programs, which induce 
changeable views of ability and intelligence to help address group and individual 
achievement gaps, may result in increased blame of those unable to overcome barriers to 
their achievement, in addition to failing to address the underlying causes of the inequity. 
Eight chapters thus uncover the cognitive structures underlying decisions 
regarding how much harm is acceptable for greater good, how much to help others, and 
whether to hold them responsible for their successes and failures. Understanding the 
cognitive processes underlying moral cognition will help uncover general moral 
principles, which can help guide the resolution of complex, real-world ethical questions, 
from how autonomous vehicles should be programmed to avoid accidents, to how to 
encourage more beneficence, to how to combat societal inequities. 
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Abstract 
There is a vast literature that seeks to uncover features underlying moral judgment 
by eliciting reactions to hypothetical scenarios such as trolley problems.  These thought 
experiments assume that participants accept the outcomes stipulated in the scenarios.  
Across seven studies (N = 968), we demonstrate that intuition overrides stipulated 
outcomes even when participants are explicitly told that an action will result in a 
particular outcome.  Participants instead substitute their own estimates of the probability 
of outcomes for stipulated outcomes, and these probability estimates in turn influence 
moral judgments.  Our findings demonstrate that intuitive likelihoods are one critical 
factor in moral judgment, one that is not suspended even in moral dilemmas that 
explicitly stipulate outcomes.  Features thought to underlie moral reasoning, such as 
intention, may operate, in part, by affecting the intuitive likelihood of outcomes, and, 
problematically, moral differences between scenarios may be confounded with non-moral 
intuitive probabilities. 
Keywords: Moral judgment, Morality, Probability, Intuition, Trolley problem 
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Intuitive Probabilities and the Limitation of Moral Imagination 
There is a large and important literature in moral theory centered around eliciting 
participants’ reactions to scenarios of various kinds and drawing conclusions about their 
judgments.  For example, systematic psychological investigation focused on the widely 
studied Trolley Problems has uncovered a variety of features of scenarios that may 
account for participants’ moral judgments, including whether the agent is described as 
causing harm to another through physical contact (e.g., Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 
2006), whether information about motives is provided (e.g., Nichols & Knobe, 2007), 
whether harm is described as being intentional (e.g., Cushman et al., 2006; Hauser, 
Cushman, Young, Kanj-Xing Jin, & Mikhail, 2007; Mikhail, 2000; Cushman, Young, & 
Hauser, 2006; Moore, Clark, & Kane, 2008; Schaich Borg, Hynes, Van Horn, Grafton, & 
Sinnott-Armstrong, 2006), and many other factors.  
In arriving at these conclusions, it is typically simply assumed that participants 
have accepted the claims made about features of the scenarios, and in particular claims 
about what outcomes will occur if agents act in certain ways (though there are some 
notable exceptions such as Royzman and Baron’s (2002) and Greene et al.’s  (2009) 
studies, discussed below).  In a series of studies, we set out to test this assumption.  
Perhaps when participants are told that, in a given scenario, if an agent acts in a particular 
way a certain outcome will ensue, participants do not accept this claim.  Instead, perhaps 
they only accept that a certain outcome might ensue.  If this hypothesis is correct, then 
participants’ judgments could be affected by a factor that is not built into the scenario at 
all, and is in fact at odds with the scenario as described.  Further, if participants are in fact 
substituting their own judgments about the probabilities of outcomes for scenario 
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stipulations, this should lead us to rethink the way in which participants’ reactions to 
scenarios are tested and what conclusions can be drawn.  Our experiments focused 
mainly on scenarios eliciting moral judgments, but we believe that the relevance of these 
findings potentially extends to the use of scenarios intended to elicit all sorts of 
judgments, including moral, prudential, and linguistic, among others.    
To see what is at stake, consider Philippa Foot’s (1967) classic Trolley Problem, 
which has been the centerpiece of an entire literature in moral theory.  A host of 
variations of the case has been used as a test of intuitions, and the results have been 
thought by many to provide strong support for a particular kind of moral theory over its 
main rival.   One variant, developed by Judith Jarvis Thomson (1976), consists of two 
scenarios.  In one, call it “Side Track”, five people are tied to a trolley track and will be 
killed unless a bystander pulls a lever that switches the trolley onto a side track.  One 
person is tied to the side track and will be killed if the bystander pulls the lever.  In 
another, call it “Footbridge,” five people are tied to a trolley track and will be killed 
unless a bystander pushes a large man off a bridge above the track, in which case his 
body will stop the trolley.  If the bystander pushes the large man off the bridge, he will be 
killed, but the five will be saved.  A large majority of participants judges that it is morally 
permissible to turn the trolley in Side Track, but morally impermissible to push the large 
man in Footbridge (see, e.g., Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001).  
But in each case, if the bystander turns the trolley or pushes the large man, five will be 
saved and one will die.  Thus, if the only morally relevant factor in determining 
permissibility were consequences—as Consequentialist moral theories have it—then it 
should be permissible both to turn the trolley and to push the large man.  Are we simply 
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inconsistent and mistaken in our judgments?  Or is there another morally relevant factor 
(or factors) that can explain in a principled way why turning the trolley is permissible and 
pushing the large man is not?  Some moral theorists have offered the following 
explanation: in Footbridge, unlike in Side Track, the one is used without his consent, if 
the bystander saves the five (see, e.g., McIntyre, 2004).  It is plausible that we have a 
right not to be used against our will, even when the consequences would be better overall 
if we were.  This fact, it is claimed, explains the moral difference between the two cases, 
removing the need to attribute inconsistency in most participants’ reactions.   
 The trolley cases continue to be used by philosophers as “intuition pumps,” and in 
classrooms as well as in journals intuitive reactions to the cases are employed in 
important arguments for non-consequentialism.  Intuitions about cases are typically used 
as part of a methodology known as “reflective equilibrium” (see Rawls, 1971).  On this 
approach, one tries to reach a kind of equilibrium between plausible general principles on 
the one hand, and intuitions about particular cases on the other.  This might require 
rejecting some intuitions in favor of others, if intuitions are ultimately inconsistent with 
each other or with plausible principles.  While the approach is subtle and does not rely 
only on intuitions about cases, it is nevertheless true that intuitions play a powerful role in 
reasoning to a particular moral theory.  
As these cases have caught the attention of experimental psychologists in recent 
years, the burgeoning research program that tests participants’ reactions to the cases in 
systematic and creative ways has yielded intriguing results.  One such result is that in 
cases in which philosophers had initially thought that only a single factor (such as 
whether or not the victim was used against his will in the plan to save others) explains 
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our differential judgments, the cases also vary on other dimensions that appear to play an 
explanatory role, such as whether or not there is physical contact in the case (e.g., 
Cushman et al., 2006).  If it turns out that participants’ moral judgments are affected by 
what many philosophers have taken to be morally irrelevant features of cases, then this is 
very important information for moral theorists to have.  For example, if on reflection 
participants would disavow the idea that directness of physical contact makes a moral 
difference, then moral theorists cannot claim to have successfully isolated a single 
morally salient factor that is both explaining and justifying participants’ initial moral 
judgments.  Further, this is also important information for psychologists to have in 
working to identify the mechanisms operative in moral reasoning, and for anyone 
interested in human behavior in a wide variety of contexts, from decisions in wartime to 
emergency rooms to legislatures. 
We set out to study various versions of moral principles featuring in ordinary moral 
thought, isolating morally salient features of situations in turn.  But some of us, in 
teaching ethics, had been struck that even after setting out hypothetical cases clearly and 
repeatedly, students often explicitly commented that they just were not going to accept 
the stipulated features in the case.  This experience led us to try to test whether 
participants in experiments also resist accepting stipulated features of the cases and, if so, 
whether this affects their judgments of permissibility.  
We are not the first to raise this set of issues.  Some researchers have expressed 
concern about resistance to stipulated features (Bennis, Medin, & Bartels, 2010; 
Christensen & Gomila, 2012; Green et al., 2009).  Some have tried to control for 
participants’ substitution of their own intuitive probability judgments.  For example, 
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Royzman and Baron (2002), studying whether participants make different moral 
judgments when agents harm victims ‘directly’ and ‘indirectly’, eliminated from 
consideration those participants who they found had judged differentially on probability 
of outcomes across ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ scenarios.  But they did so along with several 
other factors and did not test what contribution, if any, differential probability judgments 
make in generating differential moral judgments. 
Greene et al. (2009, p. 365) also tried to control in two ways for what they call 
“unconscious realism,” that is, “a tendency to unconsciously replace a moral dilemma’s 
unrealistic assumptions with more realistic ones” (p. 365).  First, they told participants 
the scenarios were “unrealistic” and asked them to suspend disbelief about them, 
eliminating responses from participants who reported being unable to do so.  Second, 
they asked participants who had previously evaluated the moral acceptability of 
protagonists performing actions in the various scenarios how probable it was that each 
protagonist’s action would be (a) as described in the dilemma (e.g., five lives saved at the 
cost of one), (b) worse than this, or (c) better than this.  They found that ratings of higher 
probability that the outcome would be worse than as described were correlated with 
lower moral acceptability ratings.  As Greene et al. (2009) pointed out, this raises the 
question of whether participants’ substitution of their own probability estimates of 
outcomes affects their moral judgments.  But, as they also noted, participants’ probability 
estimates might have been offered as post-hoc rationalizations for their prior moral 
judgments, and the evidence was at most for a correlation and not causation.  So, while 
they assumed the existence of unconscious realism in an attempt to control for it in 
investigating other aspects of the scenarios that affect moral judgments, and while their 
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results were suggestive of the hypothesis that the effects of unconscious realism “may be 
real,” they did not themselves offer studies that test the effect of probability estimates 
alone on moral judgments.  Rather, they urged others to think about controlling for this 
possibly real effect in future studies.   
Finally, Kortenkamp and Moore (2014) focused directly on assessing probability 
as a factor in moral judgment, but they did not explore whether participants substitute 
their own probability judgments when responding to scenarios in which outcomes were 
stipulated as certain.  They asked for participants’ probability judgments only in 
connection with scenarios in which outcomes of protagonists’ actions were already 
described as uncertain to happen (e.g., “x might happen” and “you don’t know whether” 
(p. 380)).  They did, however, find that participants’ responses concerning moral 
rightness or wrongness differed between scenarios in which outcomes were stipulated as 
certain and scenarios in which outcomes were stipulated as uncertain.  Yet, interestingly, 
when they probed for probabilities in the uncertain scenarios, they did not find a 
significant correlation between probability judgments and moral judgments (although 
they did find a small effect when it came to expected value judgments and moral 
judgments).  Nevertheless, taken as a whole, these studies, while not showing that people 
substitute probabilities for stipulated certainty, do show that moral judgments are 
impacted by people thinking about outcomes as probabilistic. 
In the studies described below, we directly put to the test the hypothesis that 
participants substitute their own estimates of the probability of outcomes for those 
stipulated in the scenarios, and that their doing so affects their moral judgments about 
cases.  Unlike in Kortenkamp and Moore’s (2014) study, we presented scenarios in which 
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the outcomes are stipulated and in which the protagonists know that particular outcomes 
will occur, to test whether participants are in fact substituting their own judgment for the 
stipulated features.  
And unlike Kortenkamp and Moore (2014), Royzman and Baron (2002), and 
Greene et al. (2009), we presented pairs of scenarios that varied only in outcomes that 
differed in their antecedent probabilities (such as whether someone would die from a 
train running over their foot or their neck).  Our approach also differs in that we 
distinguished among a variety of specific probabilities, including both the probability that 
the one will die and that the five will live if the agent acts and also both the probability 
that the one will live and that the five will die if the agent does not act.  We tested 
whether participants substitute their own estimates of the probability of any one of these 
outcomes, and whether any one of these probability estimates could affect participants’ 
moral judgments. 
Study 1 has four parts. Although they were initially part of the same experiment, 
for ease of exposition we present the first two as Studies 1a and 1b. In Study 1a, we 
presented participants with a Trolley Problem that was designed to vary on whether or 
not the harm to the single person was a means to save the five, or simply a foreseeable 
result of saving them.  We asked participants to report not only how permissible they 
thought the action was in the two cases, but also how likely they thought the action was 
to actually save the five and kill the one.  Study 1b also presented participants with pairs 
of cases designed to isolate changes in the perceived likelihood of outcomes by keeping 
fixed additional factors such as whether or not the harm was intended as a means.  In this 
study, we limited the changes to antecedent probabilities that the one would die if the 
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protagonist took action (e.g., turning the trolley).  Studies 1c and 1d provide evidence that 
the participants’ lack of acceptance of certain outcomes was not a result of the pragmatics 
of asking them to respond to the likelihood of the event, nor a particular result of 
participants’ use of a slider.  
To control for the possibility that participants’ responses concerning the 
likelihood of outcomes might influence their moral assessments, in Study 2 we presented 
the same scenarios as in Studies 1a and 1b and asked participants only for their moral 
assessments of the scenarios, without first asking about the likelihood of outcomes.   
Studies 3 and 4 parallel the probability-isolating scenarios from Study 1b.  Instead 
of varying the antecedent probability of the one dying if the protagonist took action, we 
instead varied the antecedent probability of the five being saved if the protagonist took 
action.   
For the first four studies, we employed the same sort of moral judgment scale 
used by Cushman, et al. (2006), namely, a Likert scale, which runs from 1 
(impermissible) to 7 (permissible).  Because many philosophers assume that the concept 
of moral permissibility is binary rather than scalar, in Study 5 we presented participants 
with one of the scenarios from Study 4, using only a Yes/No question concerning 
whether the protagonist’s action would be morally permissible.  
In Study 6, we extended the range of probability estimates assessed.  People may 
bring intuitive probabilities to bear not only on the likelihood of the action resulting in 
the death of the single person and the saving of the five, but also on the risk to each group 
in the case of inaction.  To investigate how different probability estimates concerning 
each of four different outcomes might affect moral judgment, we presented participants 
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with four scenario sets using a within-subjects design and asked them for four different 
probability judgments (two concerning how probable outcomes are if the protagonist acts 
and two concerning how probable outcomes are if the protagonist does not act), as well as 
eliciting their moral judgments on a Likert scale.  
Finally, in Study 7 we investigated whether scenarios designed to capture moral 
distinctions in quite abstract terms are nevertheless perceived as varying in perceived 
probabilities.  
 
Study 1a 
Procedure 
 One hundred and twenty one participants located within the United States were 
recruited as participants via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (mean age  = 35.6, SD = 13.2; 
62.8% female).  We used a pair of Trolley Cases, adapted from Thomson (1976), written 
to capture the intended/foreseen distinction, forms of which often appear in the moral 
judgment literature (e.g., Cushman et al., 2006).  In one member of the pair, the death of 
one individual is a foreseen consequence of diverting a trolley that will otherwise run 
over five individuals.  In the other, the individual’s body is instrumental to saving the 
five: pushing him in front of the trolley stops it from hitting the five.  In both scenarios, 
the death of the one and saving of the five are stipulated as outcomes of the protagonist’s 
action.  However, pushing a person in front of a trolley may seem more likely to kill the 
one, as well as less likely to save the five, than diverting the trolley.  (See supplementary 
Materials for scenarios.) 
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Participants were also presented with three other scenario sets that will be 
discussed subsequently as Study 1b.  Scenarios were presented in a randomized order.  
After reading each scenario, participants were asked to respond to how likely they 
thought the death of the single individual would be if the protagonist decided to perform 
the action, using a percentage scale (e.g., If Sam decides to divert the trolley in order to 
save the five, how likely is it that the lone individual will die?; 0–100%).  They were also 
asked to estimate a second likelihood: the likelihood that the five would be saved should 
the protagonist decide to perform the action (e.g., If Sam decides to divert the trolley in 
order to save the five, how likely is it that the five will be saved?; 0-100%).  Next, 
participants were asked to rate the permissibility of the action on a 7-point scale (How 
permissible would it be for Sam to divert the trolley in order to save the five?; 1 = 
Impermissible to 7 = Permissible).  Participants also provided demographic information.  
Results 
The pair of scenarios was analyzed for within-subject differences in perceived 
likelihoods and permissibility using paired-samples t-tests.  Participants reported that the 
one was significantly more likely to die when his death would result from being pushed 
onto the tracks (mean = 92.9%, SD = 15.8), compared to when it would result from the 
trolley being diverted into him (mean = 89.2%, SD = 20.3), t(120) = 2.83, p = .005, d = 
.20 (see Table 1).  Participants also reported perceiving differences in the likelihood of 
the five being saved, t(120) = 3.60, p < .001, d = .36, with diverting the trolley being 
more likely to save them than pushing a man in its way (mean push = 83.1%, SD = 24.7; 
mean divert = 91.2%, SD = 19.5).  Differences in these perceived likelihoods were 
paralleled by differences in permissibility: action in the scenario perceived as more likely 
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to result in the death of the one individual and less likely to save the five was also rated 
as significantly less permissible, t(120) = 7.20, p < .001, d = .75 (mean push = 2.96, SD = 
1.95; mean divert =  4.46, SD = 2.07).  In neither case did participants take the death of 
the one, stipulated as the outcome of the protagonist’s action, to be 100% likely, nor did 
participants think that the protagonist’s action was 100% likely to save the five, an 
outcome that was also explicitly stipulated.  
A bootstrap mediation analysis with 10,000 resamples using the mediation 
package in R (Tingley, Yamamoto, Hirose, Keele, & Imai, 2014) revealed that 
differences in the perceived likelihood of the one dying did not mediate permissibility 
differences between the two scenarios, (indirect effect  ab = .04, p = .13, 95% CI [-.01, 
.12]; direct effect c’ = 1.45, p < .001, CI [1.0, 1.9]; 3% mediated), nor did differences in 
the perceived likelihood of the five being saved mediate permissibility differences 
between the two scenarios, (indirect effect  ab = .05, p = .31, 95% CI [-.05, .16]; direct 
effect c’ = 1.45, p < .001, 95% CI [.32, .65]; 3% mediated), failing to clearly demonstrate 
a relationship between permissibility and outcome likelihood, despite both significantly 
varying between the two scenarios. 
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Table 1.1. Rated likelihoods and permissibility of scenario set intended to vary along the 
foreseen/intended distinction (Study 1a). 
 
Version 
Less likely 
(divert 
trolley) 
More likely 
(push man) sig diff. 
Rated likelihood of 
the one dying (%) 89.2 92.9 ** 
Rated likelihood of 
the five being saved 
(%) 
91.2 83.1 *** 
Permissibility 4.46 2.96 *** 
**p < .01     ***p < .001 
 
Discussion 
 The two scenarios differ along the intended/foreseen distinction, but participants 
also appear to register a difference in the perceived likelihood of the one dying and the 
five being saved.  Why this difference in perception?  One possibility is that the 
difference between the diversion of the trolley and the use of the bulk of the man as an 
obstacle to block the trolley’s path is itself associated with a difference in the perceived 
likelihood of the outcome occurring, independently of the protagonist’s intentions.  
Another is that people judge an intended harm as generally more likely to occur, since 
they think the protagonist would likely take extra steps to try to bring it about, whereas 
the protagonist might take steps to reduce the likelihood of its occurrence in the case of 
merely foreseen harm. Given that in one of the scenarios the death of the one person was 
more likely to occur and that it was less likely for that death to be accompanied by the 
saving of five, it is reasonable, especially given other differences, that the agent’s conduct 
was judged less morally permissible.  We do not, however, find evidence for the 
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perceived likelihoods mediating the permissibility judgments.  It may be that the scales, 
especially an unfamiliar one on moral permissibility, may be too crude to capture 
participants’ intuitions when so many factors are varying between scenarios.   
In any case, two things are clear.  First, people do not accept outcomes as they are 
stipulated in the moral scenarios.  Second, scenarios written to vary on only one 
dimension can easily and inadvertently vary also in the perceived likelihood of the 
specified harm and benefit occurring.  Since it is morally relevant how likely harms and 
benefits are to occur, it would not be surprising if judgments of this sort have some effect 
on participants’ moral verdicts.  For the next study, we explored whether participants’ 
perceived likelihoods affect their permissibility judgments in sets of scenarios that are 
designed not to differ on any other potentially morally relevant dimension.   
 
Study 1b 
Procedure 
 As noted above, the participants of Study 1 were presented with three additional 
scenario-pairs in which a protagonist is faced with an action that will save five 
individuals but kill one other.  The members of each additional scenario-pair were 
parallel except for the way in which the single individual would die if the protagonist 
performed the action.  The death of the one individual and the survival of the five were 
explicitly stipulated as the outcomes of action in every case.  In one case the mode of 
death, for example, the trolley severing his neck, had a plausibly higher perceived 
likelihood of being fatal than the mode of death in the other, for example, the trolley 
severing his foot.  The other two scenario sets involved (a) pushing a man off a ledge, 
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causing him to fall either 10 feet or 150 feet to his death in order to reach five to save 
them, and (b) pushing either small rocks or a large boulder off a ledge onto a person 
below in order to reach five in time to save them. (See Supplementary Materials for 
scenarios.)  If participants substitute their perceived likelihoods of the one individual’s 
death for the scenarios’ clear assertion that the individual will die in each case if the agent 
acts, then they will rate the odds of his death as different between the two cases.  This in 
turn might affect their assessment of the permissibility of the respective actions.  
After reading each scenario, participants responded to how likely they thought the 
death of the single individual would be if the protagonist decided to perform the action, 
as well as to how likely they thought the saving of the five would be if the action was 
performed.  They also rated the permissibility of the action on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = 
Impermissible to 7 = Permissible).  
Results  
We explored the contribution of altering the perceived likelihood of outcomes on 
permissibility using a repeated measures anova, with scenario set and condition specified 
as fixed factors.  First, we examined whether the predicted permissibility differences 
emerged from having manipulated the perceived likelihood that the one would die, 
despite stipulating that the death was certain.  The anova yielded a significant 
permissibility difference, F(1, 120) =  21.3, p < .001, partial η2 = .15 (mean less likely = 
4.68, SD = 1.97; mean more likely = 4.27, SD = 2.00; see Table 2).  There was also a 
main effect difference between scenario sets on permissibility, F(2, 240) = 8.48, p < .001, 
partial η2 = .07 (mean set 1 = 4.56, SD = 2.08; mean set 2 = 4.23, SD = 1.97; mean set 3 = 
4.64, SD = 1.92), but there was no significant interaction between scenario set and 
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condition, F(2, 240) = 2.03, p = .13, partial η2 = .017, suggesting that all three scenario 
sets varied equally in permissibility. 
Next we examined whether perceived likelihoods of the one dying varied within 
each scenario pair.  A repeated measures anova revealed that they did, F(1, 120) = 47.1, p 
< .001, partial η2 =  .28 (mean low = 79.0, SD = 27.7, mean high = 90.9, SD = 18.2).  
They also varied between scenario sets, F(2, 240)  = 4.18, p = .016, partial η2 =  .068, 
(mean set 1 = 87.2, SD = 22.5; mean set 2 = 84.4, SD = 25.2; mean set 3 = 83.3, SD = 
24.6).  There was no interaction between scenario set and perceived likelihood of the one 
dying, F(2, 240) = 1.98, p = .14, partial η2 = .02, suggesting that perceived likelihoods 
varied similarly across sets of scenarios. 
We also explored whether our scenarios varied the perceived likelihood of the 
five being saved by the action. Our manipulation did not influence the perceived 
likelihood that the five would be saved, F(1, 120) = .823, p = .37, partial η2 = .007 (mean 
low = 87.0, SD = 21.8; mean high = 87.6, SD = 21.0), though there was a significantly 
different perceived likelihood that the five would be saved between sets of scenarios, F(2, 
240) = 12.5, p < .001, partial η2 = .09 (mean set 1 = 91.7, SD = 18.9, mean set 2 = 85.3, 
SD = 21.9; mean set 3 = 84.9, SD = 22.5).  There was no interaction between condition 
and scenario, F(2, 240) = .98, p = .38, η2 = .008. 
Next, a bootstrap mediation analysis with 10,000 resamples (Tingley, et al., 2014) 
revealed that differences in the perceived likelihood of the one dying partially mediated 
the permissibility differences between pairs of scenarios, (mediated effect ab’ = .22, p < 
.001, 95% CI [.15, .30]; direct effect  c’ = .19, p = .02, 95% CI [.03, .36]; 53% mediated). 
These mediation models specified random intercepts and slopes for subjects. 
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Table 1.2. Rated likelihoods and permissibility across three scenarios sets that vary along 
perceived likelihood of the one dying despite death being stipulated (Study 1b).  
 Scenario 
Version Less likely  
More 
likely  
sig 
diff. 
Rated 
likelihood of 
the one dying 
(%) 
79.0 90.9 *** 
Rated 
likelihood of 
the five being 
saved (%) 
87.0 87.6 ns 
Permissibility 4.68 4.27 *** 
***p < .001 
 
Discussion 
 Despite outcomes being explicitly stipulated, participants reported a less than 
100% likelihood of their occurrence.  They also reported divergent likelihoods of the one 
dying within each of the three pairs of scenarios.  Furthermore, an increased perceived 
likelihood of the one dying as a result of the actions corresponded, quite reasonably, with 
a judgment of a lower degree of permissibility for the action relative to the other member 
of its pair: Judgments of the likelihood of the action resulting in the one person’s death 
mediated, partially, judgments of the permissibility of the action.  Given that the 
scenarios were designed to differ morally only in the intuitive likelihood of the action 
actually resulting in harm to the one, the finding that the mediation is only partial most 
likely reflects the intrinsic noisiness of participants’ estimations of probabilities and 
permissibility.   
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Next, we explored two factors that might be thought to cause participants to report 
uncertainty (or lower than 100% probability) about the outcomes even if they really 
accepted the certain stipulation.  One is the pragmatics of asking likelihood questions 
about a stipulated outcome, which might suggest that we want an answer less than 100%.  
The other is that our scale featured a slider that ranged from 0% to 100%, and so any 
error in reporting certainty would have to be on the low side, which would produce a 
mean of less than 100%.  It is worth noting that such effects cannot readily account for 
the observed differences between our paired scenarios.  If participants are just picking 
some likelihood arbitrarily less than 100% to make the question seem reasonable, or are 
just reporting 100% with some (bounded-at-100) error, then these effects should be equal 
in the two versions of the scenarios, and clearly that is not the case; participants are 
responding lawfully to perceived differences in outcomes.  Nonetheless, we explored 
whether these two factors contribute to the less-than-certain reports in a scenario with a 
high perceived likelihood of the stipulated outcome actually coming to pass. 
 
Study 1c & 1d 
We used the scenario that had been rated as having an outcome closest to 100% 
from Study 1b (the trolley severs the neck of the one if the switch is thrown, rated as 
94.5% likely to result in the death of the one).  If the difference from 100% is just due to 
random error, then when participants enter their response to the likelihood question 
freely, rather than using a slider capped at 100%, the error ought to be roughly 
symmetrical around 100%, and the average should be certainty.  This is the approach of 
Study 1c.   Study 1d examined the pragmatics issue by making the ratings not just of the 
		 26 
one certain thing, but of a variety of factors whose perceived likelihoods reasonably 
varied, and included one whose likelihood was 100%.  The addition of these other 
questions before the critical question about the stipulated certainty of the one person 
dying if the action is taken should reduce any suggestion that we want them to respond 
with a probability less than 100%. 
Procedure 1c 
Participants read the sever-the-head scenario, and were asked, If Rachel decides to 
divert the trolley in order to save the five, how likely is it that the lone individual will die 
(e.g., the likelihood of a flipped coin coming up heads is 50%)?  Participants entered any 
numeric value they wanted into a text box that appeared below the question. 
Results 1c 
Sixty-two participants (mean age = 34.6, SD = 10.3, 74.2% female) rated the 
action as having an 89.5% (SD = 24.7) likelihood of killing the lone individual, which 
significantly differed from 100%, t(62) = 3.32, p = .002, d = .43.  Thus even when 
entering a percentage value, with no slider-induced norm, participants still did not accept 
that the stated outcome would certainly happen. 
Procedure 1d 
Participants read the same scenario and answered four other likelihood questions 
before the critical one.  These questions were chosen to elicit responses that varied, 
justifying the inquiry about likelihood, and also to include a question to which the 
participants would answer 100%, to normalize participants reporting 100% on the critical 
question, if that is what they felt the answer really was. Participants were asked how 
likely a fair six-sided die was to come up less than four, and how likely the die was to 
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come up less than seven.  They also were asked how likely it is that Rachel knows one of 
the five individuals on the track ahead, and how likely it is that she knows the lone person 
on the track.  Finally, participants were asked the critical question: If Rachel decides to 
divert the trolley in order to save the five, how likely is it that the lone individual will die? 
Results 1d 
Sixty-four people (mean age: 24.5 SD = 12.3; 60.9% female) participated in the 
study.  We included what we thought would be a simple math problem about the 
likelihood of a regular six-sided die coming up less than seven, so that participants would 
see that we had at least one question where 100% was a reasonable answer.  However, 
our math problem turned out to be insufficiently easy, and 16 (of 64) people did not 
respond with 100% on the likelihood of the die showing less than seven.  To be 
conservative, we examined the ratings of the likelihood of the diverted trolley killing the 
lone individual for the participants who had reported 100% for the die roll (though the 
data are no different for all subjects).  These participants on average reported that 
likelihood as 92.9% (SD = 21.6), again significantly different from 100%, t(47) = 2.26, p 
= .029, d = .38.  
Discussion 
 Even when not using a slider that caps responses at 100%, and in the context of 
questions where asking about likelihood was quite ordinary and 100% was a reasonable 
answer, participants nonetheless did not accept that the action would certainly result in 
the stipulated death of the one.  There was no indication of either the use of a slider or a 
potentially surprising presentation of questions concerning likelihood contributing to the 
original effect.  Having conservatively selected the scenario rated as most likely to result 
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in death for this test, it is likely that this pattern of findings generalizes to the other 
scenarios tested. This suggests that rated likelihoods are not the result of a norm dictated 
by the use of a slider or by the question being asked in isolation, but that participants are 
indeed not accepting stipulated outcomes, not only in the less likely versions of our 
scenarios, but in the more likely ones as well.  
It is, however, possible that the difference in estimates of the permissibility of the 
action across each pair depended on participants being sensitized to the perceived 
likelihood of the act being fatal.  That is, being asked to rate the likelihood of the action’s 
fatality could have directed participants’ attention to perceived likelihoods and thereby 
influenced permissibility judgments.  The next experiment tested whether the 
permissibility difference we observed would persist if participants were not asked to rate 
the likelihood of action outcomes, but just read various scenarios that included 
stipulations of outcomes (as before).  Would participants, in the absence of questions 
regarding likelihood, nevertheless find action in the scenarios previously found to be 
more likely to kill the one less permissible?  
 
Study 2  
Procedure 
One hundred and nineteen participants located in the United States were recruited 
via Mechanical Turk (mean age = 34.4, SD = 11.1; 60.5% female).  We repeated the 
procedure from Study 1, although with both questions regarding likelihoods removed, 
leaving a single permissibility question for each scenario.  
Results 
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 Even without questions regarding likelihood, action in the scenarios in which 
harm to the one had been previously judged to be more likely was rated as less 
permissible.  In the scenario set from Study 1a, causing the death of the one by throwing 
a switch was judged more permissible (M = 4.29, SD = 2.12) than pushing him into the 
way of the trolley (M = 2.96, SD = 1.90), t(118) = 7.48, p < .001, d = .66.  For the 
scenario sets used in Study 1b, a repeated measures anova revealed a significant 
permissibility difference as well, F(1, 118) = 15.6, p < .001, partial η2 = .12, (mean low = 
4.21, SD = 1.97; mean high = 4.01, SD = 2.01).  The main effect of scenario set was 
significant F(2, 236) = 7.20, p = .001, partial η2 = .058, (mean set 1b = 4.26, SD = 1.99; 
mean set 2b = 3.87, SD = 1.99; mean set 3b = 4.20, SD = 1.98), as was the interaction of 
scenario set and condition F(2, 236) =  4.50, p = .012, partial η2 =  .037 (mean set 2 low = 
4.74, SD = 2.01, mean set 2 high = 4.39, SD = 2.14; mean set 3 low = 4.38, SD = 2.01; 
mean set 3 high = 4.09, SD = 1.93; mean set 4 low = 4.95, SD = 1.87, mean set 4 high = 
4.34, SD = 1.93),  suggesting that some scenarios were rated as having bigger 
permissibility differences than others (see Table 3.)  
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Table 1.3. Rated permissibility between scenarios sets that vary along perceived 
likelihood of the one dying despite the death being stipulated when not asked probability 
questions (Study 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
***p<.001 
 
Discussion 
 The data support the notion that participants use their perceived likelihoods in 
forming their moral judgments, even when attention is not explicitly called to those 
likelihoods.  It is possible that questions about likelihood may still have somewhat 
increased participants’ attention to their perceived likelihoods in the previous studies, but 
this study suggests that perceived likelihoods can influence moral judgment even in the 
absence of such attentional focusing.    
In the first four studies, we focused on the perceived likelihood of the 
protagonist’s action being fatal to the one individual in each scenario.  As we indicated 
earlier, in the moral dilemmas used, we also stipulated that the action causing the death of 
the one individual would save a larger group of five people.  This raises the question of 
whether participants see the protagonist’s action as 100% likely to save the five, for a 
divergence in the perceived likelihood of this outcome could have implications for 
participants’ moral judgments as well.  In the next study, we explored whether 
Scenario Set Study 1a Set  Study 1b Sets 
Version 
Less 
likely 
(divert 
trolley) 
More 
likely 
(push 
man) 
sig 
diff. 
Less 
likely 
(e.g. 
sever 
foot) 
More 
likely 
(e.g. 
sever 
neck) 
sig 
diff. 
Permissibility 4.29 2.96 *** 4.21 4.01 *** 
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participants substitute another perceived likelihood for a stipulated outcome that is 
generally present in trolley problems—the five being saved. 
 
Study 3 
Procedure 
 One hundred and twenty-one participants located within the United States, 
recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, completed the study (mean age = 33.1, SD = 
9.59; 60.3% female).  Three pairs of scenarios were created to vary along the perceived 
likelihood that the five would be saved despite explicit stipulation that the five would 
indeed be saved. In Set 1, a protagonist could drop either a bicycle or a granite block onto 
a track to stop a trolley from running over five; in Set 2, a protagonist could use either 
fishing line or climbing rope to rescue a group of five climbers; and in Set 3, a 
protagonist intent on keeping a bear from mauling five climbers could scare it off by 
either throwing pebbles at it or shooting it with a tranquilizer dart. (See Supplementary 
Materials for scenarios.)  In both cases, it was explicitly stated that, should the 
protagonist decide to act, the action would save the five climbers and kill one individual.  
Study 3 used the same procedure as Study 1b, asking about the likelihood of the one 
dying as a result of the protagonist’s actions, the likelihood of the five being saved, and 
the permissibility of the action for each scenario.  
Results 
We explored whether varying the perceived likelihood of the five being saved by 
an action would result in permissibility differences between the scenarios.  A repeated 
measures  anova found that varying the perceived likelihood of the five being saved by an 
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action resulted in permissibility differences within scenario pairs, F(1, 120) =  30.8, p < 
.001, partial η2 = .20, (mean low = 3.75, SD = 1.97; mean high = 4.20, SD = 1.92).  There 
was also a main effect of set, such that scenario pairs varied in permissibility from one 
another, F(2, 240) = 10.7, p < .001, partial η2 = .08, (mean set 1 = 3.22, SD = 1.86; mean 
set 2 = 3.86, SD = 1.90; mean set 3 = 3.85, SD = 1.95).  A significant interaction between 
scenario set and condition, F(2,240) = 4.67, p = .010, partial η2 = .04 (mean set 1 low = 
4.06, SD = 1.95, mean set 1 high = 4.38, SD = 1.76; mean set 2 low = 3.69, SD = 1.89; 
mean set 2 high = 4.02, SD = 1.90; mean set 3 low = 3.51, SD = 2.05, mean set 3 high = 
4.19, SD = 1.80), suggested that the permissibility difference was much more pronounced 
in set 3 than in sets 1 or 2. 
We next verified that the scenarios had indeed varied the perceived likelihood of 
the five being saved by the action. Our manipulation did influence the perceived 
likelihood that the five would be saved, F(1, 120) = 24.8, p < .001, partial η2 = .17, (mean 
low = 70.7, SD = 30.8; mean high = 79.7, SD = 24.2).  There was a main effect of 
perceived likelihood of the five being  saved between sets of scenarios, F(2, 240) = 19.1, 
p  < .001, partial η2 = .14 (mean set 1 = 80.8, SD = 25.8; mean set 2  = 73.7, SD = 27.4; 
mean set 3 = 71.1, SD = 29.9) and again there was an interaction between set and 
condition, F(2, 240) = 7.73, p = .001, partial η2 = .06 (mean set 1 low = 78.6, SD = 27.7, 
mean set 1 high = 82.9, SD = 23.8; mean set 2 low = 70.3, SD = 29.9; mean set 2 high = 
77.2, SD = 24.3; mean set 3 low = 63.2, SD = 32.8, mean set 3 high = 79.1, SD = 24.2).  
As with the permissibility ratings, the largest effect was observed for the third set. 
Next we examined whether perceived likelihoods of the one dying varied within 
each scenario pair.  The repeated measures anova revealed that they did not, F(1, 120) = 
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.88,  p = .35, partial η2 =  .007 (mean low = 89.0, SD = 16.6; mean high = 89.5, SD = 
16.5).  The perceived likelihood of the one dying as a result of the action did, however, 
vary between scenario sets, F(2, 240)  = 3.86, p =.023, partial η2 =  .03, (mean set 1 = 
91.0, SD = 14.9; mean set 2 = 89.1, SD = 16.0; mean set 3 = 87.6, SD = 18.4).  There was 
no interaction between scenario set and perceived likelihood of the one dying, F(2, 240) 
= 1.19, p = .31, partial η2 = .010.  
Next, a bootstrap mediation analysis with 10,000 resamples revealed that 
differences in the perceived likelihood of the five dying partially mediated the 
permissibility differences between pairs of scenarios, (mediated effect ab = .21, p < .001, 
95% CI [.12, .36]; direct effect c’ = .24, p < .001, 95% CI [.14, .28]; 47% mediated).  
These mediation models specified random intercepts and slopes for subjects. 
Because we had observed an interaction, each pair of scenarios was analyzed for 
differences in the two perceived likelihoods and permissibility with paired-samples t-
tests.  In Set 1, participants did not report dropping the granite block as more likely to 
save the five (M = 82.9%, SD = 23.8) than dropping the bicycle (M = 78.6%, SD = 27.7), 
t(120) = 1.77, p = .080, d = .17, though there was an observed permissibility difference: 
Action in the scenario written to be intuitively more likely to save the five was seen as 
more permissible, t(120) = 2.89, p = .005 d = .17, (mean block = 4.38, SD = 1.76; mean 
bicycle = 4.06, SD = 1.95).  The perceived likelihood of the one dying marginally 
differed between the two scenarios, t(120) = 1.79, p = .075 d = .12,  (mean block = 
90.1%, SD = 15.2; mean bicycle = 91.9%, SD = 14.7).  In both scenarios, participants did 
not take the death of the one to be 100% likely to occur, nor did they assign a likelihood 
of 100% to the five being saved. 
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In Set 2, participants reported that securing the five climbers with climbing rope 
was significantly more likely to save them (M = 77.2%, SD = 24.3) than securing them 
with fishing line (M = 70.3%, SD = 29.9), t(120) = 2.94, p = .004 d = .25.  A difference in 
permissibility paralleled the difference in the perceived likelihood of the five being 
saved: action in the scenario perceived as more likely to save the five was seen as more 
permissible, t(120) = 3.12, p = .002 d = .17 (mean climbing rope = 4.02, SD = 1.90; mean 
fishing line = 3.69, SD = 1.89).  The perceived likelihood of the one dying did not differ 
between the two scenarios, t(120) = .175, p = .86, d = .05,  (mean climbing rope = 89.0%, 
SD = 15.5; mean fishing line = 89.2%, SD = 16.6).  Neither scenario produced a 
judgment of 100% likelihood of the one dying or a judgment of 100% likelihood of the 
five being saved. 
In Set 3, participants reported that shooting the bear with a tranquilizer gun was 
significantly more likely to save the five climbers (M = 79.1%, SD = 24.2) than throwing 
pebbles at it (M = 63.2%, SD = 32.8), t(120) = 5.70, p < .001, d = .55.  A difference in 
permissibility paralleled the difference in the perceived likelihood of the five being 
saved: action in the scenario perceived as more likely to save the five was seen as more 
permissible, t(120) = 6.08, p < .001, d = .35,  (mean tranquilizer = 4.19, SD = 1.80; mean 
pebbles = 3.51, SD = 2.05).  The perceived likelihood of the one dying did not differ 
between the two scenarios (mean tranquilizer = 87.7%, SD = 18.8; mean pebbles = 
87.6%, SD = 18.1), t(120) = .190, p = .850, d = .01.  Participants did not take the 
stipulated outcome of the one dying to be 100% likely, nor did they assign a 100% 
chance to the stipulated outcome that the five would be saved.  
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Discussion 
 Across the three sets of scenarios, despite the saving of the five being explicitly 
stipulated, participants reported not only that the likelihood of the outcome was well 
below 100%, but also that there was a difference in likelihood between pairs of scenarios.  
Furthermore, an increased perceived likelihood of the five being saved corresponded to 
an increased degree of permissibility of the action (just as an increased perceived 
likelihood of the one dying corresponded to a decreased degree of permissibility in Study 
1b).   
The next study examined whether, as with the pair of studies exploring the 
perceived likelihood of the one individual’s death, the differences in permissibility would 
persist without focus being directed to the likelihoods.  That is, in the absence of 
questions regarding likelihoods, would participants nevertheless find action in the 
scenario versions previously found to be more likely to result in the deaths of the five to 
be less permissible?  Because Set 1 was not rated as having a significant difference in 
perceived likelihood of the five being saved, and Set 2 had modest effect size, relative to 
both Set 3 and the scenarios sets in Study 1b, Set 3 may be the most informative test case 
going forward. 
 
Study 4  
Procedure 
One hundred and nineteen participants located in the United States were recruited 
via Mechanical Turk (mean age = 31.4, SD = 8.59; 55.4% female).  Study 4 repeated the 
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procedure from Study 3, although with questions relating to likelihood removed, leaving 
just the single permissibility question for each scenario. 
Results 
 Permissibility differences between scenario sets that vary in perceived likelihood, 
but do not probe likelihood, were analyzed using a repeated measures anova.  The pairs 
of scenarios, written to vary in perceived likelihood of the five being saved only, did not 
show an overall difference when not probing for likelihood, F(1, 118) = .74, p = .39, 
partial η2 = .006, (mean low = 3.64, SD = 1.75; mean high = 3.67, SD = 1.77).  The main 
effect of scenario set was significant F(2, 236) = 5.60, p =.005, partial η2 = .045, (mean 
set 1 = 3.80, SD = 1.79; mean Set 2 = 3.60, SD = 1.75; mean set 3 = 3.57, SD = 1.74), and 
there was a significant interaction of scenario set and condition F(2, 236) = 3.01, p = .05, 
partial η2 =  .025.  This suggested that some scenarios were rated as having bigger 
permissibility differences than others. 
Because we again found an interaction, we examined the sets individually.  
Permissibility differences were observed in one of three scenario sets.  In Set 3, where the 
protagonist could save climbers from a bear by using either a tranquilizer gun or pebbles, 
the difference in permissibility remained significant, t(118) = 2.36, p = .02, d = .10, 
(mean tranquilizer = 3.66, SD = 1.72; mean pebbles = 3.48, SD = 1.76).  Permissibility 
did not, however, differ in Set 1, where either a bicycle (M = 3.83, SD = 1.79) or granite 
block (M = 3.76, SD = 1.80) would be dropped, t(118) = .97, p = .33, d = .04, or in Set 2, 
where climbers would either be secured using climbing rope (M = 3.59, SD = 1.78) or 
fishing line (M = 3.61, SD = 1.72), t(118) = .35, p = .72, d = .01. 
 
		 37 
Discussion 
 The findings show that, even when participants were not explicitly asked about 
likelihood, the perceived likelihood of an action’s saving five can override stipulated 
outcomes and influence moral judgments.  These results suggest that having participants 
think specifically about the likelihood of the stipulated outcome of action did sensitize 
them to those differences, and likely enhanced the rated permissibility differences in the 
prior study.  Nonetheless, a difference can emerge even without attention being explicitly 
directed to the likelihoods. 
 What explains the fact that we found significant differences with respect to moral 
permissibility judgments in Set 3, but not Set 1 and Set 2?  It is notable that when 
participants were presented with Set 1 in Study 3, we found an insignificant difference in 
participants’ perceived likelihoods of outcomes.  Perhaps surprisingly, participants there 
rated the likelihood of the five being saved to be very similar whether a bicycle or a 100-
ton granite block was released onto the track.  Participants did offer significantly different 
likelihood judgments in Set 2, but notably, these differences were not as great as those in 
Set 3.  It is possible that in cases like Set 1, where participants are not inclined to offer 
very different likelihood judgments even when asked about likelihood of outcomes, 
simply being asked can enhance the salience of even minimal perceived likelihood 
differences in answering questions about moral permissibility.  It is also possible that 
when asked about the likelihood of saving the five, other perceived likelihoods are 
brought to salience.  (We explore the possibility in Study 6 that participants are 
responding to a number of different perceived probabilities related to each scenario.)  In 
any case, it is perhaps not surprising that the set which revealed the greatest difference in 
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perceived likelihoods in Study 3, namely Set 3, generated the greatest difference in moral 
judgments when participants were not asked about likelihood at all.  
Until now, we have used continuous ratings of permissibility.  Participants use 
such a scale without complaint, and the responses do appear to covary with their 
perception of various morally relevant likelihoods.  However, the meaning of such a 
continuum is not entirely clear.  What, for example, does it mean for an action to be rated 
halfway between permissible and impermissible?  In many contexts, people treat the 
words “permissible” and “impermissible” in a way parallel to the words “legal” and 
“illegal,” and yet it is not at all clear what it would mean to be halfway between “legal” 
and “illegal.”  Moreover, most conceptual analyses of permissibility and impermissibility 
treat these concepts as binary.  For example, “impermissible” is most often treated as 
synonymous with “forbidden” or “something one ought not to do”, which express non-
scalar notions.  And the very few defenses of scalar conceptions of rightness or 
permissibility, such as Lockhart (2000) and Peterson (2013), recognize that the scalar 
view is non-standard.  Thus, there is at least an important concept of (im)permissibility 
that is non-scalar. 
Now it does not follow from the fact that there is a non-scalar concept of 
(im)permissibility that people are unable to use the words “permissible” and 
“impermissible” to express scalar notions.  We believe that this is what is going on when 
participants are presented with Likert permissibility scales.  For example, they may mean 
by “less permissible” something like “involving a more serious moral infraction” or “its 
being worse (or causing more harm, or infringing a more stringent right) to do one thing 
rather than another” (such as to kill rather than steal a piece of gum).  At the same time, 
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the standard conception of moral permissibility in moral theory corresponds to the 
standard (and, so far as we are aware, the only) treatment of legality in legal theory.  All 
felonies are illegal, and none is more (or less) illegal than any other.  But clearly some 
felonies are worse than others, cause more harm than others, or infringe more stringent 
rights than others. 
If there is an important concept captured by “permissible” that is binary, and 
judgments of permissibility are affected by participants’ substituted perceived likelihoods 
of outcomes, then we should expect to see this reflected when using a binary measure of 
permissibility.  For the next study we adopted a binary (yes/no) permissibility evaluation 
and explored whether differences in the perceived likelihoods in scenarios can influence 
binary permissibility judgments.  For this study, we also tested whether the permissibility 
judgment differences would be apparent when each participant rated only one of the pair 
of scenarios, preventing their making any comparative likelihood or permissibility rating 
based on the small alterations within each pair.  We also did not ask for explicit 
likelihood judgments, to avoid the possibility of priming driving any difference in 
permissibility judgments. 
 
Study 5  
Procedure 
One hundred and twenty-two participants located in the United States were 
recruited via Mechanical Turk (mean age = 35.5, SD = 11.7; 63.9% female).  Study 5 
used Set 3 from Studies 3/4 to investigate binary permissibility judgments.  Each 
participant saw only one member of the pair of scenarios.  Rather than respond on a 7-
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point scale, participants made a binary yes/no judgment regarding the permissibility of 
the protagonist’s action. 
Results 
Of the 61 participants who saw the version of the scenario in which the 
protagonist can save the five climbers from the bear by shooting it with a tranquilizer 
gun, 32 (52.5%) thought it would be permissible to perform the action.  Of the 61 
participants who saw the version in which the protagonist can save the five climbers from 
the bear by throwing pebbles at it, only 21 (34.4%) thought it would be permissible to 
act.  The difference in the distributions of judgments was significant, χ2(N = 122) = 4.06, 
p = .044, OR = 2.10, 95% CI [1.01, 4.36], suggesting that participants were more likely 
to think it permissible to kill the one to save the five when the bear would be shot with 
the tranquilizer gun than when pebbles would be thrown at the bear, despite both versions 
explicitly stating that the action would save the five climbers. 
Discussion 
 In this study, perceived likelihoods were found to override explicitly stated 
outcomes and to affect binary permissibility judgments, just as in previous studies they 
had affected scalar permissibility judgments.  It was also apparent that the effect emerges 
in a between-subjects design just as it had in within-subjects designs.  And, as before, the 
effect emerges even when there is no explicit question about the likelihood of outcomes. 
 
Study 6  
 So far we have examined the way that people bring their own perceived 
likelihoods to bear on moral decisions with respect to pairs of written scenarios where the 
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chances of the protagonist’s action leading to the death of one individual, or to the saving 
of five individuals, are plausibly different.  However, this does not exhaust (potentially 
morally relevant) likelihoods.  In particular, one can distinguish between the likelihoods 
of outcomes consequent upon inaction as well as upon action.  The likelihoods in the 
previous studies reflect the likelihood of certain events occurring should a particular 
action be performed.  What if one varied the likelihood of events occurring should the 
action not be performed?   Would participants judge it to be less permissible to kill one to 
save five if the five had some chance of surviving anyway?  Or would they judge it to be 
more permissible to act if the single person was already at some risk of death?  This study 
explores these questions. 
Procedure 
One hundred and twenty-seven participants located within the United States were 
recruited via Mechanical Turk (mean age = 35.0, SD = 10.4; 63.0% female).  One set 
from Studies 1/2 was used, where our intent was to manipulate perceived likelihoods of 
the one dying, as was one set from Studies 3/4, where the intent was to manipulate 
perceived likelihoods of the five being saved.  Two new scenario pairs were created to 
vary along perceived likelihoods relating to inaction.  The first set stipulated that the one 
would survive if the action was not taken, but varied along the perceived likelihood that 
this would occur.  The second was intended to let intuitions vary about the likelihood that 
the five would die if the action was not taken.  Thus, in this study, we inquired about the 
perceived likelihoods of all four of these outcomes: (a) how likely the one was to live if 
the protagonist did not act, (b) how likely the one was to die if the protagonist acted, (c) 
how likely the five were to die if the protagonist did not act, and (d) how likely the five 
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were to live if the protagonist acted.  We also asked about permissibility.  This allowed us 
to explore whether all of these perceived likelihoods have ramifications for moral 
judgments, as well as the extent to which they can be altered independently, even in 
scenarios where the outcomes are stipulated. 
 We used Set 1 from Studies 1b and 2, in which the action would either kill the one 
by severing his neck or his foot, which varied the perceived likelihood that the one would 
die as a result of the action.  The next set varied the perceived likelihood that the one 
would die if the action were not taken.  In one version an individual miner has his foot 
stuck in the rubble, and in the other he is trapped and severely injured.  Although we 
asserted that the one would live in both cases, it seems intuitively that the one whose foot 
is stuck is more likely to do so.  As a result, it might seem that blasting the hole in the 
rubble he is trapped in to rescue five other miners is more permissible in the latter case.   
 We used Set 3 from Studies 3 and 4, in which the five could be saved from a bear 
by throwing pebbles at the bear or shooting it with a tranquilizer dart, thus varying the 
perceived likelihood that the five would be saved with action.  The final set varied the 
perceived likelihood that the five would survive despite inaction: Although in both 
members of the pair the death of the climbers is stipulated, it might be thought less likely 
that the climbers will die when they fall 10 feet onto a flat rock surface, compared to 
when they plummet 1,000 feet onto jagged rocks.  This may make killing one person to 
save five seem less permissible. 
Participants saw each version of each scenario, randomly ordered.  After reading 
each scenario, they answered four questions regarding likelihood and one regarding 
permissibility.  Two of the likelihood questions concerned the likelihood of the one dying 
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and the five being saved if the protagonist decides to act—these were the same questions 
we asked in Studies 1 and 3.  Two more likelihood questions, relating to inaction, were 
also asked: one about the likelihood of death of the one individual if the protagonist 
decides not to act (e.g., If Jason decides not to rapidly traverse the narrow ledge, how 
likely is it that the man on the ledge will die? 0-100%), the other about the likelihood of 
the five surviving if the protagonist decides not to act (e.g., If Jason decides not to 
rapidly traverse the narrow ledge, how likely is it that five will survive? 0-100%).  
Results 
 Set 1. This set was intended to vary the perceived likelihood of the one dying if 
the protagonist acts.  Indeed, replicating the finding from Study 1b, severing the neck was 
rated more likely to lead to death (M = 92.5%, SD = 19.4) than severing the foot (M = 
77.8%, SD = 27.3), t(126) = 5.61, p < .001, d = .62 (see Table 4).  Fifty out of the 127 
participants thought severing the foot had a greater than 95% chance of actually killing 
the one, whereas 99 out of the 127 thought severing the head did. A difference in 
permissibility paralleled this difference in perceived likelihood: Action in the version of 
the scenario rated more likely to lead to the one individual’s death was rated less 
permissible (mean neck = 4.63, SD = 2.02; mean foot = 4.94, SD = 1.91), t(126) = 2.61, p 
= .010, d = .16.  
Other perceived likelihoods did not differ between the two scenarios of Set 1.  As 
in Study 1b, the perceived likelihood of the five being saved if action was taken did not 
differ, t(126) = 1.28, p = .20, d = .11(mean neck = 89.9%, SD = 21.2; mean foot = 92.0%, 
SD = 17.1).  The perceived likelihood of the one dying if action was not taken also did 
not differ, t(126) = .872, p = .39, d = .08 (mean neck = 19.3%, SD = 30.1; mean foot = 
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17.0%, SD = 27.4).  The perceived likelihood of the five surviving if action was not taken 
did not differ either, t(126) = 1.24, p = .22, d = .11 (mean neck = 21.1%, SD = 30.9, mean 
foot = 17.9%, SD = 27.3).  Outcomes that were stipulated to occur were assessed as less 
than 100% likely, and outcomes that the scenario suggested would not occur (e.g., the 
single person dying on the tracks even if no action is taken) were rated as having some 
non-zero chance of occurring. 
Set 2. This set was intended to vary the perceived likelihood of the five being 
saved if the protagonist acts.  As in Study 4, shooting the bear with a tranquilizer gun was 
again thought to be more likely to save the five (M = 83.2%, SD = 21.0) than throwing 
pebbles at it (M = 72.1%, SD = 28.6), t(126) = 5.14, p < .001, d = .44.  Fourty-one 
participants thought it more than 95% likely that throwing pebbles at the bear would 
prevent it from attacking, while 49 participants thought the same about shooting the bear 
with the tranquilizer gun.  A difference in permissibility paralleled this difference in 
perceived likelihood: The action judged more likely to save the five was deemed more 
permissible, t(126) = 2.36, p = .020, d = .12 (mean tranquilizer = 4.06, SD = 1.97; mean 
pebbles = 3.83, SD = 1.94).   
Other perceived likelihoods did not differ between the scenarios of Set 2.  Again, 
the perceived likelihood of the one dying if action was taken did not differ, t(126) = .661, 
p = .51, d = .04 (mean tranquilizer = 89.3%, SD = 18.6; mean pebbles =  88.5%, SD = 
20.8).  The perceived likelihood of the one dying if action was not taken did not differ 
either, t(126) = .350, p = .73, d = .02 (mean tranquilizer = 11.8%, SD = 21.3; mean 
pebbles =  12.3%, SD = 22.6), nor did the perceived likelihood of the five surviving if 
action was not taken, t(126) = .718, p = .47, d = .07 (mean tranquilizer = 28.1%, SD = 
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29.2; mean pebbles =  26.1%, SD = 28.0).  Outcomes that were stipulated to occur were 
assessed as less than 100% likely, and outcomes that were stipulated as not occurring 
were assessed as more than 0% likely. 
Set 3. This set was intended to vary the perceived likelihood of the death of the 
one, if the protagonist does not act to save the five.  In the mining scenario participants 
thought the one was more likely to die when trapped and severely injured (M = 39.6%, 
SD = 30.4) than when only his foot is stuck (M = 29.1%, SD = 33.9), t(126) = 3.40, p < 
.001, d = .33.  A difference in permissibility paralleled this difference in perceived 
likelihood: Action leading to the one’s death in the scenario in which the one was 
perceived as less likely to survive in the absence of action was judged more permissible, 
t(126) = 4.36, p < .001, d = .24 (mean severe = 4.89, SD = 1.91, mean foot = 4.42, SD = 
1.97).   
Other perceived likelihoods did not differ between the pairs of Set 3.  The 
perceived likelihood of the one dying if action was taken did not differ, t(126) = .587, p = 
.56, d = .07 (mean severe = 90.3%, SD = 20.1; mean foot = 88.9%, SD = 22.6).  The 
perceived likelihood of the five being saved if action was taken did not differ, t(126) = 
.873, p = .38, d = .08 (mean severe = 82.9%, SD = 23.5; mean foot = 84.6%, SD = 20.8), 
nor did the perceived likelihood of the five surviving if action was not taken, t(126) = 
.280, p = .78, d = .02 (mean severe = 20.1%, SD = 26.3; mean foot = 20.7%, SD = 27.7).  
Stipulated outcomes were not judged as either definitely occurring or definitely not 
occurring. 
 Set 4. The final set was intended to vary the perceived likelihood of the five 
surviving without the protagonist acting to secure their bridge.  Despite the stipulation 
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that falling would lead to the climbers’ deaths in either scenario, participants reported 
thinking that if the climbers fell 10 feet onto a flat rock surface they were more likely to 
survive (M = 37.8%, SD = 36.2), compared to the scenario where they would plummet 
1,000 feet onto jagged rocks (M = 19.4%, SD = 27.6), t(126) = 5.16, p < .001, d = .57.  
Judgments of permissibility significantly differed, inversely to the difference in perceived 
likelihood of the five surviving, t(126) = 5.20, p < .001, d = .34 (mean short fall = 3.64, 
SD = 2.01; mean long fall = 4.31, SD = 1.93).   
Perceived likelihoods other than the likelihood of the five surviving even without 
action did not differ between scenarios.  Participants did not think that the pair of 
scenarios varied along likelihood of the one dying if action was taken, t(126) = .594, p = 
.55, d = .05 (mean short fall = 90.1%, SD = 16.2; mean long fall = 89.3%, SD = 17.7).  
Nor did they take the scenarios to differ in likelihood of the one dying if action was not 
taken, t(126) = .395, p = .69, d = .04 (mean short fall = 13.8%, SD = 25.3; mean long fall 
= 14.7%, SD = 25.1).  However, there was a marginal difference in the perceived 
likelihood of the five being saved, t(126) = 1.90, p = .060, d = .16 (mean short fall = 
84.1%, SD = 19.9; mean long fall = 80.6%, SD = 23.7), suggesting that the perceived 
likelihood of the five surviving due to inaction contributed to the perceived likelihood of 
the five being saved.  Outcomes that were stipulated to occur were assessed as less than 
100% likely, and those that participants might be expected to understand as not occurring 
were judged as more than 0% likely. 
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Table 1.4. Rated likelihoods and permissibility between scenario sets that vary along four 
intuitive probabilities, despite the outcome being stipulated for each (Study 7). 
 Scenario	Set	 Set	1	 Set	2	 Set	3	 Set	4	
Version	 Less	likely	(sever	foot)	
More	likely	(sever	neck)	
sig	diff.	
Less	likely	(pebbles)	
More	likely	(tranquilizer	gun)	
sig	diff.	
Less	likely	(foot	trapped)	
	More	Likely(body	trapped)	
sig.	diff.	
Less	likely	(fall	10	feet)	
More	likely(fall	1000	feet)	
sig	diff.	
Rated	likelihood	of	the	one	dying	if	action	taken(%)	 77.8	 92.5	 ***	 88.5	 89.3	 ***	 88.9	 90.3	 ns	 80.1	 89.3	 ns	Rated	likelihood	of	the	five	being	saved	if	action	taken	(%)	 92.0	 89.9	 ns	 72.1	 83.2	 ***	 84.6	 82.9	 ns	 84.1	 80.6	 †	Rated	likelihood	of	the	one	dying	w/	out	action	(%)	 17.0	 19.3	 ns	 12.3	 11.8	 ns	 29.1	 39.6	 ***	 13.8	 14.7	 ns	Rated	likelihood	of	the	five	surviving	w/out	action	(%)	 17.9	 21.1	 ns	 26.1	 28.1	 ns	 20.7	 20.1	 ns	 37.8	 19.4	 ***	
Permissibility	 4.94	 4.63	 *	 3.83	 4.06	 *	 4.42	 4.89	 ***	 3.64	 4.31	 ***	
 
Bolded likelihoods reflect the probability intended to intuitively vary in each scenario  
†p < .1     * p < .05     **p < .01     ***p < .001 
 
In this study, where we find differences in the perceived likelihoods of the one 
dying and the five surviving without action, and the one surviving and the five dying with 
action, and associated differences in the permissibility of action, we can explore the 
relationship between perceived likelihoods and permissibility.  That is, we can test 
whether the alterations in perceived likelihood are mediating the differences in 
permissibility.  Bootstrap mediational analysis (Tingley et al., 2014) was used to 
investigate this for each of the four sets, with random intercepts entered for each subject.   
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There was a significant indirect effect of Set 1 (which was designed to manipulate 
perceived likelihood of the action actually killing the single person) on permissibility 
through probability, ab = .15, p < .001, 95% CI [.04, .28] (10,000 resamples).  The direct 
effect was no longer significant, c’ = .16, p = .21, 95% CI [-.09, .40], suggesting that the 
difference in perceived likelihood of the one actually dying fully mediated permissibility 
differences.  While the effect sizes reported throughout these studies are small, their 
magnitude may be misleading due to the large variance in perceived likelihoods—despite 
change in perceived likelihoods being small relative to this range, their movement 
entirely mediates the permissibility difference observed here. 
For Set 2 (which manipulated perceived likelihood that the action would indeed 
save the five), there was a significant indirect effect on permissibility through probability, 
ab = .21, p < .001, 95% CI [.12, .33] (10,000 resamples).  The direct effect was no longer 
significant, c’ = .01, p = .89, 95% CI [-.18, .20], suggesting that the difference in 
perceived likelihood of the five actually being saved by the action fully mediated 
permissibility differences between the two scenarios. 
There was a significant indirect effect of Set 3 (which manipulated the perceived 
likelihood that the single person might die even without action) on permissibility through 
probability, ab = .12, p < .001, 95% CI [.04, .22] (10,000 resamples).  The direct effect 
remained significant, c’ = .35, p < .001, 95% CI [.14, .56], suggesting that the difference 
in perceived likelihood of the one dying regardless of whether action was taken partially 
mediated permissibility differences.  This may suggest that some counterfactual 
probabilities are hard to explicitly convey, despite their effect on permissibility. 
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Finally, there was a significant indirect effect of Set 4 (which manipulated the 
perceived likelihood of the five surviving even without action) on permissibility through 
probability, ab = .29, p < .001, 95% CI [.16, .45] (10,000 resamples).  The direct effect 
remained significant, c’ = .39, p < .001, 95% CI [.14, .63], suggesting that the difference 
in perceived likelihood of the five surviving regardless of whether action was taken 
partially mediated permissibility differences.  This provides further evidence that the 
rated likelihood may not necessarily perfectly capture the intuitive likelihood’s impact on 
permissibility judgments. 
Discussion 
 Study 6 found that each scenario we had written to specifically vary one of four 
perceived likelihoods was associated with corresponding differences in participants’ 
judgments about likelihood as well as permissibility.  This result supports the hypothesis 
that intuitions regarding a variety of kinds of likelihoods can be substituted for scenario 
stipulations.  Stipulated outcomes were never taken to have a 100% probability of 
occurring.  The action that was described as saving five people was not seen as perfectly 
likely to have that effect, nor was the action described as omitting to save them seen as 
leaving them to their certain death.   Similarly, the action that was described as resulting 
in the death of the single individual was not seen as 100% likely to have that effect, nor 
was the corresponding omission seen as any kind of guarantee that the individual would 
survive.  Moreover, the fact that differences in each type of perceived likelihood were 
associated with differences in permissibility judgments supports the hypothesis that 
intuitions about each type of likelihood can have an effect on moral judgment.  In all 
cases, we found that the perceived likelihoods did mediate, either partially or fully, the 
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impact on permissibility.  This reinforces the notion that intuitions about actual 
likelihoods, even when the relevant outcomes are stipulated to occur, can alter moral 
judgments. 
 Our studies so far suggest that perceived likelihoods are at least partial drivers of 
permissibility judgments.  We can now revisit the hypothesis we entertained in our 
discussion of Study 1a, viz. that perceived intention may influence probability judgments.  
Our final study explored whether such probability differences are relevant not only in 
consideration of the details of scenarios, but even occur as a result of the underlying 
moral principles the scenarios are thought to convey.  The question is whether, regardless 
of the details, describing a harm as intended can make it seem more likely to occur than 
describing it as merely foreseen. 
 
Study 7 
Procedure 
One hundred and seventeen adults located in the United States were recruited via 
Mechanical Turk (mean age = 36.7, SD = 12.0; 60.7% female).  Study 7 presented 
participants with two scenarios, written to differ along the foreseen/intended distinction 
abstractly, to avoid any potential effect of differing details on perceived likelihoods. 
Participants read both scenarios, and then two questions. 
Foreseen:  
Plan X 
Imagine you are told that Jason has a plan to save a group of children from a terrorist 
attack, and that a foreseen, but not intended, consequence of Jason carrying his plan out 
is that Thomas, a bystander, is killed. 
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Intended:  
Plan Y 
Imagine you are told that Harry has a plan to save a group of children from a terrorist 
attack, and that Harry intends to kill a bystander, Robert, because for Harry's plan to 
work it is necessary that Robert is killed. 
 
Participants responded to “Which plan is more likely to result in the death of the 
bystander?; -7 = Plan X is more likely than Plan Y to result in the bystander’s death to 7 
= Plan Y is more likely than Plan X to result in the bystander’s death” and “Which of the 
two plans is morally worse?; -7 = Plan X is much worse than Plan Y to 7 = Plan Y is 
much worse than Plan X”. 
Results 
Responses to the scenario set were analyzed for differences in relative perceived 
likelihoods and relative moral acceptability with one sample t tests comparing responses 
to 0 (equal).  Participants reported thinking that the bystander was significantly more 
likely to die in the intended plan than in the foreseen plan scenario t(116) = 6.54, p < 
.001, d = .60 (M = 1.93; SD = 3.20).  A difference in relative moral acceptability 
paralleled this difference in perceived likelihood: the plan describing the intended death 
of a bystander was judged to be significantly less morally acceptable than the plan 
describing a foreseen death, where the bystander’s death had been perceived to be less 
likely, t(116) = 8.92, p < .001, d = .82 (M = 2.99; SD = 3.63).  Relative perceived 
likelihood ratings correlated with relative moral acceptability ratings, F(1, 115) = 23.4, p 
< .001, r = .41. 
Discussion 
We began our investigation in Study 1a with a scenario pair modeled on the 
classic trolley dilemma.  Responses to this dilemma and others like it are sometimes 
		 52 
taken to support the claim that something like the Doctrine of Double Effect is tacitly 
operative in moral judgment.  Our final study shows that the foreseen/intended 
distinction, presented in the abstract and stripped of additional likelihood-relevant details, 
still conveys likelihood-relevant information that appears to contribute to differences in 
moral judgments.  This is an important result.  Together with the results from Studies 1-6, 
it suggests that judgment patterns consistent with the Doctrine of Double Effect cannot be 
readily interpreted as showing that something like the DDE is tacitly operative in moral 
thought, since in many cases such a principle is confounded with differences in perceived 
likelihoods.  Since the details of the scenarios—both those related to and those unrelated 
to intention—convey differential likelihood information relevant to and potentially 
impacting moral judgment, moral dilemma tasks designed to test for the DDE face the 
serious challenge of isolating a pure comparison on the dimension of foreseeability and 
intention, and not implicitly conveying differential likelihoods of outcomes.  This is not 
to say that the challenge cannot be met, or that something like the DDE is in fact tacitly 
operative.   But more work needs to be done to demonstrate a clear test of the operation 
of the DDE.   
 
Meta-Analytic Results 
A meta-analytic approach was taken to combine results across the studies that 
were designed to differ only in perceived likelihoods, not in morally relevant factors 
(namely, Studies 1b and 2-6).  We calculated average effect sizes for permissibility 
differences between pairs of scenarios across studies when participants had been asked to 
rate likelihoods of the outcomes, and also when they had not been so asked, controlling 
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for the sample size of each study.  Studies that asked about likelihoods alongside 
permissibility had a standardized effect size of .24, p = .001, when averaging the overall 
effect sizes of Study 1b, Study 3, and Study 6, taking into account the number of 
participants in each study.  A parallel examination of studies that did not ask about 
likelihood showed a standardized effect size of .17, p = .022 across Study 2, Study 4, and 
Study 5.  The last study required using Chinn’s (2000) approach to converting the odds 
ratio to an effect size. 
General Discussion 
In seven studies, we explored the extent to which people accept stipulated 
outcomes in hypothetical moral scenarios, how this can differ between scenarios, and 
how such differences in intuitive likelihoods can result in different judgments of 
permissibility.  Study 1a found that a scenario set representative of those used to study 
the Doctrine of Double Effect differed not only in terms of whether the harm was 
intended or foreseen, but also in the intuitive likelihood of death of the one individual, as 
well as in the intuitive likelihood of the five being saved, despite both of these outcomes 
being stipulated.  Study 1b sought to test whether scenario pairs which held everything 
else constant and differed only with respect to the intuitive probability that the individual 
would die if the protagonist acted would produce differences in probability and 
permissibility ratings, and found, across multiple scenarios, that they do.   Studies 1c and 
1d supported the idea that participants reporting less-than-certain likelihoods was not an 
artifact of our experimental method. 
Study 2 verified that differences in permissibility ratings could arise in the 
absence of questions regarding the intuitive likelihood of the death of the one individual, 
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though these questions may have sensitized participants to intuitive differences in 
likelihood.  Study 3 examined scenarios written to isolate the difference in intuitive 
likelihood of the five being saved, rather than of the one dying, and showed that this 
difference alone could also result in a difference in permissibility ratings between 
scenarios.  Study 4 demonstrated that even in the absence of questions regarding the 
intuitive likelihood of the five being saved, differences along this dimension could result 
in divergent permissibility ratings. Study 5 replicated this result while presenting each 
participant with only one member of a pair of scenarios and with a binary yes/no 
permissibility judgment, suggesting that our findings hold even when participants are not 
exposed to both versions of a scenario, without any sensitization due to asking about 
intuitive likelihoods, and with a response measure that better reflects most philosophers’ 
view of the non-scalarity of permissibility.  Study 6 explored how two other probabilities 
present in many moral dilemmas—the likelihood of the one dying and of the five 
surviving without the protagonist’s intervention—could likewise affect permissibility 
ratings.  Study 7 extended our findings about the connection between intuitive likelihood 
and moral judgment, suggesting that the foreseen/intended distinction similarly 
implicates differential judgments of likelihood, and that this can have a corresponding 
effect on moral judgment.  
These findings have implications that are both methodological and conceptual.  It 
seems clear that people do not understand the scenarios in precisely the way they are 
intended.  We have shown that interventions that we assert will save five people may not 
be seen as necessarily doing so.  Nor will the steps taken to, perhaps, save those five 
necessarily harm the single individual.  In fact, the gap between how scenarios are 
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conceived and how they are understood may go beyond this.  When we assert that five 
people are helpless on one of the tracks the trolley might travel, perhaps we are wrong 
about there being precisely five of them.  And perhaps those five (or so) people, ones we 
have imagined to be just random innocents, are actually seen as complicit in their own 
fate—who, after all, hangs out on tracks down which trolleys can readily travel?  Such a 
view is actually familiar to those who have posed moral scenarios to people only to have 
them quibble with the premises.  “Why not yell ahead and alert the people on the tracks?” 
or “Perhaps the conductor should just put the switch in the middle position and safely 
derail the trolley.”  Such views are not irrational, though they do pose challenges to 
researchers.  People are, generally, wise to take their prior probabilities into account in 
decision making, and, in other contexts, are often criticized for doing so insufficiently 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
When we ask participants whether it is worth sacrificing one to save five in 
detailed scenarios, it appears that many understand the questions in terms of relative risk.  
Differences between individuals in moral judgments may be due in some part to the 
extent to which they accept the assertions within the scenario rather than substitute their 
own intuitive probabilities, how they form the estimate of those probabilities, and then, to 
some extent, what intuitive moral theory they hold and apply.  That last factor—the one 
of most direct interest to those investigating people’s moral reasoning—is more difficult 
to isolate than one might hope.  Simply asserting that everything else is fixed appears 
insufficient.  
As an alternative explanation of our data, it might be suggested not that the 
intuitive probabilities that participants substitute for stipulations affect their moral 
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judgments, but rather that participants’ moral judgments affect the intuitive probabilities 
that they substitute for stipulations (see Liu & Ditto, 2013).  Although some of our 
studies do not rule out this possibility, others speak against it.  Consider, for example, Set 
1 in Study 2, which consists of a pair of cases that differ only with respect to which body 
part of the one individual, neck or foot, will be severed by a trolley that has been diverted 
in his direction.  Although participants are told in both cases that the one individual will 
die, they judge the likelihood of his dying as falling significantly short of 100% when 
what is severed is his foot (M = 79.8%), but as falling nearer to 100% when what is 
severed is his neck (M = 94.5%).  If the difference in participants’ judgments of degree of 
moral permissibility of diverting the trolley were driving the difference in their judgments 
of the likelihood of the one’s death, then something other than the latter difference would 
need to be driving the former.  But what could that be?  Apart from the foot/neck 
difference, the two cases are exactly the same.  Were there some further factual 
difference between the cases that might account for the difference in moral judgment 
(e.g., that in the one case the five are all children while in the other they are all adults, or 
that in the one case the protagonist made a promise to the five while in the other the 
protagonist did not), it might be possible to explain the difference in participants’ moral 
judgments in a way that coheres with the assumption that this difference is itself driving 
the difference in participants’ intuitive probabilities.  But there is no such further factual 
difference in Set 1 of Study 2.  We are, therefore, left with what seems in any event to be 
the most plausible explanation of participants’ moral judgments in these cases: 
Participants find it easier to justify diverting the trolley at least in part because they 
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believe that it is less likely that the one who will experience the severing of a body part 
will actually die. 
Our studies have important implications for the fields of moral psychology and 
experimental philosophy.  Until we can ensure that participants are not substituting their 
own intuitive probability estimates for experimenters’ stipulations, we are not permitted 
to draw any unqualified conclusions from studies of moral judgments that are based on 
participants’ evaluations of protagonist behavior in vignettes that are simply presented to 
them on paper or online.  Our studies also suggest that we need to be very careful before 
drawing any conclusions about folk moral intuitions on the basis of moral conversations 
with people who may well refuse to accept stipulations about outcomes in hypothetical 
cases.  As previously noted, some people (e.g., in classrooms) push back against the 
stipulations, and we often exclude their reactions from the data for this reason; but our 
results establish that many participants who do not explicitly resist the stipulations in fact 
resist them anyway (consciously or not).  Future studies need to correct for the fact that 
many participants judge whether a protagonist’s behavior is morally better or worse, 
(more or less) morally permissible or impermissible, on the basis of their own sense of 
how likely it is that certain events will occur or won’t occur depending on whether the 
protagonist acts or does not act.  Future work needs to address the best way of making 
this correction: One solution might be to write scenarios in which intuitive probabilities 
are matched, and another might be to find a way to present scenarios so that participants 
accept all the embedded stipulations. 
If, as we suspect, participants routinely refuse to accept stipulations that conflict 
with their antecedent probability expectations, then some doubt might be cast on a wide 
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variety of past vignette-driven experiments, designed to elicit not merely moral 
judgments but other philosophical judgments (e.g., about the compatibility of free will 
with determinism), causal judgments, linguistic judgments, mental state judgments, and 
more.  The proper design of studies in vignette-driven psychology and experimental 
philosophy needs to be rethought. 
There are at least two more questions raised by our studies that deserve further 
consideration.  The first question is whether further intuitive probabilities not discussed 
in our studies play some role in participants’ moral judgments about the actions of 
protagonists in hypothetical scenarios.  Participants, for example, might think that there is 
a non-negligible likelihood of a runaway trolley posing a danger to more people than the 
six who are usually mentioned in a typical trolley case.  They could also include their 
intuitive likelihood that the various protagonists are on the track in the path of a trolley 
through their own negligence.  It might even be that participants’ moral judgments are 
affected by their estimate of the ex ante likelihood of the hypothetical scenario itself.  
Shtulman and Tong (2013), for example, found that, as an individual difference variable, 
regarding extraordinary events as possible (i.e. having a non-zero likelihood) was 
associated with finding different actions as possibly being permissible.  It would certainly 
be valuable to know just how many, and how extensively, antecedent probability 
estimates of different types affect moral judgment.  
The second question concerns participants’ judgments about the morality of risk.  
To discover which features of the world participants take to be morally significant (and 
how morally significant they take them to be), researchers ask them questions based on 
vignettes in which it is stipulated that such-and-such an action or omission will (in no 
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uncertain terms) lead to so-and-so outcome (e.g., “If Sam throws a switch, the trolley will 
be diverted”).  What, then, do participants really believe about what morality forbids or 
permits in the presence of greater or lesser risk?  If, for example, participants are faced 
with a scenario in which the protagonist must, in order to save five, choose between 
imposing a near-100% risk of death on one or imposing a 50% risk of death on two (or, 
perhaps, a scenario in which the protagonist must choose between a course of action that 
has a near-100% chance of saving one and a course of action that has a 50% chance of 
saving two), what will they recommend?  Scenarios typically stipulate fixed outcomes, 
but in the real world there is always uncertainty about the results of acting, or failing to 
act.  An understanding of people’s moral reasoning should reflect this. 
 
Chapter 1, in full, is a reprint of the material as it appears in Cognitive Science 
2018. Ryazanov, Arseny; Knutzen, Jonathan; Rickless, Samuel; Christenfeld, Nicholas, 
Nelkin, Dana. The dissertation/thesis author was the primary investigator and author of 
this paper.  
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Abstract 
Some would support killing one innocent person to save five, while others would 
argue that such acts are wrong, regardless of their maximizing utility. The research focus 
on moral dilemmas concerning tradeoffs between one and five lives may obscure more 
nuanced commitments involved in moral decision-making. Six studies (N = 2177) 
examine the role of the actual numbers of lives involved, and the impact of making the 
outcomes probabilistic rather than certain. Study 1 examines the extent to which people 
are sensitive to the ratio of lives saved to lives ended by a particular action. Study 2 
verifies that the ratio rather than the difference between the two values is operative. Study 
3 examines whether participants treat probabilistic harm to some as equivalent to 
certainly harming fewer, when expected values are held constant, exploring whether 
prospect theory can account for responses to moral dilemmas. Study 4 compares 
sensitivity to probabilistic outcomes and expected value under single and joint evaluation. 
Study 5 investigates whether participants are willing to pay an expected value premium 
to distribute risk of harm among more individuals rather than certainly harm fewer under 
joint evaluation. Studies 6 and 7 explore an analogous issue regarding the sensitivity of 
probabilistic saving. Participants are remarkably sensitive to expected value for 
probabilistic harms under single evaluation, but deviate from it under joint evaluation. 
Participants deviate from expected value for probabilistic saving even under single 
evaluation. Collectively, the studies are consistent with the view that people’s moral 
judgments are based on the principle of threshold deontology, and raise the question of 
whether joint or single evaluations are normatively correct. 
Keywords: morality; probability; risk; decision-making; moral dilemma 
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Beyond Killing One to Save Five: Sensitivity to Ratio and Probability in Moral Judgment 
A much-studied moral dilemma arises when an individual has a choice to save a 
relatively large number of people by killing a relatively small number of people. Is it 
permissible, for example, to kill one to save five? When moral philosophers first 
introduced such cases (Foot, 1967), it was with the aim of supporting non-
consequentialist moral theory. Foot made an empirical prediction that people would reject 
the idea that it is permissible to kill one to save five, in service of the normative claim 
that considerations in addition to mere consequences are essential to answering moral 
questions.  
While this was certainly not the end of the story, dilemmas of the same general 
form as Foot’s original example have had tremendous staying power. In particular, with 
some notable exceptions we discuss below, the 1:5 ratio of the classic cases has been a 
mainstay in both moral theorizing and experimental moral psychology, and dilemmas are 
presented as though the stipulated outcomes of possible actions are certain to occur, 
unlike in many real-world situations. Further, dilemmas are typically presented in single, 
rather than joint form (e.g., asking participants whether, in order to save two, one ought 
to impose a 100% risk of one dying, rather than asking participants whether, in order to 
save two, it is better to impose a 50% risk of two dying than a 100% risk of one dying). 
In this article, we depart from each of these three formal features of the original dilemma 
in order to better understand just what moral considerations people bring to bear in a 
whole range of moral dilemmas, including real-world ones.   
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Ratio and Moral Judgment 
Systematic study of participants’ responses to classic moral dilemmas called into 
question the original prediction that most people reject the permissibility of killing one to 
save five, at least once confounding factors are removed. Recent studies on dilemmas of 
this kind have suggested that people’s moral judgments can systematically vary 
according to a variety of factors, such as the existence of physical contact (Cushman, 
Young, & Hauser, 2006), the intentional structure of the action (Hauser, Cushman, 
Young, Kang-Xing, & Mikhail, 2007; Schaich Borg, Hynes, Van Horn, Grafton, & 
Sinnott-Armstrong, 2006), individual differences on working-memory-capacity tasks 
(Moore, Clark, & Kane, 2008), and personality traits (Arvan, 2013). 
Empirical researchers have proposed several dual-process theories of moral 
cognition, according to which judgments in moral dilemmas are based on two competing 
processes: an outcome-based (or model-based) process responsible for “consequentialist” 
judgments (which rest on the idea that only consequences matter to deciding questions of 
moral permissibility), and an action-based (or model-free) process responsible for “non-
consequentialist” judgments (which rest on the idea that considerations in addition to 
consequences matter (e.g., Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; 
Greene & Haidt, 2002; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Greene, 
Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008; Green et al., 2009; Haidt, 2001; 
Cushman, et al., 2006; Cushman, Young, & Greene, 2010; Cushman & Greene, 2011; 
Paxton, Ungar, & Greene, 2012; Cushman, 2013; Crockett, 2013). Though outcome-
based and action-based processes have typically been construed as “winner take all” 
processes (e.g., Cushman, 2013), recent work suggests that the distinct brain regions 
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responsible for each of these processes (e.g., Shenhav & Greene, 2010; 2014) are jointly 
integrated in moral judgments (Hutcherson, Montaser-Kouhsari, Woodward, & Rangel, 
2015; Cohen & Ahn, 2016). 
Many studies, however, assume that dual processes must reflect two distinct, 
competing moral principles: absolutist consequentialism (according to which only the 
consequences of action and inaction matter; see, e.g., Sinnott-Armstrong, 2015) and 
absolutist non-consequentialism (according to which certain non-consequentialist 
constraints, e.g., constraints against killing or against intending death, are firm and 
exceptionless; see, e.g., Quinn, 1989; Rickless, 1997). This oversimplification can also be 
seen in researchers’ tendency to categorize the moral judgments into being either simply 
“consequentialist” or “non-consequentialist.” (See Kahane, Everett, Earp, Farias, & 
Savulescu, 2015, who have challenged this tendency, but based on reasons different from 
the ones we provide, as well as Conway, Goldstein-Greenwood, Polacek, & Green, 2018; 
Conway & Gawronski, 2013). 
What this dichotomy obscures is that those opposed to killing at a particular ratio 
may in a principled way shift to endorsing killing at a higher ratio of good done and harm 
done. For example, of those who reject killing one to save five, it may be that some 
endorse killing one to save ten. And of those who accept killing one to save five, some 
may reject it when the number killed grows to four. Such shifts would support the view 
that people in fact reason according to a more nuanced principle of morality than 
absolutist consequentialism or absolutist non-consequentialism, and would be consistent 
with the integration of outcome-based and action-based processes observed by 
Hutcherson et al. (2015). 
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A philosophical framework that accounts for such shifts is threshold deontology 
(see Moore, 1997). On this view, there is a threshold of good that needs to be achieved 
beyond which it is morally permissible to infringe a non-consequentialist moral 
constraint. For many threshold deontologists, the threshold is not a fixed amount of good, 
but rather varies according to, among other things, the ratio of good achieved (or 
expected) to harm done (or expected). That is, there is a general moral constraint against 
killing, but this constraint is overridden when the consequences of inaction are bad 
enough. Someone who finds it morally unacceptable to kill four to save five (or to kill 99 
to save 100), but who finds it morally acceptable to kill one to save five (or ten, or 
twenty), exhibits judgments that are consistent with threshold deontology, but not with 
absolutist consequentialism or absolutist deontology (see Alexander & Moore, 2016).  
Cohen and Ahn (2016) have proposed an alternative candidate to explain people’s 
moral judgments, namely, subjective utilitarian theory, as a single process underlying 
people’s judgments in moral dilemmas. The theory states that people choose the option 
that brings the maximal amount of personal value, with personal value purposefully left 
underspecified (Cohen & Ahn, 2016). It is possible that even if threshold deontology is 
the correct moral theory, it is not what is operative in actual moral decision-making.   
While a full comparative evaluation between subjective utilitarian theory and threshold 
deontology on explanatory grounds is not possible here, we believe, on the basis of the 
studies described below, that threshold deontology can better explain a persisting 
asymmetry in participant responses regarding doing and merely allowing harm. At the 
same time, we take this to be consistent with surprising results in how individuals value 
outcomes as Cohen and Ahn’s data suggest.   
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Threshold deontologists often focus on the permissibility of overriding moral 
constraints in extreme cases, where the only available alternative is catastrophic (Nozick 
1974; Fried, 1978; Nagel, 1979; Moore, 1997; though see Thomson, 1990 and Brennan, 
1995). An example would be the killing of one person in order to avoid the destruction of 
a large city or an entire nation. This deviation from the paradigmatic 1:5 ratio also 
appears in psychological research (Nichols & Mallon, 2006; Bartels, 2008). The 
underlying assumption seems to be that the expected value of the ratio doesn’t matter 
unless the result of inaction amounts to a catastrophe. In the studies described below, we 
explore the power of threshold deontology to explain participants’ responses to a variety 
of dilemmas. To do this, we present dilemmas with a variety of different ratios, from very 
high to very low. 
Expected value, ratio, and probability 
Most studies on moral dilemmas have focused on actions whose outcomes are 
described as certain to happen (or at least not described in terms of probabilities of 
anything less than 100%). In real life, however, we rarely know with certainty what will 
happen if we act one way rather than another, and often work with probabilities 
somewhere between 0 and 1. Moreover, in psychological research, even when 
participants are told that outcomes are certain, there is evidence that they often substitute 
their own probability estimates of less than 100% for outcomes that are described as 
certain (Ryazanov, Knutzen, Rickless, Christenfeld, & Nelkin, 2018; Shou & Song, 
2017). So, in addition to departing from the 1:5 ratio and from the focus on catastrophic 
alternatives, we also depart from the presumption of certainty to test whether participants 
treat equivalent expected values similarly when probabilities of harm or rescue differ.  
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Recent research suggests that moral judgments are sensitive to expected value. 
Tassy, Oullier, Mancini, and Wicker (2013), and Shenhav and Greene (2010) found that 
participants were sensitive to the number of people who could be saved in dilemmas 
where participants could choose one of two groups to save. However, neither of these 
tasks constituted sacrificial moral dilemmas, in that they involved choosing to benefit one 
party at the expense of another (picking between positive outcomes), rather than 
imposing harm on one party for the benefit of another. Whether participants exhibit 
sensitivity to expected value (outcome) in actions where harm is caused remains unclear. 
There are still further questions regarding the relationship between harm and 
benefit in moral dilemmas: How is the ratio of good done to harm done to be defined?  
And does the difference between the amount of harm and good done, or ratio of good 
done to harm done, matter to moral judgment? Shenhav and Greene’s (2010) studies 
showed a relationship between expected value and nonsacrificial moral dilemmas, but 
whether the operative factor was the difference in the number of lives saved or the ratio 
of lives saved to lives lost was not tested. Mikhail (2011) hypothesizes that participants’ 
moral grammar includes a “moral calculus of risk”, which treats the justifiability of 
imposing a risk of unintentional harm as a means of knowingly producing a good effect 
as a matter of whether the probability of producing the harm multiplied by the value of 
the harm is morally worse than the product of three factors: (i) the probability of 
knowingly producing the good effect, (ii) the probability that the good effect would not 
be achieved without risk of harm, and (iii) the value of the good effect.  But Mikhail 
(2011) does not test whether the moral calculus of risk governs participants’ judgments. 
In our studies, we test whether the expected difference between, or the expected ratio of, 
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good and bad plays a role in moral judgment. We define the ratio here in a way that 
incorporates the number of people who might be saved and the probability that they will 
be saved, as well as the number of people at risk of being killed and the probability that 
they will be killed: 
R = EVlives saved / EVlives ended = Nlives saved × Plives saved / Nlives ended × Plives ended 
Researchers have also started to study the role of probability in moral reasoning. 
Fleischhut, Meder, and Gigerenzer (2017) found that moral judgments when outcomes 
are certain to occur differ from when those outcomes are uncertain, though without 
specifying any probability for the outcomes’ occurrence. In addition to varying the 
number of lives that could be saved, Shenhav and Greene (2010) varied the probability 
that the latter group of people do not actually need saving, (e.g. the probability that a 
group of people blocked in an office building will successfully escape anyway). There are 
two different probabilities at stake as well, which they didn’t study: the probability that 
the plan of saving them will be successful, and the probability that the plan will kill a 
number of people. Do these probabilities matter? How will they interact with the role of 
expected value? These questions remain unanswered.  
Probability in moral reasoning may have a similar structure to the more general 
phenomenon of risk-seeking and risk-aversion. In many domains people systematically 
deviate from expected value, as elaborated in prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 
2013; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Among other things, prospect theory predicts a 
“certainty effect” that “contributes to risk aversion in choices involving sure gains and to 
risk seeking in choices involving sure losses” (Kahneman & Tversky, 2013, p. 263). Are 
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people sensitive to the certainty effect, showing risk-averse or risk-seeking tendencies 
when it comes to lives in moral dilemmas? One way to explore this issue is to keep the 
expected values fixed, while varying the probability of killing and the number of people 
killed at the same time. Alternatively, one might keep the expected values fixed while 
varying the probability and number of people saved. Prospect theory suggests that people 
will be sensitive to probability while expected values are held constant. That is, if people 
are risk seeking for losses, they might be willing to accept a greater expected number of 
people being killed when the harm is probabilistic rather than certain. And if they are risk 
averse for gains, they might need a greater expected number of people being saved in 
order to be willing to harm the same number of people when the saving of lives is 
probabilistic rather than certain. Some indication comes from work on variants of the 
“asian disease problem”, in which participants must decide between certain losses of life 
and probabilistic losses of life, as well as between certainly saving a group of individuals 
and probabilistically saving a group of individuals (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). While 
typically used to explore the framing effect of losses and gains, these non-sacrificial 
dilemmas suggest that probabilities and expected value may matter in sacrificial moral 
dilemmas, and that, furthermore, probabilistic harm and saving may be treated differently 
(Diederich, Wyszynski, & Ritov, 2018). It remains to be seen whether sacrificial moral 
dilemmas treat harm as a loss, and the benefit as a gain, and, if so, whether participants 
are risk seeking for harm and risk averse for probabilistic saving. 
Thus, this paper has two aims: (1) to test the hypothesis that participants exhibit 
judgments consistent with threshold deontology, rather than absolutist consequentialism 
or absolutist deontology; (2) to systematically examine the role of expected value and 
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probability in moral judgment, which further involves (i) testing how the expected 
number of people being saved and the expected number of people being killed interact 
with each other, and (ii) testing how varying the probability of harming and successfully 
saving affects participant responses.  
Single Versus Joint Evaluation 
People’s responses to moral uncertainty can be explored in single evaluation 
scenarios. Such cases would involve asking people whether someone should act when 
one of the outcomes is specified as uncertain, e.g., whether one should impose a 50% risk 
on two people in order to save five. They can also be studied in joint evaluation. This 
would involve asking people which of two options is preferred when they vary in the 
level of uncertainty, e.g., whether, in order to save five, it is better to impose a 100% risk 
on one person or a 50% risk on two people. According to general evaluability theory, 
evaluations made between simultaneously available alternatives can differ from 
evaluations of each alternative made separately (Hsee, 1996; Hsee & Zhang, 2010; Hsee, 
Loewenstein, Blount, & Bazerman, 1999). For example, participants may express equal 
support for preventing the extinction of Australian mammals and preventing skin cancer 
among farm workers when asked about just one or the other, despite strongly prioritizing 
the latter when choosing which to support (Kahneman & Ritov, 1994). Recently, Barak-
Corren, Tsay, Cushman, and Bazerman (2018) found that participants’ preference 
between two versions of the trolley problems—one in which participants decided whether 
to drop one person onto a trolley track to save others ahead or divert the trolley onto a 
track with one person on it to save others ahead—is reversed when the evaluations are 
made jointly, rather than individually. We thus explore the role of expected value, and 
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deviations from it when harm and saving are probabilistic rather than certain, under both 
single and joint evaluation. 
The Studies 
Study 1 examined the extent to which people are sensitive to specific numbers 
involved on the harming side and helping side. Study 2 explored whether the expected 
value ratio, and not, for example, the difference between the number of lives saved and 
the number of lives lost, is operative in participant sensitivity to expected value, 
consistent with the hypothesis of threshold deontology. Study 3 examined the extent to 
which people are sensitive to ratio and the probability of the harm (Plives ended). Study 4 
further explored the sensitivity to the probability of harm under both single and joint 
evaluation. Study 5 explored whether participants are willing to increase the expected 
amount of harm done in order to distribute risk of harm among more individuals. Finally, 
Studies 6 and 7 explored analogous issues regarding the sensitivity to the probabilities on 
the saving side (Plives saved). 
 
Study 1 
Study 1 Materials and Participants 
 Participants read one of four scenarios, in which a group of people could be saved 
from a terrorist attack by harming a bystander. As an example, one of the scenarios goes 
as follows: 
Harry has a plan to save two people from a terrorist attack. For Harry’s plan to work it 
is necessary that Robert, a bystander, is killed. If Harry carries out this plan, he will 
certainly save the two people, but in doing so will certainly kill the bystander. 
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Participants saw a version of the scenario where one would be killed to save two 
(ratio (R) = 2), one would be killed to save one hundred (R = 100), one would have a 
50% chance of being killed to save 50 (R = 100), or 99 would be killed to save 100 (R ≈ 
1.01). Participants responded to a single question regarding their confidence that the 
action should be carried out, adapted to each scenario, along an eleven-point scale. For 
example, participants were asked, Should Harry carry out a plan that he knows will 
certainly save two people, but will certainly kill a bystander? (-5: very confident he 
should not carry out the plan, to 5: very confident he should carry out the plan). We 
chose this dependent variable, rather than a continuous forbidden-obligatory measure, 
because according to many consequentialists and non-consequentialists, actions cannot be 
more or less morally right or wrong (see Ryazanov et al., 2018), and questions that don’t 
explicitly ask about confidence (e.g., agree-disagree) implicitly do by asking for degree 
of agreement/disagreement. We used a single scale measure, rather than process 
dissociation as endorsed by Conway & Gawronski (2012), because we are interested in 
whether judgments change at different expected values, rather than in the strength of 
deontological and utilitarian “inclinations” that could contribute to moral judgments. One 
hundred and twenty-two participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (110 
passed an attention check and were retained for analysis; 56.4% female; mean age = 32.9, 
SD = 8.30).  
Study 1 Results 
We began by examining how participant responses to whether the action should 
be carried out correspond to the action’s expected value ratio. An ANOVA, with 
expected value ratio entered as a continuous factor, yielded a significant effect of 
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expected value on moral judgment, F(1,108) = 35.4, p < .001, r2 = .25 (mean R 1.01 = -
2.23, SD = 2.67; mean R 2 = .11, SD = 2.45; mean R 100 = 2.12, SD = 2.79 collapsing 
across both versions of the ratio; see Figure 1). Thus, participants were sensitive to the 
expected value ratios presented to them. Next we examined whether different forms of 
the same expected value ratio showed different preferences, since we had two scenarios 
with R = 100. A planned comparison of a 50% chance of killing one to save 50 and a 
100% chance of killing one to save 100 did not reveal a significant difference: t(55)  = 
.218, p = .83, d = .06 (mean 1v100 = 2.20, SD = 2.93; mean 50%1v50 = 2.04, SD = 
2.70). 
  
  
Figure 2.1. Sensitivity to expected value ratio of lives saved to lives lost. Error bars 
represent one standard error. 
 
Categorizing responses into “would not act” (responses < 0) and “would act” (responses 
> 0), revealed that while 80% would act in the 1v100 dilemma, only 48% would do so in 
the 1v2 dilemma, χ2(N = 51) = 5.40, p = .020, Cramer’s V = .33. 
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Study 1 Discussion 
 Study 1 found evidence for sensitivity to expected value ratio. Participants more 
often endorsed an action that harmed one to save others when the ratio regarding the 
expected value of lives saved to the expected value of lives lost was larger. This 
sensitivity suggests that people are neither absolutist deontologists nor consequentialists, 
instead making decisions based on the principle of threshold deontology.  
Study 1 also includes preliminary evidence regarding sensitivity to probabilistic 
forms of the same expected value ratio. People treated the two scenarios whose ratios 
were identical no differently, despite one of them involving a probabilistic harm and one 
a certain harm. In this instance at least, moral uncertainty doesn’t have any impact 
independent of the expected value ratio on people’s application of their ethical principles. 
Contrary to prospect theory’s prediction that participants would prefer a chance of harm 
to the one over the certain death of one, to save a matched number of people (50 and 100, 
respectively), we did not see evidence for this variation in single evaluation. It could be 
that such a preference emerges in joint evaluation, however, when two such plans are 
compared side by side. We tested this hypothesis in Study 4. 
But first, we note that the results of the first study suggest that it is ratio that 
matters when it comes to harming some to save others. It is possible that such decisions 
could be made not on the ratio, but instead on the number of lives gained. That is, 
sacrificing 99 to save 100 involves a net gain of one life, and in this way is similar to 
sacrificing one to save two. However, our data indicate that the latter option is regarded 
much more favorably than the former. In Study 2, we set out to test more directly the 
hypothesis that it is in fact ratio that is operative.    
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Study 2a 
Study 2a Materials and Participants 
Study 2a sought to verify that the ratio of lives saved to lives lost, rather than the 
difference between the two expected values, was operative. Each participant read about 
one of three plans, which were identical to those of Study 1 except for the numbers 
involved. The plans involved killing 1 to save 2 (difference = +1 life), killing 10 to save 
20 (difference = +10 lives), or killing 100 to save 200 (difference = +100 lives). One 
hundred and fifty-eight participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (135 
passed an attention check and were retained for analysis; 63.7% female; mean age = 34.2, 
SD = 10.8). 
Study 2a Results 
We examined differences in responses to each of the three scenarios. If people 
favor the action more when it saves more net lives, there should be a sharp increase in 
supporting the action as the net number goes from +1 to +10 to +100 lives. If, instead, 
people are sensitive to the ratio, then the three scenarios should be regarded as effectively 
identical, with the action in each one saving twice as many as are sacrificed. An 
ANOVA, with difference in number of lives saved / lost entered as a continuous factor, 
confirmed that there was no significant difference between the scenarios, F(1, 133) = .50, 
p = .48, η2 = .004 (Mean 1v2 = -.16, SD = 3.10; Mean 10v20 = 0, SD = 2.63; Mean 
100v200 = .27, SD = 2.60; see Figure 2a). 
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Figure 2.2.a. Sensitivity to ratio of lives saved to lives lost, rather than difference 
between lives lost and saved, in abstract scenarios. Error bars represent one standard 
error. 
 
Study 2a Discussion 
 The lack of sensitivity to the difference between the number of lives lost and the 
number of lives saved suggests that participants in Study 1 were sensitive to ratio, instead 
of the net gain in lives from the action (or, even the raw number killed or saved). The 
scenario we used was a fairly abstract one, which, while specifying the numbers 
involved, did not flesh out how the fewer would die, nor how that would save the many.  
We sought to replicate our effects also with more detailed scenarios. 
 
Study 2b 
Study 2b Materials and Participants 
 Concrete scenarios were created in which the ratio of lives saved to lives lost was 
held constant, though the difference in numbers between the two groups varied, to 
examine whether it is the ratio of lives saved to lives lost that is operative, rather than the 
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difference in the expected values. Each participant again read about one of three plans: 
killing 1 to save 2, killing 10 to save 20, or killing 100 to save 200, though now, instead 
of more abstract plans, we utilized a more detailed scenario that involved setting off an 
explosion to prevent a rocket from reaching a house. Subjects in the condition pitting 
sacrificing ten against saving twenty read the following scenario: 
A missile has been accidentally fired at a house with 20 people in it. Bob is in charge of a 
missile defense tool that can destroy this missile by firing a rocket that can automatically 
detect the missile’s location. The rocket will incapacitate the missile by setting off an 
explosion in the air near it. As Bob knows, the rocket’s explosion near the missile will 
disable the missile, but will also kill 10 people standing in a field over which the missile 
will be intercepted. Firing the rocket given the timing and flight path of the missile is the 
only available option to prevent the missile from continuing on its path to the house with 
20 people in it. Bob also knows the following facts. If Bob does not intervene, then the 
missile will certainly hit the house and kill all 20 people in it; if Bob intervenes, then the 
rocket Bob can set off will certainly destroy the missile and spare the people in the house, 
but will certainly kill the 10 people in the field. 
 
Participants were asked, Should Bob set off a rocket that he knows will kill 10 people, but 
that he also knows will destroy a missile that will otherwise kill 20 people? (-5: very 
confident he should not set off the explosion, to 5: very confident he should set off the 
explosion). One hundred and forty-nine participants were recruited via Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (129 passed an attention check and were retained for analysis; 54.7% 
female; mean age = 34.2, SD = 9.78). 
Study 2b Results 
As in the case of abstract scenarios, an ANOVA, with difference in number of 
lives saved / lost entered as a continuous variable, confirmed that there was no significant 
difference between any of the more concrete scenarios, in which the expected value ratio 
was held constant, but the difference between the number of lives saved and the number 
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of lives lost was varied, F(1, 127) = .35, p = .55, η2 = .003. (Mean 1v2 = 1.96, SD = 2.41; 
Mean 10v20 = 2.14, SD = 2.65; Mean 100v200 = 1.75, SD = 2.46;, see Figure 2b).  
 
 
Figure 2.2.b. Sensitivity to ratio of lives saved to lives lost, rather than difference 
between lives lost and saved, in concrete scenarios. Error bars represent one standard 
error. 
 
Study 2b Discussion 
 Again, participants remained insensitive to the difference between the number of 
lives lost and the number of lives saved, suggesting that participants are sensitive to ratio, 
rather than to difference in number of lives saved/lost or to some combination of the two. 
Consistent with studies that find participants to be more willing to act in concrete than in 
abstract situations (Agerström & Björklund, 2009; Amit & Greene, 2012), an exploratory 
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analysis revealed that participants expressed greater confidence in action in the concrete 
scenarios of Study 2b than in the abstract scenarios of Study 2a, t(262) = 6.30, p < .001, d 
= .78. Sensitivity to ratio, rather than difference, was apparent in both kinds of scenarios. 
 Thus far, we have found participant responses to be consistent with threshold 
deontology. Next, we examine how such judgments incorporate probability, beginning 
with comparing probabilistic harm to certain harm. 
 
Study 3 
Study 3 Materials and Participants 
 Study 3 examined the effect of probability across three expected value ratios: R = 
5, R = 2, and R = 1.25. Probabilities of the people being sacrificed were varied, with 
expected value remaining constant. Probabilities explored included 1%, 10%, 20%, 50%, 
80% (only for 4v5), and 100%. We again utilized the more detailed scenarios from Study 
2b, which involved setting off an explosion to prevent a rocket from reaching a house. In 
the R = 5 cases, for example, participants were asked, Should Bob set off a rocket that he 
knows will have a X% chance of killing Y persons [where XY=100], but that he also 
knows will destroy a missile that will otherwise kill 5 people? (-5: very confident he 
should not set off the explosion, to 5: very confident he should set off the explosion). 706 
participants were recruited (616 passed an attention check and were retained for analysis; 
mean age = 36.5, SD = 12.0, 61.1% female). Each subject rated only one scenario, and 
provided brief demographic information.  
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Study 3 Results 
 As in Study 1, an ANOVA with probability and ratio entered as continuous 
factors revealed a significant effect of expected value ratio, regardless of the probability 
of harm, F(1, 612) = 42.5, p < .001, ηp2 = .065 (mean 1v2 = 1.86, SD = 2.45; mean 1v5 = 
2.97, SD = 2.13; mean 4v5 = 1.41, SD = 2.75, see Figure 5a). However, there was no 
significant effect of probability while keeping expected value matched, F(1, 612) = .22, p 
= .64, ηp2 < .001, nor was there an interaction of probability and ratio, F(1, 612) = .01, p 
= .94, ηp2 < .001, see Figure 5b. There was no sensitivity to probability for any of the 
individual ratios (all p’s > .22). This suggests that, again, under single evaluation 
participants were sensitive to expected value ratio, but not to the probability of harm, 
even when the uncertain harm covered the range down to a 1% chance of occurrence. 
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Figure 2.3. Insensitivity to various forms of the same expected value ratio of lives saved 
to lives lost in more concrete scenarios when probability of harm is varied (a). Sensitivity 
to expected value ratio (b). Error bars represent one standard error. 80% harm only tested 
for 4v5 because other ratios cannot achieve it with whole numbers. 
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Study 3 Discussion 
 Study 3 showed that people are sensitive to expected value, even across a fairly 
subtle range. In single evaluation, even with increased power from a larger number of 
participants, we continued to see no clear relationship between probability of harm, when 
expected value is fixed, and moral judgment. Regardless of how the expected value was 
presented to participants (e.g. 1% chance of killing 100 to save 5, or 1 certainly being 
killed to save 5), participants remained sensitive to the value. That participants shift 
judgments when the expected value of the saving changes from 2 to 5 suggests that, 
rather than making exceptions to deontological thinking only in catastrophic cases, 
people instead incorporate expected value into their moral calculation, and, as expected 
value increases, linearly shift from responses that disapprove of sacrifice to responses 
that approve of it. This is consistent with the view that our participants, in actuality, hold 
an ethical view that is consistent with threshold deontology.  
 
Study 4 
 Study 4 expanded on the findings from Studies 1 and 3, that people treat an action 
that is 50% likely to harm N people as equivalent to an action that certainly harms N/2 
people. Though the single evaluation of these actions produced remarkably similar moral 
judgments, it could be that participants nevertheless prefer probabilistic deaths over 
certain death when the two are jointly evaluated, as would be suggested by prospect 
theory, if lives harmed are perceived as potential losses.  
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Study 4 Materials and Procedures 
 Study 4 asked participants to evaluate one of two plans, as they had in Study 3. 
One plan was certain to kill one bystander, but would save two people from a missile that 
had accidentally been fired at them. The other plan involved a 25% chance of killing four 
bystanders to save the two from the missile. After evaluating one of the two plans, (e.g. 
Should Bob set off a rocket that he knows will kill 1 person, but that he also knows will 
destroy a missile that will otherwise kill 2 people?; -5: very confident he should not set off 
the explosion, to 5: very confident he should set off the explosion), participants were 
exposed to both plans, labeled as Plan X and Plan Y, and were asked to compare them—
Which of the following two plans is morally better: firing Rocket X, which certainly kills 
1 bystander and saves the group of 2 people, or firing Rocket Y, which has a 25% chance 
of killing 4 bystanders and saves the group of 2 people? (-5 – 5; Firing Rocket X is much 
better than firing Rocket Y – Firing Rocket Y is much better than firing Rocket X). We 
chose to ask which plan is morally better for the joint evaluation, rather than asking 
participants for their level of confidence that the action should be carried out, because 
asking a confidence question in joint evaluation would imply that the agent must perform 
one of the two actions, when the agent could also choose not to act. Two hundred and 
five participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (179 retained for 
analysis, 63.7% female, mean age = 35.5, SD = 12.3).  
Study 4 Results 
 Under single evaluation, there was no preference between a plan that risked a 
25% chance of killing four to save two, and a plan that would certainly kill one to save 
two, t(177) = .17, p = .87, d = .025 (mean 100% = 2.02, SD = 2.42; mean 25% = 1.97, SD 
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= 2.10, see Figure 3a). However, under joint evaluation there was a significant preference 
for the plan that spread the risk across four individuals, over the plan that would certainly 
kill one, t(178) = 2.26, p = .025, d = .17 (mean = .53, SD = 3.12, see Figure 3b).  
 
  
Figure 2.4. Insensitivity to whether harm is probabilistic or certain when expected value 
of lives saved to lives lost is fixed under single evaluation (a). Preference for probabilistic 
harm over certain harm when expected value is fixed under joint evaluation (positive 
ratings indicate a preference for probabilistic harm b). Error bars represent one standard 
error. 
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Study 4 Discussion 
While participants did not favor distributing harm when making a single 
evaluation, in the joint evaluation they expressed moral preference for an action that 
saves two by risking a 25% chance of killing four, over an action that saves two by 
certainly killing one. Such a preference is consistent with risk seeking in the context of 
losses, as suggested by prospect theory.   
In single evaluation, people do not exhibit risk aversion (or preference), and their 
judgment reflects just the mathematical expected value of the risk. However, in joint 
evaluation, a significant preference for risk emerges. People appear to be using different 
principles in the two cases. In the former, there is a weighing of the harm required against 
the good that will be done, and whether it is ethically justified. In the latter, when the 
action must be taken, the question of whether acting to save the two is morally 
permissible is no longer salient to the participant; instead, the most relevant question 
concerns whether it is morally better to sacrifice one for certain, or two with a 50% 
chance. Here the preference for spreading risk emerges.   
People’s use of different intuitive rules to decide the single and joint evaluation 
cases suggests that it should be possible not just to find two cases tied in the single 
evaluation with a preference in the joint evaluation, as we did in the current study, but 
also to construct cases tied in the joint evaluation with a preference in the single 
evaluation. We explored this in the next study. If people prefer risky harm, when the 
expected values are equal, they should be roughly indifferent if the expected value of the 
risky harm is suitably larger than the expected value of the certain harm. In the single 
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evaluation case, where risk preferences did not emerge, they should find this action less 
tolerable. 
Study 5 
Study 5 Materials 
Study 5 had the same design as Study 4, though with the expected value of the 
two plans not equated. Half of the participants were exposed to a scenario where the plan 
would kill one to save two (R = 2), and half were exposed to a scenario where the plan 
would risk a 25% chance of harming 8 to save 2 (R = 1). After evaluating one of the two 
plans, participants saw both plans, and were again asked which one was morally better. 
Two hundred and nine participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk for 
participation in Study 4 (180 were retained for analysis after excluding participants who 
failed an attention check, mean age = 34.4, SD = 10.5, 61.7% female). 
Study 5 Results 
Participants indicated that the plan with certain harm was more acceptable than 
the plan with probabilistic (and twice as great) harm, t(178) = 2.12, p = .035, d = .31 
(mean certain harm of 1 = 1.70, SD = 2.47; mean 25% chance of 8 harmed = .90, SD = 
2.61, see Figure 4a). However, when both plans were compared directly, there was no 
preference between them, t(179) = .11, p = .91, d < .01(mean =-.028, SD = 3.28), despite 
the certain harm action having an expected value ratio of 2, and the probabilistic harm 
action having an expected value ratio of 1 (see Figure 4b). That is, the certain harm case 
involved saving twice as many as would be harmed, while the probabilistic harm case 
involved, as a matter of expected value, harming just as many people as the action would 
save, with no net gain in lives at all. Participants thus exhibited risk-seeking in joint 
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evaluations of plans that have a probability of harming some to save others, and 
displayed a preference based on expected value ratio under single evaluation. 
  
 
Figure 2.5. Sensitivity to expected value when value of lives saved to lives lost is not 
matched under single evaluation (a). Indifference between probabilistic harm with lower 
expected value and certain harm with higher expected value under joint evaluation 
(positive ratings indicate a preference for probabilistic harm; b). Error bars represent one 
standard error. 
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Study 5 Discussion 
As in Study 4, participant preferences diverged in single and joint evaluations. 
Participants became indifferent when selecting between a plan that had an expected value 
ratio of 2 and a plan that had an expected value ratio of 1, because the plan with the lower 
expected value ratio spreads risk to more individuals, thus pitting sensitivity to expected 
value against a preference for spreading risk. 
So far, while we have varied the number of people involved on both the harming side and 
the saving side of the dilemma, we have explored the effect of probability only on the 
harming side. We next explore how people treat ethical dilemmas where the saving is 
certain versus probabilistic. 
Study 6 
Study 6 turned to a different probability: probabilistic saving with certain harm. 
We adapted the scenarios from Study 5 to examine a parallel range of probabilities, this 
time on the saving side. For example, would an action that kills one to save two be 
judged differently from an action that kills one to save four who have a 50% chance of 
dying without the intervention? 
Study 6 Materials and Participants 
Study 6 examined the effect of probability across the same ratios as Study 5: 1v5 
(R = 5), 1v2 (R = 2), and 4v5 (R = 1.25). While the expected value of the number of lives 
being saved was held constant, probabilities of the missile hitting the group on the saving 
side were systematically varied: the missile had a 1%, 10%, 20%, 50%, or 100% chance 
of hitting the group of people the agent was considering saving. Participants were asked, 
for example, Should Bob set off a rocket that he knows will kill 1 person, but that he also 
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knows will destroy a missile that will otherwise have an X % chance of killing Y people 
[where XY = 200]? (-5: very confident he should not set off the explosion, to 5: very 
confident he should set off the explosion). 697 participants were recruited (603 passed an 
attention check and were retained for analysis; mean age = 34.3, SD = 11.5, 57.7% 
female).  
Study 6 Results 
 As in Study 1, An ANOVA with probability and expected value ratio entered as 
continuous factors revealed a significant effect of ratio, F(1, 599) = 6.14, p = .014, ηp2 = 
.01 (mean 1v5 = 1.42, SD = 3.00; mean 1v2 = 1.12, SD = 3.11; mean 4v5 = .63, SD = 
3.03); see Figure 6a. Unlike situations involving probabilities of harming, there was a 
significant effect of probability of saving while keeping expected value matched, F(1, 
599) = 59.5, p < .001, ηp2 = .09. The pattern is consistent with participants being risk 
averse to probabilistic saving: they were more likely to endorse the action when the 
chances of saving the group was high (e.g. 100%) and less likely to endorse it when the 
chances were low (e.g., 1%), even though the expected number saved was constant; see 
Figure 6b. This pattern occurred for each of the ratios: F(1, 199) = 39.1, p < .001, η2 = 
.16, F(1, 196) = 12.9, p < .001, η2 = .06, F(1, 202) = 13.5, p < .001, η2 = .06 for 1v5, 1v2, 
and 4v5, respectively. The interaction of probability and ratio was marginal F(1, 599) = 
3.05, p = .08, ηp2 = .01. 
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Figure 2.6. Sensitivity to expected value ratio of lives saved to lives lost in more concrete 
scenarios when probability of saving is varied (a). Sensitivity to various forms of the 
same expected value ratio (b). Error bars represent one standard error. 
 
Study 6 Discussion 
Participants continued to exhibit sensitivity to expected value ratio, being more 
confident of the action’s rightness as the ratio of the number saved to the number 
sacrificed increased. However, unlike the findings for uncertain harming in single 
evaluation cases, we found a significant sensitivity to probability on the saving side. 
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Participants were averse to versions of plans that, though holding expected value fixed, 
probabilistically save lives. For example, when it came to sacrificing four to save an 
expected value of five, people were generally favorable when the saving of five was 
certain, and unfavorable when it was presented as a 1% chance of saving 500.  
 
Study 7 
Study 6 shows that, under single evaluation, there exists a preference for certain 
saving over probabilistic saving. Study 7 explored what happens to the preference for 
certain saving under joint evaluation. That is, though people prefer an action that is 
certain to kill one to save two over an action that is certain to kill one to save eight from a 
25% chance of death, do they become indifferent to the two plans under joint evaluation? 
Study 7 Materials 
In Study 7, half of the participants were exposed to a scenario where the plan 
would kill one to save two (R = 2), and half were exposed to a scenario where the plan 
would kill one for a 25% chance of saving eight (R = 2). After evaluating one of the two 
plans, participants saw both plans and were asked which one was morally better: Which 
of the following two plans is morally better: firing the rocket at Missile X, which certainly 
kills 1 bystander and destroys a missile that will otherwise certainly kill 2 people, or 
firing the rocket at Missile Y, which certainly kills 1 bystander and destroys a missile that 
will otherwise have a 25% chance of killing 8 people? (-5: very confident he should not 
set off the explosion, to 5: very confident he should set off the explosion). Two hundred 
and thirty-five participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk for 
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participation in Study 7 (199 were retained for analysis after excluding participants who 
failed an attention check, mean age = 36.0, SD = 11.7, 65.3% female). 
Study 7 Results 
In the single evaluation, participants were again more confident that the agent 
should fire the missile when certainly saving two, than when doing so would have a 25% 
chance of saving 8, t(197) = 6.47, p < .001, d = .87 (mean certain saving 2 = 2.38, SD = 
2.40; mean 25% chance of saving 8 = .08, SD = 2.89), see Figure 7a. When both plans 
were compared directly, the preference for certain saving remained: t(199) = 2.83, p = 
.005, d = .20 (mean =-.62, SD = 3.08), see Figure 7b. Participants thus exhibited risk-
aversion to uncertain saving both under single and joint evaluation. 
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Figure 2.7. Sensitivity to whether saving is probabilistic or certain when expected value 
of lives saved to lives lost is fixed under single evaluation (a). Preference for probabilistic 
harm over certain harm when expected value is fixed under joint evaluation (negative 
ratings indicate a preference for the certain saving; b). Error bars represent one standard 
error. 
 
Study 7 Discussion 
Participants favored certain saving when evaluating cases individually and under 
joint evaluation. Thus, participant responses for probabilistic saving in neither case 
aligned with expected value, unlike for harm, where participants’ responses were 
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determined by expected value under single, but not joint evaluation. The joint evaluation 
case, when evaluating two plans that may save two groups of people, had a relatively 
small effect, given the magnitude of the single evaluation scale difference—this case is 
intrinsically more complex, as choosing not to pursue the plan that could or will save a 
group of people may be interpreted as letting the other group of people die. One way to 
account for this is to suppose that the pattern of responses in joint evaluation is not based 
only on whether saving is probabilistic or certain, but is rather a function of the 
probability of saving, the probability of letting die, and the number of people at risk of 
being let die. This raises the issue of whether and how people are sensitive to expected 
value and risk when it comes to letting die. In particular, will people’s patterns of 
responses be risk-seeking, as in cases of killing, or risk-averse, as in cases of saving? This 
is an open question that requires further investigation. 
 
General Discussion 
 Collectively, our studies show that people are sensitive to expected value in moral 
dilemmas, and they show this sensitivity across a range of probabilities. The particular 
kind of sensitivity to expected value participants display is consistent with the view that 
people’s moral judgments are based on one single principle of threshold deontology. If 
one examines only participants’ reactions to a single dilemma with a given ratio, one 
might naturally tend to sort participants’ judgments into consequentialists (the ones who 
condone killing to save others) or non-consequentialists (the ones who do not). But this 
can be misleading, as is shown by the result that a number of participants who make 
judgments consistent with consequentialism in a scenario with ratio of 5:1 switch to an 
apparently deontological judgment when the ratio decreases. The fact that some 
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judgments participants make are consistent with consequentialism does not entail that 
these judgments are expressive of a generally consequentialist moral theory. They 
consistently reflect a threshold deontological theory. On this theory, there is a general 
constraint against killing, but this constraint is overridden when the consequences of 
inaction are bad enough. The variability across people suggests that participants have 
different thresholds of the ratio at which the consequences count as “bad enough” for 
switching from supporting inaction to supporting action. This is consistent with the wide 
literature showing that people’s judgments can shift within the same ratio, depending on, 
for example, how the death of the one is caused. 
Making the harms of action uncertain has a limited effect on participants’ moral 
choices. In a single evaluation case, people’s confidence about the moral rightness or 
wrongness of sacrificing one to save five was no different from their confidence about the 
moral rightness or wrongness of subjecting one hundred people to a 1% risk of sacrifice 
to save five. This suggests that people do not invoke distinct moral principles when it 
comes to harming others versus putting them at even slight risk of harm. It also indicates 
that, in this sort of dilemma at least, people do not show the usual risk-seeking tendency 
when it comes to losses. However, this tendency is apparent when people are asked not 
whether to act, but instead which action plan to implement. In such a joint evaluation 
case, participants show a preference for spreading the risk of harm across many people. 
In fact, this preference is strong enough that they are willing to incur twice as much 
expected harm when that harm is probabilistic.  
Sensitivity to probability on the saving side revealed a somewhat different effect.  
In single evaluation cases, people are less confident about the rightness of bringing about 
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a particular level of harm when the benefit is uncertain, even when it has the same 
expected value. This is consistent with prospect theory and risk aversion for gains. This 
preference for concentrating benefits is sufficiently strong that people are willing to take 
about half as much expected good for a given sacrifice if that good is certain rather than 
chancy.  
One partial explanation for the asymmetry between responses on the saving side 
and responses on the harm side might be that subjects are bringing consistent 
deontological principles to bear. On some deontological theories, one’s duty not to kill is 
stronger than one’s duty to save or otherwise benefit others. Further, on such theories, 
one’s duty to save or benefit others might be such that one can choose among a wide 
range of ways to fulfill the duty, and, in some situations, there may be no duty to save or 
benefit others at all. (See the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties in Kant 
1785/2002, p. 222.) The scenarios are complicated in that they involve both imposing and 
reducing risk, but it is possible that in the case of benefiting others, given that there is no 
duty to benefit (or to benefit in any particular way) in the first place, one has no duty to 
distribute increased chances of living to more people as opposed to increasing even more 
the chances of living for a smaller group. Thus, with no such duty involved, but with a 
high value on certain saving, it makes sense in this case to prefer to save a smaller 
number with certainty than perform an act that at best will decrease others’ chances of 
dying when they might not have died in any case. And this is what we find in subjects’ 
responses to single evaluations in Studies 6 and 7. In contrast, when we vary whether the 
agent would cause certain death, or merely risk death in a single evaluation (as we do in 
Study 3), we do not find a difference in subjects’ responses. In that case, it is only in the 
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joint evaluation that we find differential responses. One reason for this might be that it 
is prima facie wrong to impose significant risk, just as it is prima facie wrong to kill, and 
so the salience of the comparison does not arise until one sees the two options in a joint 
evaluation. Thus, while there may be no duty to save (or to save in a particular way or on 
particular occasions), and so it is permissible to take into account factors such as 
probability of having an effect, there is a duty at all times not to kill or impose significant 
risk. And this could go some way toward explaining why it is only once subjects see a 
direct comparison of certain harming and spreading the risk of harm to a larger group that 
this difference becomes especially salient.    
 Our findings also contribute to a more nuanced understanding of deontology by 
comparing how participants respond to probabilistic and certain death. While 
deontologists may not be willing to kill one to save five, they may deem it acceptable to 
risk a 1% chance of harm to one to save five. Our data suggest that expected value 
calculation, rather than level of risk itself, accounts for this shift in judgment. An open 
question remains as to what determines a person’s deontological weighting, or the value 
by which their expected value calculation is offset in deciding whether to act. Another 
open question concerns whether and to what extent people’s deontological weighting 
about probabilistic harming and saving depends on the status quo. For example, our 
studies treated probabilistic saving, in the 25% case, as decreasing the probability of 
someone dying from 25% to 0%, but one might also probabilistically save someone by 
decreasing the probability of their dying from 100% to 75%. It requires further 
investigation whether people will respond differently according to the pre-existing level 
of risk in the circumstances. 
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 Similar patterns of sensitivity to expected value and probability emerge in our 
findings with both concrete and abstract scenarios. The patterns also suggest that people 
are inclined to make more extreme moral judgments (e.g., being more confident that it is 
morally acceptable to kill one in order to save two) in our concrete scenarios than they 
are in our abstract scenarios. This difference is consistent with some recent work on 
Construal Level Theory (CLT) and moral judgment (Gong & Medin, 2012; Lammers, 
2012). Based on CLT, one possible explanation of the difference in our findings is that 
people engage in low-level construals in concrete scenarios, and such low-level 
construals can intensify moral judgments by being easier to imagine (see Gong & Medin, 
2012, p. 635). By contrast, people engage in high-level construals in abstract scenarios, 
and these high-level construals involve greater psychological distance that can mitigate 
the radicalness of moral judgments. But it is not obvious how to apply the theory in this 
case, since subjects are being asked to imagine both the possibility of two people dying 
and one person being killed intentionally by another. Since both aspects are made more 
vivid in the concrete scenario, it is not clear in which direction the moral judgment in this 
case we should expect to be intensified. We believe that the question of how responses 
differ with respect to concrete and abstract scenarios is an interesting one worth further 
exploration.  
 Our findings do not appear to fit clearly with the broader literature on 
evaluability, which finds that people make more logical decisions under joint evaluation 
than they do under single evaluation (e.g., Bazerman & Gino, 2012). For example, 
Bartels (2008) found that omission bias, readily apparent under single evaluation, can be 
reduced under joint evaluation. More broadly, it has been argued that normative positions 
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should be derived from joint evaluation. Our Studies 4 and 5 find that people 
systematically deviate from expected value under joint evaluation, but not under single 
evaluation, when all other aspects of the scenario remain fixed, in deciding whether to 
spread risk of harm to many. It is not clear which position is normatively correct. One 
might view the simple calculation of the expected harm as correct, in which case it is the 
single evaluation cases that track the proper principle. On the other hand, there are some 
plausible normative arguments for spreading risk of harm when expected values are 
equal. That is, all else being equal, it might be better to commit the four lesser wrongs of 
imposing a 25% risk of harm than to commit the one greater harm of imposing certain 
death on one. Spreading risk might be preferable because it makes people more evenly 
suffer right-violation and is thereby a more just option when all else is equal. 
Alternatively, it might be the case that the aggregate of four deaths isn’t exactly four 
times the moral worth of one death, but smaller than the latter due to diminished marginal 
(negative) utility. Finally, it might be the case that the norms of instrumental rationality 
already involve sensitivity to risk. Buchak (2013) has recently defended a “risk-weighted 
expected utility theory” as an alternative normative theory to the standard expected utility 
theory of instrumental rationality. If her theory is correct, then it is possible for us to both 
be risk-seeking and instrumentally rational. And since considerations about instrumental 
rationality can affect moral judgments—a point that even threshold deontologists would 
agree with—it is hardly surprising that moral judgments are sensitive to risk. It will then 
follow that, in the comparison between certain and probabilistic harming, the joint 
evaluation rather than the single evaluation is consistent with the proper principle. 
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This presents a complication for those using moral dilemmas to inform policy 
surrounding autonomous vehicles, as their findings outline moral preferences for how 
autonomous vehicles should be programmed under single evaluation (e.g., Awad et al., 
2018). If such single evaluations are not coherent with joint evaluations of the multiple 
options that autonomous vehicles are likely to have in the face of a collision, policy may 
be better informed by the study of moral dilemmas involving joint evaluations. 
 Our data suggest that people seem, on the whole, not to embrace simple absolute 
consequentialist or non-consequentialist moral positions, but hold instead more nuanced 
views, balancing the harm done, the good achieved, and the value of rights, consistent with 
a principled threshold deontology. Our data also begin to shed light on the remarkably 
neglected domain of moral principles applied in an uncertain world. The normative ethical 
positions are largely silent on how such applications should be made, and so, given that 
almost every actual dilemma is likely to feature some degree of uncertainty at some level, 
data on how people view such dilemmas is especially valuable and potentially relevant to 
social policies and procedures. In order to give herself a high probability of saving a small 
group of people (or a low probability of saving a large group of people), a firefighter might 
need to break a window that will cause a fire to reach an elderly person who is unable to 
move. What should she do? Should an autonomous vehicle be programmed to avoid 
plowing into a school bus by moving to the left, where there is a low probability of colliding 
with a tandem, or by moving to the right, where there is a high probability of colliding with 
a pedestrian? Among the factors that appear to be important, and worthy of serious further 
scrutiny, are whether the uncertainty is on the harm side or the benefit side, and whether 
the dilemma is about whether to incur that harm or instead how to apportion it. 
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Chapter 2 has been submitted for publication of the material as it may appear in 
Cognitive Science, 2019. Ryazanov, Arseny; Wang, Tinghao; Nelkin, Dana; 
Christenfeld, Nicholas; Rickless, Samuel. The dissertation author was the primary 
investigator and author of this paper.  
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Abstract 
Psychologists and philosophers working on the nature of moral judgments rely on 
hypothetical moral dilemmas typically specify outcomes as certain to occur. This is in 
sharp contrast with real-life moral dilemmas or moral decision-making, which is almost 
always infused with outcome uncertainty. Six studies contribute to the growing literature 
on moral judgment under probabilistic outcomes by examining sensitivity in moral 
dilemmas to where shifts in probability of harm and saving occur. By pitting participant 
sensitivity to size of shift in harm probability against an observed sensitivity to location 
of probability shift, we identify that end-states of harm  imposed by an action matter 
more than the magnitude the harm imposed, under both single evaluation and when the 
comparison between shifts is made explicit under joint evaluation. Our results also 
identify that moral judgments made under joint evaluation deviate further from expected 
value than judgments made under single evaluation. Consistent with the Dyadic Model of 
Morality, perceived harm partially mediates sensitivity to location of harm probability 
shift. Unlike for shifts in likelihood of harm, participants are found to be insensitive to 
where the shift in saving probability occur under both single and joint evaluation, 
suggesting an asymmetry between harm and benefit in moral reasoning. 
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Sensitivity to Shifts in Probability of Harm and Benefit in Moral Dilemmas  
 Despite being long-neglected by philosophers and psychologists alike, the role of 
probability in moral decision-making is garnering increasing attention (Shenhav & 
Greene, 2010; Ryazanov, Knutzen, Rickless, Christenfeld, & Nelkin, 2018; Shou & 
Song, 2017; Fleischhut, Meder, & Gigerenzer, 2017). Such research bridges the gap 
between the hypothetical scenarios that stipulate certain outcomes, through which moral 
dilemmas are traditionally studied, and the real-life scenarios that are infused with 
outcome uncertainty. For instance, instead of asking “should Tom certainly kill one 
person to certainly save five people?”, the studies mentioned above ask questions such as 
“should Tom certainly kill one person for a 50% chance of saving ten people?” or 
“should Tom risk a 50% chance of killing two people for certainly saving five people?”. 
Prior studies on uncertain moral dilemmas have identified systematic sensitivity to 
outcome likelihoods in moral judgments, both when it comes to probabilistic saving and 
probabilistic harming. 
The Size and Location of Probability Shifts in Moral Dilemmas 
We distinguish between the size of a probability shift and the location of a 
probability shift. The size of a probability shift concerns how much the probability of a 
certain outcome increases or decreases when one performs an action. But a probabilistic 
shift with the same size—e.g., a 25% increase—can occur in different locations, despite 
resulting in an identical change in expected value. For example, consider a plan that 
increases the probability of killing four people by 25%  in order to save two others.  The 
25% increase in the probability of four people dying results in an expected loss of one life 
(.25 x 4), whereas certainly saving two people is an expected gain of two lives, leading to 
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a favorable ratio of expected lives saved to expected lives lost (expected value ratio of 2).  
Note that the 25% increase in probability could occur anywhere in the 0-1 probability 
interval and not affect expected value.  For example, increasing the probability of four 
people dying from 0% to 25% has the same expected loss of life as does increasing the 
probability from 75% to 100%.  
Thus far, studies on moral dilemmas with uncertainty have all focused on the size 
of probability shifts, and, more specifically, on how the size of probability shifts 
contributes to the differences in expected value calculation where such shifts are 
presumed to be increases from 0% or decreases from 100% likelihood of an outcome. 
However, the location of probabilistic shifts could also matter for moral judgments. In 
the examples above, it might matter that increasing the probability of a group of four 
people dying from 0% to 25% means putting at risk a group that is otherwise facing no 
risk.  Or it might matter that the increase from 75% to 100% means that everyone in the 
group will certainly die.  If it turns out that the location of probability shifts has a robust 
effect on moral judgment in addition to the effect from the size of probability shifts, then 
it becomes puzzling how to characterize the nature of folk moral psychology. The finding 
would contradict the view that people’s moral judgments are consequentialist, since 
being a consequentialist in the traditional sense is to recognize as morally relevant only 
the difference in expected value of an action, which is independent of the location of the 
probability shift.  Though sensitivity to the location of probability shifts could be 
consistent with claiming that people’s judgments are deontological, traditional 
deontological theories don’t have the ready resources to explain the variations either. It is 
unclear why deontological constraints -- e.g., that we should not violate people’s rights or 
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use people as mere means -- are sensitive to where the probabilistic shifts occur. Moral 
dilemmas with different locations of probability shifts are thus worth systematic 
empirical investigation. 
Relevant Research and Predictions 
There is already some evidence suggesting the relevance of the location of 
probability shifts in decision making outside of the moral domain. In a study by Gonzalez 
and Wu (1999), participants were asked to select which of the following felt like a more 
significant change: increasing the odds of a lottery ticket that has a 65% chance of 
winning to 70%, or increasing the odds from 90% to 95%. Most participants chose the 
latter option. When offered a similar choice between increasing the odds of a ticket that 
has a 5% chance of winning to 10%, or from 30% to 35%, participants were more likely 
to choose the former option. This suggests that participants’ responses in monetary 
decisions are sensitive to the location of probability shifts and that participants are more 
sensitive to probability shifts that occur closer to 0% and 100% than to probability shifts 
that occur closer to 50% for monetary decisions. It remains an open question whether 
participants would be similarly sensitive to probability shifts in moral dilemmas, and we 
thereby take up this question in the current project. We predict that there will be some 
kind of sensitivity to the location of probability shifts in moral dilemmas, given the 
sensitivity to location in other domains. 
In the lottery ticket case, we might reasonably expect participants to be sensitive 
to the location of probability shifts regardless of whether the shift is an increase in 
likelihood of a beneficial outcome such as winning the lottery, or a negative outcome, 
such as the likelihood of losing an investment. But in moral dilemmas, which contain 
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both negative outcomes (harm caused) and positive outcomes (benefit), there could be an 
asymmetry in sensitivity to the location of probability shifts for shifts likelihood of harm 
and shifts in likelihood of benefit. Intuitively, in the absence of other morally relevant 
factors, there is a right or claim to not have one’s probability of dying increased whereas 
there is no right or claim to have one’s probability of survival increased. More generally, 
there is a right or claim to not be probabilistically harmed whereas there is no right or 
claim to be probabilistically benefited. This parallels what moral philosophers refer to as 
the difference between the right and the good (Ross, 1930) or the distinction between 
justice and charity (Foot, 1978).  
 Empirical evidence adds further support to the philosophical notion of a 
harm/benefit asymmetry, which could possibly extend to an asymmetry in sensitivity to 
harm and benefit likelihood location shifts. Guglielmo and Malle (2019) find that blame 
is more differentiated than praise, more specifically, that mental states preceding negative 
actions are more finely-distinguished than mental states preceding positive actions (also 
see Monroe & Malle, 2019). Likewise, negative events have a larger range of linguistic 
representation than positive events (Rozin & Royzman, 2001; Peeters, 1971).  In 
addition, some empirical theories on moral judgment give a much more central role to 
harm than they do to benefit. One notable example is Schein and Gray’s (2018) theory of 
dyadic morality, which predicts the immorality of an act almost exclusively in terms of  
the perceived harm it causes. If such discernment extends to sensitivity to various ways 
of expressing the same change in expected value, but with the location of where the 
probability shift occurs varied, it suggests that participants may discern more among 
different locations in probabilistic harm (e.g., whether risk of harm is raised from 0% to 
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25%, or from 75% to 100%) than among different locations in probabilistic benefit (such 
as whether the risk of death is reduced from 100% to 75% or from 25% to 0%). 
We examine whether moral judgments are more sensitive to the location of 
probabilistic shifts in the case of harm than in the case of benefit, as would be possible if 
the blame/praise differentiation asymmetry extended to location sensitivity for where 
shifts in probabilistic harm and benefit occur and would be consistent with the 
asymmetrical treatment of harm and benefit in some major moral theories. In light of 
Schein and Gray’s (2018) theory of dyadic morality, we hypothesized that sensitivity to 
different locations of probabilistic shifts in harm could be attributable to differences in 
perceived harm. This is also consistent with Gonzalez and Wu’s (1999) study, since if a 
shift of harm likelihood feels like a more significant change, it could be that the action 
feels more harmful. Though there are presumably deeper explanations for the differences 
in harm perception, we take it that perceived harm is a good starting point and already 
goes some way towards giving a more complete story of folk moral psychology in 
uncertain moral dilemmas. 
 Finally, moral judgments can be studied between-subjects, by posing different 
scenarios to different people, or within-subjects, by asking participants whether they find 
a particular difference to be morally relevant. Both approaches are useful: more 
consistent moral judgments are made under joint evaluation than when rating individual 
scenarios for two versions of trolley problems—where a person can be dropped onto a 
trolley track to save others ahead or where a trolley can be diverted onto a track with one 
person on it to save others ahead (Barak-Corren, Tsay, Cushman, & Bazerman, 2018). 
One reasonable explanation for this difference is that participants are motivated to reflect 
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on whether their divergent reactions to the two scenarios are normatively defensible 
under joint evaluation. Thus, in this paper we explore the effect of the location of 
probability shifts in moral judgments under both single and joint evaluation. We 
hypothesize that the single evaluations will reveal people’s unreflective preferences, 
while the joint evaluations will reveal people’s considered preferences once the 
differences in individual cases are made particularly salient.   
Studies 
Six studies examine the role of shifts in probability in moral judgment. Study 1 
finds that participants are sensitive to the location of probability shifts for harm, but not 
benefit, when the size of probabilistic shifts is held fixed. Study 2 examines whether the 
effect of location shifts in harm probability reflects sensitivity to end-state probability and 
insensitivity to the size of the shift. Studies 3a and 3b explore whether participants 
endorse the patterns observed in the between-subject studies upon reflection, under joint 
evaluation. Through mediation analyses, Study 4a examines the relationship between 
location of shift in likelihood of harming bystanders and the perceived harmfulness of the 
action, while Study 4b examines the relationship between location shift in likelihood of 
saving a group and perceived benefit. 
 
Study 1 
We begin by exploring whether participants are sensitive to the location of 
probability shifts for both harmful and beneficial outcomes in moral dilemmas, when the 
size of probabilistic shifts is held fixed. 
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Study 1 Methods 
One thousand nineteen participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk (862 passed an attention check; because results did not significantly differ between 
the full sample and those passing the attention check, all participants were retained for 
analysis; 61.8% female; mean age = 34.4, SD = 10.7). Participants were randomly 
assigned to read one of eight scenarios. Four of the scenarios concerned moral dilemmas 
in which two people could certainly be saved by increasing the risk of harming 4 
bystanders by 25%. The four scenarios all had different starting and ending points for the 
probability shift, but the same expected value: 0% to 25%, 25% to 50%, 50% to 75%, and 
75% to 100%, respectively, see Table 1. As an example, one of the scenarios was as 
follows:  
Harry sees a group of two people who will certainly die without intervention. He knows 
the following facts. There is a group of four bystanders that is facing a 0% risk of 
death. Harry can carry out a plan that will certainly save the group of two people. 
However, in carrying out the plan, Harry will increase the risk of death for the group of 
four bystanders from 0% to 25%. 
 
Participants responded to a single question regarding their confidence that the action 
should be carried out, adapted to each scenario, along an eleven-point scale. For example, 
participants were asked, Should Harry carry out a plan that he knows with certainty will 
both save the group of two people and at the same time raise the risk of death for the 
group of four bystanders from 0% to 25%? (-5: very confident Harry should not carry out 
the plan, to 5: very confident Harry should carry out the plan). 
The other four scenarios concerned moral dilemmas in which the probability of a 
group of eight people dying can be decreased by 25% as a result of certainly killing one 
bystander. Again, four scenarios all had different starting and ending points for the 
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probability shift, but the same expected value: 25% to 0%, 50% to 25%, 75% to 50%, and 
100% to 75%, respectively. For example, one of the scenarios was as follows:  
Harry sees a group of eight people whose lives are in danger. He knows the following 
facts. There is a 25% chance of the group of eight people dying. Harry can carry out a 
plan that will reduce the risk of the group of eight dying from 25% to 0%. However, in 
carrying out the plan, Harry will certainly kill one bystander.  
Participants responded to a single question regarding their confidence that the action 
should be carried out, adapted to each scenario, along an eleven-point scale. For example, 
participants were asked, Should Harry carry out a plan that he knows with certainty will 
both reduce the risk of the group of eight dying from 25% to 0% and at the same time kill 
one bystander? (-5: very confident Harry should not carry out the plan, to 5: very 
confident Harry should carry out the plan).  
 
Table 3.1. Study 1 scenarios. 
Probability 
shift 
Harm Scenarios Save Scenarios EV 
ratio of 
action 
0% to 25% Increase chance of 4 people 
dying from 0%  to 25% to 
save 2 people 
Kill 1 person to decrease 
chance of 8 people dying 
from 25% to 0% 
2 
25% to 
50% 
Increase chance of 4 people 
dying from 25%  to 50% to 
save 2 people 
Kill 1 person to decrease 
chance of 8 people dying 
from 50% to 25% 
2 
50% to 
75% 
Increase chance of 4 people 
dying from 50%  to 75% to 
save 2 people 
Kill 1 person to decrease 
chance of 8 people dying 
from 75% to 50% 
2 
75% to 
100% 
Increase chance of 4 people 
dying from 75%  to 100% to 
save 2 people 
Kill 1 person to decrease 
chance of 8 people dying 
from 100% to 75% 
2 
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Study 1 Results 
We first verified that participants were generally endorsing an action that had a 
positive expected value ratio (good done to harm done) of 2. Across all eight versions of 
the action, participants endorsed the action t(1018) = 7.01, p < .001, d = .22 (mean = .67, 
SD = 3.04). There was no significant difference between ratings assigned to scenarios 
where harm was probabilistic and scenarios where saving was probabilistic, t(1017) = 
1.11, p = .27, d = .07 (mean harm = .77, SD = 2.97; mean save = .56, SD = 3.11).  
Entering where the shift in harming/saving occurred as a linear factor (25-0, 50-
25, 75-50, 100-75, recoded as 1, 2, 3, 4, respectively), and entering the type of probability 
shift (harm or save), as well as their interaction as factors into an ANOVA revealed an 
interaction between type of shift and sensitivity to probability shift F(1, 1015) = 27.1, p < 
.001, r = .18 , suggesting that participants were differentially sensitive to location of 
probability shifts for probabilistic harms and probabilistic saving (mean harm 0-25% = 
1.55, SD = 2.54; mean harm 25-50% = 1.19, SD = 2.80; mean harm 50-75% = .89, SD = 
2.81; mean harm 75-100% = -.55, SD = 3.29; mean save 25-0% = .35, SD = 3.20; mean 
save 50-25% = .33, SD = 2.91; mean save 75-50% = .76, SD = 3.13; mean save 100-75% 
= .81, SD = 3.20; see Figure 1a). Reverse coding shift location for save shifts (so that 1 = 
100-75, 2 = 75-50, etc.) also yielded a significant interaction, F(1, 1015) = 8.16, p = .004, 
r = .09, see Figure 1b), suggesting that the interaction was not an artifact of the coding 
scheme used to compare harm shifts and saving shifts. 
We then separately examined sensitivity to probability shifts on the harm side—is 
a plan that raises the risk of four bystanders dying from, e.g., 0% to 25% in order to save 
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two people preferred to a plan that raises the risk of four bystanders dying from 50% to 
75%? Entering where the shift in harm occurs as a linear factor revealed that participant 
judgments of whether the action should be carried out were influenced by where the 25% 
shift in likelihood of harm occurs, F(1, 510) = 33.4, p < .001, r = .25. In order to examine 
whether this linear effect was driven solely by an aversion to causing certain death—the 
75%-100% shift, the linear model was rerun after excluding the 75%-100% shift and still 
yielded a significant linear relationship between being decreased confidence in action and 
the location of the probability shift 1, F(1, 510) = 33.4, p < .001, r = .25. Thus, as the 
25% increase in likelihood of harm occurred closer to 100%, participant confidence in 
carrying out the action decreased. 
We next examined sensitivity to probability shifts on the saving side—for 
example, is a plan that will certainly kill one bystander in order to reduce the risk of a 
group of 8 dying from 25% to 0% viewed more favorably than a plan that reduces the 
risk of a different group of 8 dying from 75% to 50%? Entering where the shift in saving 
occurs as a linear factor (25-0, 50-25, 75-50, 100-75, recoded as 1, 2, 3, 4, respectively), 
revealed that participants judgments were not influenced by where the 25% shift in 
likelihood of saving occurred, F(1, 506) = 2.14, p = .14, r = .065. To verify that the 
observed lack of effect on the saving side was not the result of framing the saving 
likelihood as a decrease in the likelihood of dying, rather than an increase in the 
likelihood of survival, a separate study compared the two versions for several probability 
shifts and found no evidence of sensitivity to probability shift for either frame (see 
supplementary materials). 
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Figure 3.1. Sensitivity to probability shift location for an action that increases in 
likelihood of four bystanders dying by 25% in order to save two people (harm), and to 
probability shift location for an action that deceases the likelihood of eight individuals 
dying by 25% by killing one bystander.  Error bars represent one standard error. 
 
Study 1 Discussion 
 Study 1 found that that the location of probability shifts affects moral reasoning 
independently from the ways in which the numerical value of the shift contributes to the 
differences in expected value calculation for probabilistic harm. Harry’s plan in each of 
the eight scenarios concerns exactly the same ratio in expected value—the equivalent of 2 
lives saved and 1 life lost. Though participants, on the whole endorse action, and we did 
not observe overall differences in endorsing actions between actions that involve 
probabilistic harm or benefit, participants were sensitive to location of the shift in harm 
likelihood, but not the location of the shift in benefit likelihood. 
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 Thus, there appears to be a harm/benefit asymmetry in sensitivity to the location 
of probability shifts, when the size of the shift is held fixed. On the harming side, 
participants are keenly sensitive to where the shift in probability of harm occurs. On the 
saving side, however, participants are largely insensitive to where the shift in probability 
of saving occurs. The finding of differential sensitivity between harm and benefit location 
shifts is consistent with the more general phenomenon that judgments of negative actions 
being more fine-grained than moral judgments of beneficial actions (Guglielmo & Malle, 
2019; Monroe & Malle, 2019).  
 The effect of shifts in probability of harm appears to be linear, rather than 
showing increased sensitivity when the shifts occur close to 0 and 1, as found by 
Gonzalez and Wu (1991) for monetary decisions. Furthermore, the sensitivity to shifts of 
harm does not appear to simply reflect a specific to an aversion to certain harm, as 
excluding the 75%-100% shift from the linear model still yielded a significant linear 
relationship between being decreased confidence in action and the location of the 
probability shift. 
 It’s not obvious what the sensitivity to the location of probability shifts shows 
about the nature of folk moral psychology. A common view of moral judgment depicts it 
as either consequentialist or deontological. Consequentialist judgments reflect an 
exclusive concern for the expected values in outcomes, whereas deontological judgments 
reflect a further concern regarding certain deontological constraints, e.g., constraints 
against right violation or using people merely as means. But neither consequentialism nor 
deontology can easily characterize the sensitivity observed in the current study. On one 
hand, the relevant moral judgments cannot be said to be consequentialist, since to be a 
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consequentialist in the traditional sense is to recognize as morally salient only differences 
in expected values irrespective of where the probability shifts occur. Thus, the studies 
clearly reveal that something other than expected value is operating for probabilistic 
harms. On the other hand, it is not obvious what tools deontologists have to accommodate 
the relevance of probability shifts, since it’s not totally clear how the legitimacy of any 
deontological constraints, e.g., those regarding right violation or treating people as ends, 
depends on where a probability shift occurs. Thus, the sensitivity observed in the current 
study constitutes a puzzling phenomenon that cannot be easily accommodated in the 
traditional consequentialism/deontology framework, though we make some suggestions 
about how to address this puzzle in the general discussion. This pattern of results may, 
however, be accounted for psychologically: harm that occurs closer to certainty feeling 
more harm-like could drive moral judgment, consistent with the role of perceived harm 
identified by the Dyadic Theory of Morality. We test this possibility in Study 4, after first 
examining whether participants attend to both start-state and end-state probabilities, and 
examining their judgments under single and joint evaluation. 
 
Study 2 
In Study 1, we held fixed the size of probability shifts and explored the role of the 
location of probability shifts. A further question concerns what will happen if the size of 
probability shifts is not held fixed. Will the end-state of probability shifts affect moral 
psychology in a way that overrides the differences in size and differing starting point? 
For example, we found that increasing risk of harm from 75% to 100% mattered more 
than increasing risk from 50% to 75%.  To the extent that end state is all that matters, 
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then an increase from 50% to 100% will have the same effect as an increase from 75% to 
100%, even though the expected loss of life in the former case is twice that of the latter.  
Studies 2 and 3 aim to explore this general question from different perspectives. 
 Study 2 independently varied the size of the probability shift and the end point of 
the probability shift for probabilistic harms. It could be the case that the end-state 
probability was driving the effect in Study 1.  In the event that end-states influence moral 
judgment, we also wanted to verify that our participants paid adequate attention to both 
the starting points and the ending points (i.e., the size) of the probability shifts when 
responding to the moral dilemmas we developed, in order to rule out the possibility that 
our findings in Study 1 were due to participants  not paying attention to initial-state 
probabilities. 
 
Study 2 Methods 
Three hundred twenty nine participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk (59.6% female; mean age = 35.2, SD = 10.7). Participants were randomly assigned 
to read one of four scenarios in which two people could certainly be saved by increasing 
the risk of harming four bystanders. In two of the scenarios, the shifts were from 0% to 
50% and from 25% to 50%; in the other two scenarios, the shifts were from 50% to 100% 
and from 75% to 100%. Participants then responded to a single question regarding their 
confidence that the action should be carried out along an eleven-point scale, as in Study 
1. Immediately after the question, participants were asked to recall the initial probability 
of harm to the four bystanders and the probability of harm to the four bystanders should 
the plan be carried out (What was the initial risk of death for the group of four 
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bystanders?; What would the risk of death be for the group of four bystanders if Harry 
carried out his plan?). This was used to verify that participants paid adequate attention to 
the initial, not just final, probability of harm.  
 
Table 3.2. Study 2 scenarios 
Probability shift Harm Scenarios EV ratio 
of action 
0% to 50% Increase chance of 4 people dying from 0%  to 25% 
to save 2 people 
1 
25% to 50% Increase chance of 4 people dying from 25%  to 
50% to save 2 people 
2 
50% to 100% Increase chance of 4 people dying from 50%  to 
75% to save 2 people 
1 
75% to 100% Increase chance of 4 people dying from 75%  to 
100% to save 2 people 
2 
 
If participants were pure consequentialists, they should be more likely to endorse the 
actions that involve 25% shifts in harm (EV ratio = 2; 2 lives saved / 1 ended), compared 
to actions that involve 50% shifts in harm (EV ratio = 1; 2 lives saved / 2 ended). We 
would expect to see the main effect of shift size, but no effect of end point, since only 
shift size matters to EV. However, if participants are instead sensitive to endpoint rather 
than size of shift, we would expect to see similar ratings of actions with the same end 
point (e.g., 100%), regardless of shift size (50%-100% vs. 75%-100%).  
Study 2 Results 
A 2x2 ANOVA analyzing the full set of participants, with size of shift and end-
point entered as factors revealed no significant effect of size of shift, F(1, 324) = 1.95, p 
= .16, r = .07 (mean 50% shift = -.18, SD = 3.15; mean 25% shift = .26, SD = 3.06, 
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suggesting that participants were not sensitive to expected value, and therefore not 
making purely consequentialist judgments. A significant main effect of end-state revealed 
that participants were sensitive to whether the final end-state was a 50% chance of the 
four bystanders dying, or a 100% chance of the four dying, F(1, 324) = 59.9, p < .001, r = 
.39 (mean 50% end-state = 1.27, SD = 2.73; mean 100% end-state = -1.18, SD = 2.99), 
inconsistent with pure consequentialism. There was no significant interaction of end point 
and size of shift, F(1, 324) = .01, p = .93, r < .01. This suggests two possibilities: 
participants may have mistakenly attended to only end points in the experiment, or 
participants may genuinely care more about endpoints than sizes of shift in harm.   
By employing a stringent attention check that asked participants to identify 
starting and ending probabilities using free recall, we could explore whether size of shift 
mattered for participants who had correctly identified both probabilities. Two hundred 
thirty five people (71%) correctly identified the starting and ending probabilities after 
being asked to respond to our dependent variable. Notably, the pattern of results among 
those participants was similar to the full sample: A 2x2 ANOVA, with size of shift and 
end-point entered as factors again revealed no significant effect of size of shift, F(1, 233) 
= 2.70, p = .10, r = .11 (mean 50% shift = -.63, SD = 3.14; mean 25% shift = .05, SD = 
3.12). Thus, participants who had verifiably attended to both start-state and end-state 
probabilities, and were therefore aware of the shift size, were nonetheless insensitive to 
shift size. Consistent with the larger sample, we continued to see a significant main effect 
of end point, F(1, 233) = 66.6, p <.001, r = .47 (mean 50% end-state = 1.19, SD = 2.84; 
mean 100% end-state = -1.77, SD = 2.71). There was no significant interaction between 
end point and size of shift, F(1, 231) = .03, p = .86, r = .01. Planned contrasts between 
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shifts that resulted in the same end-state level of risk to the bystanders were all non-
significant (25-50 vs. 0-50: t(119) = 1.28, p = .20, d = .31 (mean 25-50% = 1.45, SD = 
2.70; mean 0-50% = .84, SD = 3.00); 50-100 vs. 75-100: t(113) = .92, p = .36, d = .18, 
(mean 50-100% = -2.02, SD = 2.60; mean 75-100% = -1.54, SD = 2.81)). Thus, our 
findings suggest that ending probabilities, rather than the difference in the sizes of 
probability shifts or starting point, matter to participants, and that this is not the result of 
having only attended to endpoints.  
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Figure 3.2. Sensitivity to size of shift and end-state likelihood of harm to bystanders for 
all participants (a) and participants correctly recalling the initial and end state probability 
of harm (b). Error bars represent one standard error. 
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Study 2 Discussion 
Participants were more sensitive to the end-state probability than to the size of the 
shift in probability of harm to the bystanders, despite being able to recall initial and final 
probabilities for the scenarios they read. This suggests that participants care more about 
what level of risk of harm the bystanders end up at than how much the risk of harm is 
increased for the bystanders.  
 Because end points matter more than shift size, it raises the question of just how 
much people are willing to trade off the two.  Large increases in probability of harm with 
relatively low end points (e.g., 0%-90%) might be viewed as more acceptable than small 
increases in probability of harm with high endpoints (e.g., 90%-100%).  And, if so, we 
were also interested in whether participants’ more reflective preferences under joint 
evaluation would be consistent with their preferences under single evaluation. 
 
Study 3a and 3b 
Studies 3a and 3b continued exploring how much the location of probability shifts 
matters. To examine the extent to which participants would prefer a larger probability 
increase in harm with a lower end state to a small probability increase with a higher end-
state probability, we set out to estimate a balance point value, X, such that participants 
would no longer prefer the 0% to X% plan over the X% to 100% plan.  For a 
consequentialist, X would be 50 (i.e., indifferent between an increase in harm from 0%-
50% and an increase from 50% to 100%).  However, sensitivity to end points suggests 
that X will be greater than 50%.  We examine these preferences under single and joint 
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evaluation, in order to see whether judgments made under single evaluation would 
withstand reflection under joint evaluation. 
 
Study 3a 
Study 3a Methods 
 Three hundred and ninety five participants were recruited via Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (327 passed an attention check; because results did not significantly 
differ between the full sample and those passing the attention check, all participants were 
retained for analysis; 55.4% female, mean age = 33.9, SD = 11.6). The study was 
comprised of a single evaluation task and joint evaluation task. In the single evaluation 
task, each participant was randomly assigned to read one of eight scenarios. Four of the 
eight scenarios involved an increase from 0% to x% (x = 50, 75, 85, 95), whereas the 
other four involved an increase from x% to 100% (x = 50, 75, 85, 95). For example, the 
single evaluation task that involved an increase from 0% to 95% went as follows:  
Harry sees a group of two people who will certainly die without intervention. He knows 
the following facts. There is a group of four bystanders that is facing a 0% risk of death. 
Harry can carry out a plan that will certainly save the group of two people. However, in 
carrying out the plan, Harry will increase the risk of death for the group of four 
bystanders from 0% to 95%. 
 
Participants were asked, for example, Should Harry carry out a plan that he knows with 
certainty will both save the group of two people and at the same time raise the risk of 
death for the group of four bystanders from 0% to 95%?  (-5: very confident Harry 
should not carry out the plan, to 5: very confident Harry should carry out the plan). After 
completing the single evaluation, participants then read a joint evaluation scenario in 
which participants had to choose between two plans, labeled as Plan X and Plan Y. One 
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of these two plans was the plan participants had read under single evaluation, the second 
was its matched pair, such that participants saw matched 0% to X% and X% to 100% 
plans (see Table 3 for scenarios and pairings). For example, participants who had rated 
either the 0% to 95% plan or the 95% to 100% plan under single evaluation, chose 
between a 0% to 95% plan and 95% to 100% plan in the joint evaluation task, as follows:  
Harry sees a group of two people who will certainly die without intervention. He knows 
the following facts. There are two groups, A and B, with four bystanders in each 
group.  Group A is facing a 0% risk of death, and Group B is facing a 95% risk of death. 
Harry can carry out a plan, Plan X, that will save the group of two people, but raise the 
risk of death for the A group of four bystanders from 0% to 95%. Alternatively, he can 
carry out a plan, Plan Y, that will save the group of two people, but raise the risk of death 
for the B group of four bystanders from 95% to 100%. He only has time to carry out one 
of his plans. 
 
Participants were then asked, Assuming that Harry must carry out one of the two plans, 
which should he carry out: Plan X, which he knows with certainty will both save the 
group of two people and at the same time raise the risk of death for the A group of four 
bystanders from 0% to 95%; or Plan Y, which he knows with certainty will both save the 
group of two people and at the same time raise the risk of death for the B group of four 
bystanders from 95% to 100%? 
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Table 3.3. Study 3a scenarios. 
Probability 
shift 
Harm Scenarios Scenario 
Pairing 
EV ratio 
of action 
0% to 50% Increase chance of 4 people dying from 0%  
to 25% to save 2 people 
A 1 
50% to 100% Increase chance of 4 people dying from 
50%  to 100% to save 2 people 
A 1 
0% to 75% Increase chance of 4 people dying from 0%  
to 75% to save 2 people 
B .66 
75% to 100% Increase chance of 4 people dying from 
75%  to 100% to save 2 people 
B 2 
0% to 85% Increase chance of 4 people dying from 0%  
to 85% to save 2 people 
C .59 
85% to 100% Increase chance of 4 people dying from 
85%  to 100% to save 2 people 
C 3.33 
0% to 95% Increase chance of 4 people dying from 0%  
to 95% to save 2 people 
D .53 
95% to 100% Increase chance of 4 people dying from 
95%  to 100% to save 2 people 
D 10 
 
Study 3a Results: 
In this study, we were interested in whether, upon reflection, participants would 
endorse an x-100 plan over a 0-x plan. We could thus identify the balance point (X) at 
which people flip from preferring a 0-x plan to an x-0 plan under joint evaluation, and 
whether this tracks their preferences under single evaluation. 
 First, we examined preferences under single evaluation. We observed a significant 
interaction between where the balance point was set (x) and whether the shift in harm 
resulted in a probabilistic or certain harm end-state (0-x or x-100), F(1, 391) = 28.4, p 
<.001, r2 = .0725 (see Figure 3). Consistent with Study 2 findings, though participants 
endorsed a plan that raises the likelihood of four bystanders dying from 0-50% to save a 
group of two, they rejected a plan that raised the likelihood of the four bystanders dying 
from 50-100% to achieve the same result, t(96) = 3.48, p < .001, d = .70 (mean 0-50% = 
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.92, SD = 2.96; mean 50-100% = -1.10, SD = 2.79). However, participants preferred a 
plan that increases the chances of harm from 95-100% over a plan that shifts risk of harm 
to the four from 0-95%, t(98) = 4.55, p <.001, d = .91 (mean 0-95% = -1.85, SD = 2.80; 
mean 95-100% = .75, SD = 2.90. There was no preference between plans that raised the 
likelihood of harm from 0-75% and 75-100%, t(101) = .04, p = .96, d = .01 (mean 0-75% 
= -.58, SD = 2.95; mean 75-100% = -.60, SD = 2.95), nor between plans that raised the 
likelihood of harm from 0-85% and 85-100%, t(92) = .69, p = .49,  d = .14 (mean 0-85% 
= -.69, SD = 3.04; mean 85-100% = -.24, SD = 3.25). Thus, under single evaluation, 
sensitivity to expected value and to end-state were tied when the balance point (X) was 
set at 75.  
 
 
Figure 3.3. Sensitivity to size of shift in probability of harm to bystanders for shifts that 
increase the likelihood of harm from 0-x%, or from x-100%, under single evaluation. 
Error bars represent one standard error. 
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Under joint evaluation, we were interested in whether participants would endorse 
the patterns observed under single evaluation (e.g., whether participants endorse the idea 
that raising the risk of harm to four bystanders from 0-50% is preferable to raising the 
risk of harm to four bystanders from 50-100%). While a preference for 0-50% over 50-
100% could be normatively defensible, in that it would not be unreasonable for avoiding 
certain harm to be a tie-breaking preference between two actions with matched expected 
values, a preference for 0-85% over 85-100% (or indifference between 0-95% and 95-
100%) is less clearly defensible, in that the expected value of the 0-85% action is such 
that it does much more harm than good (EV ratio = .59), whereas the 85-100% action 
does much more good than harm (EV ratio = 3.33).  
Participants endorsed the pattern of results observed under single evaluation for 0-
50% and 50-100% plans, by endorsing 0-50% plans under joint evaluation, despite their 
equivalent expected value, t(97) = 6.19, p < .001, d = .63 (difference from 0; mean = -
1.89, SD = 3.01), see Figure 4. Despite not having a preference under single evaluation 
between a plan that raises the risk of harm to four bystanders from 0-75% to one that 
raises the risk of four bystanders dying from 75-100%, participants preferred the 0-75% 
plan under joint evaluation, t(102) = 2.78, p = .007, d = .27 (mean =  -.86, SD = 3.15). 
Likewise, despite not having a preference under single evaluation between a plans under 
single evaluation, participants preferred the 0-85% over the 85-100% plan under joint 
evaluation, t(93) = 3.15, p = .002, d = .32 (mean = -1.03, SD = 3.18). Perhaps most 
surprisingly, despite clearly endorsing the 95-100% plan and rejecting the 0-95% plan 
under single evaluation, under joint evaluation participants became indifferent between 
the 95-100% plan, which had an expected value ratio of 10 (causing much benefit for 
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little harm), and the 0-95% plan, which had an expected value of .53 (causing much more 
harm than benefit), t(99) = 1.50, p = .13, d = .15 (mean = -.49, SD = 3.28). Thus, 
participants were willing to pay a tremendous expected value premium to avoid raising 
the likelihood of death to the bystanders to 100%: Sensitivity to expected value and to 
end-state, under joint evaluation, was achieved only once the balance point (X) was set at 
95. 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Preference for plans that increase harm from 0-x% or x-100% to four 
bystanders in order to save two people, under joint evaluation. Negative numbers indicate 
a preference for 0-x plans. Error bars represent one standard error. 
 
One unexpected finding was that an order effect emerged, such that participants 
who had seen 0-x plans were more likely to endorse them F(1, 387) = 8.76, p < .01 (mean 
0-x% = -1.52, SD = 3.04; mean x-100% = -.60, SD = 3.27), across all scenarios. 
Supplementary studies were conducted using the x = 50 and x = 95 conditions, where the 
-5-4
-3-2
-10
12
34
5
50 75 85 95Pre
fe
re
nc
e	
fo
r	
pl
an
	u
nd
er
	jo
in
t	e
va
lu
at
io
n
Harm	probability	shift	(0-x	vs	x-100)
		 136 
joint evaluation task was presented without preceding single evaluations. The results 
showed the same pattern, with participants being undecided at x = 95 (t(112) = .84, p = 
.40, d = .08 (mean = -.26, SD = 3.24)) and having a strong preference at x = 50 (t(106) = 
13.9, p < .001, d = 2.34, (mean = -2.89, SD = 2.15). See supplementary materials for 
details. 
 
Study 3a discussion 
 Under joint evaluation, not only do participants endorse the position that it is 
better to raise the risk of one dying from 0-50% than to raise the risk of another dying 
from 50% to 100%, but they are willing to pay a premium to avoid raising the risk to the 
group already at risk.  Specifically, they prefer a plan that raises the risk of death for four 
bystanders from 0% to 85% over a plan that raises the risk of death for another group of 
four bystanders from 85% to 100%. By contrast, single evaluation tasks don’t show a 
strong preference for the 0% to 85% plan. Furthermore, under joint evaluation 
participants are tied between 0-95% plans and 95-100% plans, despite having a strong 
preference for 95-100% plans under single evaluation. We interpret the joint evaluation 
tasks as revealing people’s considered judgments, and thereby should be taken seriously 
for the purpose of understanding lay moral theory, as well as for moral theorists’ project 
of engaging in reflective equilibrium in defense of a correct set of moral principles that 
mutually support and explain our reactions to particular scenarios. But this is subject to 
further scrutiny. Both the single and the joint evaluation results add support to our Study 
2 finding that the end-state of probability shifts matters more than the size of the 
probability shifts. Surprisingly, joint evaluations (balance point = 95) deviate further 
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from sensitivity to expected value than single evaluations (balance point = 75) for shifts 
in likelihood of harm. We next examined whether joint evaluation judgments of shifts in 
location on the saving side would be consistent with single evaluation insensitivity to 
location observed in Study 1. 
 
Study 3b 
 We have competing predictions regarding what will happen under joint evaluation 
for varying shifts on the saving side. It could be that people continue to be insensitive to 
probability shifts under joint evaluation, if people genuinely do not believe that it is better 
to definitely save than to reduce definite risk. Alternatively, it could be that a preference 
for certain saving emerges under joint evaluation, such that, for example, when choosing 
between a plan that can decrease risk of death for one group of people from 50% to 0%, 
or decrease the risk of death for another group from 100% to 50%, people prefer the plan 
that results in certain saving. 
 
Study 3b methods 
 One hundred seventy five participants were recruited for this study (141 passed an 
attention check, because results did not significantly differ between the full sample and 
those passing the attention check, all participants were retained for analysis, 63.4% 
female, mean age = 35.3, SD = 11.0). Study 3b was structurally similar to Study 3a: 
Participants were asked to perform a single evaluation task and a joint evaluation task. 
But the actions in the scenarios now involved shifts in the likelihood of a group dying, at 
the cost of killing a bystander. Though we had not observed sensitivity to location of 
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saving probability shift in Study 1, it is possible that a preference for certain saving could 
emerge under joint evaluation. In order to examine this, we adapted the Study 3a 
scenarios to describe an action that could decrease the likelihood of the group of eight 
dying by certainly killing a bystander. We selected new balance point values (X), such 
that the action could reduce the likelihood of death for the eight from 100-x% or from x-
0%. Selecting x = 50 as a balance allowed us to examine this preference at tied expected 
values (EV = 4 for both plans). A second balance point, x = 25%, allowed us to 
determine whether any potential emergent joint evaluation preference for certain saving, 
observed under tied expected values, could outweigh sensitivity to the expected value of 
the action when expected values are unmatched (25- 0% EV = 2; 100-75% EV = 6). 
Participants were randomly assigned one of four plans: two of the plans involved killing a 
bystander to decrease the risk of eight dying from x% to 0% (x = 50, 25), and two 
involved killing a bystander in order to decrease the chance of eight people dying from 
100% to x% (x = 50, 25), see Table 4. One scenario, for instance, was as follows: 
Harry sees a group of eight people whose lives are in danger. He knows the following 
facts. There is a 50% chance of the group of eight people dying. Harry can carry out a 
plan that will reduce the risk of the group of eight dying from 50% to 0%. However, in 
carrying out the plan, Harry will certainly kill one bystander.  
After evaluating one of the two plans, (e.g. Should Harry carry out a plan that he knows 
with certainty will both reduce the risk of the group of eight dying from 50% to 0% and at 
the same time kill one bystander?  ; -5: very confident Harry should not carry out the 
plan, to 5: very confident Harry should carry out the plan), participants were exposed to 
the plan they had seen and its matched pair, such that they would see both a 0-X and 
corresponding X-100 plan, labeled as Plan X and Plan Y: 
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Harry sees two groups, A and B, with eight people in each group whose lives are in 
danger. He knows the following facts. Group A is facing a 50% chance of dying, and 
Group B is facing a 100% chance of dying. Harry can carry out a plan, Plan X, that will 
reduce the chance of Group A dying from 50% to 0% but certainly kill one bystander. 
Alternatively, he can carry out a plan, Plan Y, that will reduce the chance of Group B 
dying from 100% to 50% but certainly kill one bystander. He only has time to carry out 
one of his plans. 
 
Participants were then asked to compare the two plans as follows: Assuming that Harry 
must carry out one of the two plans, which should he carry out: Plan X, which he knows 
with certainty will both reduce the risk of the A group of eight dying from 50% to 0% and 
at the same time kill one bystander; or Plan Y, which he knows with certainty will both 
reduce the risk of the B group of eight dying from 100% to 50% and at the same time kill 
one bystander? (-5 – 5; Very confident Harry should carry out Plan X –Not at all 
confident either way—Very confident Harry should carry out Plan Y). 
 
Table 3.4. Study 3b scenarios. 
Probability 
shift 
Save Scenarios Scenario 
Pairing 
EV ratio 
of action 
50% to 0% Kill 1 bystander to decrease chance of 8 
people dying from 50% to 0% 
A 4 
100% to 50% Kill 1 bystander to decrease chance of 8 
people dying from 100% to 50% 
A 4 
25% to 0% Kill 1 bystander to decrease chance of 8 
people dying from 25% to 0% 
B 2 
100% to 25% Kill 1 bystander to decrease chance of 8 
people dying from 100% to 25% 
B 6 
 
Study 3b results: 
Under single evaluation, overall, plans that reduced the likelihood of the eight 
dying from 100% to x were rated more favorably than plans that reduced the likelihood 
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of the eight dying from x to 0%, F(1, 170) = 5.74, p = .018, r = .15 (mean 100-x% = 1.77, 
SD = 2.46; mean x-0% = .71, SD = 3.19), see Figure 5. There was no main effect of 
where the balance point x was set (whether x = 25 or 50), F(1, 170) = .30, p = .58, r = .04 
(mean 25 = 1.08, SD = 2.88; mean 50 = 1.33, SD = 2.95), or interaction between where 
the balance point was set and whether the probability shift resulted in probabilistic or 
certain saving (100-x% or x-0%), F(1,168 ) = .62, p = .43, r = .06. The main effect, 
however, was driven primarily by the 25-0% vs. 100-25% comparison, t(82) = 2.26, p = 
.026, d = .50 (mean 25-0% = .47, SD = 2.53; mean 100-25% = 1.87, SD = 2.53) rather 
than the 50-0% vs 100-50% comparison t(86) = 1.12, p = .27, d = .24 (mean 50-0% = 
.98, SD = 3.39; mean 100-50% = 1.68; SD = 2.43). These results suggest that, under 
single evaluation, participants were indifferent between plans with identical expected 
values but that varied in probability shift end-state (50-0% and 100-50%). Participants, 
were, however, sensitive to the differences in expected value between the 100-25%  (EV 
= 6) plan and the 25-0% plans (EV=2), preferring the plan that resulted in probabilistic 
saving over the plan that resulted in certain saving, but at a lower expected value. 
Consistent with Study 1 findings, we observed insensitivity to equivalently-valued 
likelihood shifts on the saving side. We additionally found sensitivity to size of shift on 
the saving side, which did not appear to compete with a preference for a certain saving 
end-state. 
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Figure 3.5. Preference for plans that reduce the likelihood of a group of eight dying from 
0-x% or x-100% but will kill a bystander, under single evaluation. Error bars represent 
one standard error. 
 
Under joint evaluation, participants were indifferent between the plan that 
reduced the likelihood of 8 dying from 50-0% and 100-50%, t(83) = .43, p = .66, d = .05 
(mean = -.15, SD = 3.17), consistent with insensitivity to end-state of probability shift on 
the saving side observed under single evaluation, see Figure 6. Unlike under single 
evaluation, however,  participants were indifferent between the 25-0% and 100-25% 
plans, despite the 100-25% plan having a higher expected value than the 25-0% plan 
t(83) = .97, p = .33, d  = .11 (mean = .36, SD = 3.36). Thus, under joint evaluation, we 
again saw no preference for certain saving end-states, and saw a decreased sensitivity to 
expected value, as compared to judgments made under single evaluation. 
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Figure 3.6. Preference for plans that reduce the likelihood of a group of eight dying from 
0-x% or x-100% but will kill a bystander, under joint evaluation. Error bars represent one 
standard error. 
 
Study 3b Discussion 
Under joint evaluation, participants do not appear to endorse a preference we 
observed under single evaluation for a 100-25% shift in in likelihood of the group of 
eight dying. This preference can be interpreted as a sensitivity to size of shift, as 
participants Study 1 were insensitive to location shifts involving saving probabilities that 
varied start-states and end-states.  The overall findings, however, are consistent with the 
decreased sensitivity to saving shifts, as compared to harming shifts that we observed in 
prior studies. Again, here we take the results from joint evaluations to be participants’ 
considered preferences and to reflect their lay moral theory. Though the lack of 
sensitivity to the location of probabilistic benefit confirms our hypothesis that there is 
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more sensitivity on the side of harm than on the side of benefit, it comes as a surprising 
finding that other than size of shift being relevant under single evaluation, we observe no 
sensitivity under joint evaluation for this. Though the result is broadly consistent with 
existing findings on the harm/benefit asymmetry, according to which moral reasoning 
may be more fine-grained in sensitivity to shifts in harm than in shifts in benefit, it is still 
surprising that folk moral psychology is so coarse-grained that it doesn’t even 
differentiate between, for example, decreasing the probability of people dying from 100% 
to 25% and decreasing the probability of the same number of people dying from 25% to 
0% under joint evaluation.  
 The general harm vs. benefit asymmetry as observed in Study 1, and reconfirmed 
in Studies 3a and 3b, is consistent with the hypothesis we started with: There should be 
more sensitivity on the harm side, because we have a right or claim to not have our 
probability of dying increased whereas we do not have a right to have our probability of 
living increased.  
  
Studies 4a and 4b: Mediations 
 Throughout the preceding studies, we observed a sensitivity to where shifts in 
likelihood of harm occur, and general insensitivity to where shifts in saving likelihood 
occur. One question that emerges is why such a shift occurs. One possibility is that 
participants perceive different harm probability shifts as differentially harmful, consistent 
with the dyadic model of morality (Schein and Gray, 2018). Though Schein and Gray’s 
model focuses almost exclusively on perceived harm, it is plausible that perceived benefit 
might play a mediating role as well, especially in cases involving probabilistic saving. In 
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the following studies, we explore whether differences in perceived harm and perceived 
benefit are causal in divergent moral judgments of the action. 
 
Study 4a Design 
Study 4a asked participants to evaluate one of two plans, as they had in Study 1. 
The first plan involved increasing the risk of dying to a group of four bystanders from 0-
25% in order to save two people. The other plan involved a 75-100% increase in the 
chance of the group of four bystanders dying to save the two. After evaluating one of the 
two plans, participants were asked to answer two questions: one regarding whether Harry 
should carry out the plan (Should Harry carry out a plan that he knows with certainty will 
both save the group of two people and at the same time raise the risk of death for the 
group of four bystanders from 0% to 95%?  ; -5: very confident Harry should not carry 
out the plan, to 5: very confident Harry should carry out the plan), and a second 
regarding how harmful the action would be to the group of bystanders (e.g. How harmful 
is Harry's plan for the four bystanders?; 0: not at all harmful, to 10: extremely harmful). 
Questions were presented in a randomized order. Two hundred twenty two participants 
were recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (163 passed an attention check; because 
results do not significantly differ between full sample and those passing attention check, 
all participants were retained for analysis; 54.1% female, mean age = 35.1, SD = 11.5). 
 
Study 4a Results 
In order for us to test whether the perceived harm to the bystanders mediates 
moral judgment of actions that carry a variable shift in likelihood of harm, we first tested 
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the significance of each individual path. The relationship between harm probability shift 
(0-25% or 75-100%) and confidence in the morality of action was partially mediated by 
the perceived harmfulness of the action for the group of four bystanders. The regression 
of probability shift on confidence in the morality of action was statistically significant (β 
= .39, t(220) = 6.34, p < .001), as was the regression of probability shift on perceived 
harmfulness (β = .53, t(220) = 9.40, p < .001), and the regression of perceived 
harmfulness on confidence in the morality of action (β = .37, t(220) = 5.91, p < .001), see 
Fig. 1. The standardized indirect effect was (.53)(.37) = .44. The significance of this 
indirect effect was tested using bootstrapping procedures: unstandardized indirect effects 
were computed for each of 10,000 bootstrapped samples, and the 95% confidence 
interval was computed by determining the indirect effects at the 2.5th and 97.5th 
percentiles. The bootstrapped unstandardized indirect effect partially mediated the 
relationship between probability shift and judgments of the action (mediated effect = 
1.06, p < .001, 95% CI [.50, 1.66]; direct effect = 2.39, p < .001, 95% CI [1.38, 3.43]).  
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Figure 3.7. Standardized regression coefficients for the relationship between harm 
probability shift and confidence in the morality of carrying out an action that raises the 
risk of four bystanders dying to save people as mediated by perceived harmfulness of the 
action for the four bystanders. The standardized regression coefficient between 
probability shift and confidence in the morality of action, controlling for perceived 
harmfulness, is in parentheses.  
***p <  .001.  
 
Study 4a Discussion 
Perceived harm partially mediated the difference between plans that increase the 
risk of bystanders dying from 0-25% and plans that increase the risk of bystanders dying 
from 75-100%, consistent with predictions made by the theory of dyadic morality.  We 
next explore whether we see a similar effect for saving. 
 
Study 4b 
Study 4b Design 
Study 4b adopted the approach of Study 4a to scenarios in which the saving is 
probabilistic, and in which shifts in saving likelihood vary. Study 4b asked participants to 
evaluate one of two plans. The first plan would result in the death of one bystander in 
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order to decrease the likelihood of a group of eight people dying from either 25-0% or 
100-75%. After evaluating one of the two plans, participants were asked to answer two 
questions: one regarding whether Harry should carry out the plan (Should Harry carry 
out a plan that he knows with certainty will both reduce the risk of the group of eight 
dying from 25% to 0% and at the same time kill one bystander?  ; -5: very confident 
Harry should not carry out the plan, to 5: very confident Harry should carry out the 
plan), and a second regarding how beneficial the action would be for the eight people 
(e.g. How beneficial is Harry's plan for the eight people whose lives are in danger?; 0: 
not at all beneficial, to 10: extremely beneficial). Questions were presented in a 
randomized order. Two hundred twenty nine participants were recruited using Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (165 passed an attention check; because results do not significantly 
differ between full sample and those passing attention check, all participants were 
retained for analysis; 56.9% female, mean age = 32.4, SD = 10.7). 
 
Study 4b Results 
In order for us to test whether perceived benefit mediates confidence in the 
morality of actions that carry a variable shift in likelihood of benefit, we first tested the 
significance of each individual path. The regression of probability shift on confidence in 
the morality of action was not statistically significant (β = .07, t(223) = 1.08, p = .28). 
The non-significant effect observed here is consistent with Study 1 findings, and 
precludes mediation analyses. However, we can still examine whether perceived benefit 
varies where the shift in outcome likelihood for saving occurs. The regression of 
probability shift on perceived benefit was significant, (β = .20, t(221) = 3.05, p < .01, as 
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was the regression of perceived benefit on confidence in the morality of action (β = .28, 
t(221) = 4.32, p < .001), suggesting that perceived benefit is sensitive to outcome 
probability shifts, and that perceived benefit does relate to confidence in the morality of 
action, though not in a way that contributes to overall differences between the two 
versions of the scenario, see Figure 8. 
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Figure 3.8. Confidence in action for plans that reduce the likelihood of a group of eight 
dying from 25-0% or 100-75% but will kill a bystander (a). Ratings of how beneficial the 
action would be for the eight (b). Error bars represent one standard error. 
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Study 4b Discussion 
Though perceived benefit does correlate with confidence in the morality of action 
more generally, it does not mediate a difference between moral judgments where the 
saving probability differs between two otherwise identical moral dilemmas.  
 
Studies 4a-b Discussion 
 We see that divergent moral judgments arise between saving probability shifts 
because shifts are perceived as differentially harmful. The effect size of where the shift in 
outcome likelihood for saving occurs on perceived benefit  (β = .20) was less than half 
the effect size of where the shift in outcome likelihood for harming  occurs on perceived 
harm (β = .53), suggesting that participants were differentiating more between location-
shifts for harm than for benefit, consistent with a more general greater differentiation of 
negative events than positive events other researchers have observed (e.g., Guglielmo & 
Malle, 2019). 
General Discussion 
Our results suggest that participants are sensitive not only to expected value and 
probability in moral dilemmas, but also to where the shift in probability occurs, for 
increases of risk to bystanders. Study 1 identified that participants are sensitive to where 
shifts in the likelihood of harm to a group of bystanders occur, but not to where shifts in 
the likelihood of saving a group occur. Study 2 found that participants are sensitive to 
end-state probability, rather than to the size of the shift or start-state probability, for shifts 
in likelihood of harm to bystanders. Study 3a explored whether participants would 
endorse such a position upon reflection, under joint evaluation, and found that 
		 151 
participants prefer plans that raise the likelihood of harm for a group of four bystanders 
from 0-85%, in order to save two people, over plans that raise the likelihood of harm 
from 85-100% for a different group of four bystanders. In Study 3b, participants were 
found to continue being indifferent between location of shifts in likelihood of saving a 
group under joint evaluation. Study 4a identified perceived harm as a mechanism behind 
divergent moral judgments for actions that cause mathematically equivalent harm 
likelihood shifts that occur at different parts of the probability distribution. Study 4b 
found that, though saving probability shifts are perceived as differentially beneficial, 
differences in perceived benefit between probability shifts do not result in divergent 
moral judgments. 
In general, the results from these six studies show that participants are strongly 
sensitive to the location of probability shifts for harm. This phenomenon makes it 
difficult to render folk moral judgments consistent with the traditional consequentialist 
framework which takes expected value to be the single currency for moral permissibility 
and obligation. At the same time, the traditional tools of the deontologist, which 
presuppose the existence of moral constraints on certain harming, do not capture this 
phenomenon without further elaboration. We thus need a more nuanced way to describe 
the normative principle that can explain why participants reason in this way. We think 
one promising strategy is to develop more fine-grained deontological constraints that 
concern moral decision making under uncertainty. Such a strategy would need to, for 
example, explicate the force of deontological constraints in terms of the location of 
probability shifts. For example, it may be that the right against raising a person’s risk of 
death to 100% is more stringent than the right against raising a person’s risk of death to 
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50%, even when the probability shift in the latter case is greater.  We are optimistic that 
this kind of framework can be worked out, but a complete defense has to be left for 
another occasion. 
The more practical applications of the sensitivity to locations of probability shifts 
can be seen, for example, in the design of autonomous vehicles. Autonomous vehicles all 
face “decisions” under uncertainty; it is therefore worth examining how complicated the 
probabilistic computing would need to be. And our results show that the computation has 
to involve at least two distinct probability estimates: an estimate of initial (or final) 
probabilities of various outcomes and an estimate of the size of probability shifts. That is, 
it is not enough for autonomous vehicles to simply calculate how much change in the 
probability of harming people would be involved in alternative courses of action. One 
implication of the finding that participants care more about end-state harm likelihoods 
than sizes of shifts is that initial risk levels are largely irrelevant to the endorsement of 
action in moral dilemmas. Such findings help inform where resources should be directed 
in the design of detectors in autonomous vehicles that will serve as inputs for ethical 
decisions these vehicles will be programmed to make: whether the pedestrian that can be 
sacrificed to save a family in a vehicle ahead is already at some risk of dying is less 
important than what level of risk redirecting the autonomous vehicle would bring her, 
outside of situations where the pedestrian is already at great risk of dying from the 
impending collision. 
Our results also show that locations of probability shifts matter in ways that can 
even make participants indifferent as between probability shifts of the same size, and 
even prefer a larger size of increase of the probability of people dying just because the 
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increase occurs in the preferable location. Thus, the location isn’t merely a “tie-breaker” 
for participants but rather plays a substantial role in their decision-making process. 
We also see a general harm/benefit asymmetry in the sensitivity to locations of 
probability shifts. This pattern of asymmetry adds further support to the claim that we are 
sensitive to probability shifts in harm in a more fine-grained way than we are to 
probability shifts in benefit. However, the finding that there is no significant variation 
according to the locations of probability shifts on the benefit side is surprising to us, 
potentially suggesting a deeper harm/benefit asymmetry than first appears plausible. We 
speculate that the explanation is that we have a right or claim to not be harmed but no 
right or claim to be benefited. This is consistent with the suggestion of dyadic morality 
theory, according to which perceived harm plays a much more central role in moral 
judgments, in contrast to perceived benefit.  
Finally, single and joint evaluations result vary in our studies. Like others that 
have advocated for joint evaluations to be taken more seriously, since they indicate 
participants’ considered preferences under reflection (Barak-Corren et al., 2018), we find 
moral judgment under single and joint evaluation to diverge, calling into question the 
common method both in philosophy and in psychology to simply test for moral 
permissibility by appealing to intuitions about single cases. However, we do not find 
judgments under joint evaluation to be more clearly defensible, though we can say that 
joint evaluation judgments of actions involving shifts in harm or saving deviate further 
from expected value calculation than single evaluations for some actions. A complete 
moral theory would benefit from further comparison across both kinds of evaluation to 
come to an eventual moral verdict, in order to help us arrive at a more nuanced and 
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complete moral theory. This, again, has crucial implications for designing autonomous 
vehicles. The relevant moral principles will be nuanced in a way that reflects whether the 
vehicle is facing a single alternative course of action to a collision, or multiple options, in 
addition to the end-state probability for each outcome. More broadly, such research 
informs decision-making in complicated real-life cases in which there are multiple 
actions that might be taken, each matched with a variety of probabilities regarding 
outcomes.   
 
Chapter 3 is currently being prepared for submission for publication of the 
material. Ryazanov, Arseny; Wang, Tinghao; Nelkin, Dana; McKenzie, Craig; Rickless, 
Samuel. The dissertation author was the primary investigator and author of this paper.  
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Abstract 
Current evidence for whether incidental affect can shift moral judgment is 
equivocal. In a large study (N = 365), we examined whether risk preferences in moral 
decisions are sensitive to incidental affect. Participants made a series of parametrically-
varied moral or monetary decisions, adapted from the Asian disease problem, choosing 
between certain losses and probabilistic losses, as well as between certain gains and 
probabilistic gains, with varying expected values. Each decision was preceded by 
positive, negative, or neutral food stimuli, putatively as part of a separate reaction time 
task. Both moral and monetary gambles were sensitive to incidental negative affect, 
suggesting that incidental affect can influence moral decision-making through a domain-
general process. Additionally, moral decisions were found to overall be less sensitive to 
expected value than monetary decisions are. 
 
Keywords: moral cognition; incidental affect; prospect theory; morality  
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Gambling With Lives and Money: Incidental Affect Shifts Gamble Preferences For 
Moral and Monetary Decisions 
Whether morality has an affective or cognitive basis is a fundamental question 
faced by philosophers and psychologists alike. Hume famously argued that reason was 
the “slave of the passions”, while Kant believed moral authority to stem from pure reason 
(Hume, 2003; Wilson & Denis, 2018). The role affect plays in morality has likewise been 
contested by different schools of psychologists, from Kohlberg’s (1971) rationalist model 
that rejected the role of affect to Haidt’s (2001) social-intuitionist model which holds 
affect to be central to moral judgment, likening morality to an emotional dog with a 
rational tail. Contemporary dual-process models suggest that there are distinct affective 
and deliberative paths in moral cognition, without taking a stance on whether one of these 
paths accounts for the majority of moral judgments (Crockett, 2013; Cushman, 2013; 
Greene 2007; Greene 2009).  
Theories that incorporate a causal role of affect in moral judgment, such as the 
social-intuitionist model, initially enjoyed the support of a large volume of research on 
incidental disgust, in which moral judgments appeared to be amplified when made in 
disgusting contexts (e.g., while seated at a messy desk; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005; Schnall, 
Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008; Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & Cohen, 2009; Seidel & Prinz, 
2013). However, a subsequent meta-analysis of 50 studies that manipulated incidental 
disgust found a very-small-to-negligible overall effect of incidental disgust on moral 
decision-making (Landy & Goodwin, 2015; though see Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 
2015 for response). While other studies have provided evidence for integral affect  
playing an important role in moral judgment (e.g., Shenhav & Greene, 2014; Greene, 
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2017), the question of whether incidental affect matters for moral cognition has become 
unclear in light of this meta-analysis.  
One possible reason for the inconsistency in the observed impact of incidental 
affect on moral judgment is that incidental affect may only play a role in judgments that 
people are unsure about, i.e. for boundary cases, rather than amplifying moral judgment 
more generally. This would be consistent with Payne, Brown-Iannuzzi, and Loersch’s 
(2016) finding that primes affected gambling decisions in a blackjack task only when the 
value of the gamble was uncertain, rather than across all hands dealt. Adopting such a 
model, incidental affect could influence judgment of boundary transgressions, for 
example the permissibility of stealing a box of pens from one’s employer for personal 
use, but not transgressions that are clearly wrong, such as the permissibility of murdering 
one’s coworker for having stolen a box of pens. Thus, the study of how incidental affect 
shifts moral judgment may benefit from parametrically varying the ambiguity of the 
morality of the act being judged. 
One moral judgment that is particularly amenable to such parametric variation is 
termed the Asian disease problem. In the Asian disease problem, participants decide 
between the certain loss of a group of individuals or the probabilistic loss of a larger 
group, and between the certain survival of a group of individuals and the probabilistic 
survival of a larger group of individuals (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Despite being 
initially developed to explore the framing effects of losses and gains, with risk aversion 
observed for gains, but risk seeking observed for losses, subsequent research has 
identified that scenario details can shift risk preferences. For example, Ginges and Atran 
(2011) examined a modified Asian disease problem in which they pitted deontological 
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preferences for military action, as opposed to non-violence, against risk preferences in 
decisions regarding rescuing hostages from a foreign country. Their findings showed that, 
in decisions where the expected value of a certain option and risky option were tied, 
deontological preferences for military action could reverse general risk preferences. In 
another set of studies, the specific nature of the disease involved in the problem (whether 
the disease was AIDS, leukemia, or an unusual infection) was also found to influence 
participant risk preferences (Diederich, Wyszynski, & Ritov, 2018). Though exactly why 
risk preferences differ for different diseases remains unclear, one possibility is that the 
diseases evoke different affective reactions, which in turn influence risk preferences. If 
integral affect, such as the kind of disease or type of action undertaken can influence risk 
preference, it is possible that incidental affect, or affective reactions to unrelated stimuli, 
could likewise shift risk preferences.  
Importantly, like Payne, Brown-Iannuzzi, & Loersch, (2016), Diederich, 
Wyszynski, and Ritov (2018) departed from the traditional paradigm of asking a few 
questions to many participants, and instead parametrically varied a series of factors, such 
as the probability of harm, that could matter in the Asian disease problem. Since prior 
research has identified that participants are sensitive to the expected value of such 
decisions (e.g., Shenhav & Greene, 2014), we chose to parametrically vary the expected 
value of risky options presented alongside certain options to examine the role of 
incidental affect in moral decision-making across a range of expected values. This allows 
us a range of moral ambiguity over which to examine incidental affect, and to see 
whether incidental affect selectively influences moral decision-making involving 
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expected values that participants are uncertain about, consistent with the Payne et al. 
(2016) task. 
While much of the prior research on how incidental affect could amplify moral 
judgment focused specifically on incidental disgust, recent evidence suggests that disgust 
is not a unique affective predictor of moral evaluation. For example, Cusimano, 
Royzman, Leeman, and Metas (2018) found that the role of disgust can be overstated by 
methodologies that limit participant responses to disgust measures, and Landy and Piazza 
(2019) found that general negative affect correlates with moral evaluation. Furthermore, 
it may be that affect, regardless of whether it has a positive or negative valence, shifts 
moral judgment: Cheng, Ottati, and Price (2013) found that in addition to grief, fear, and 
disgust, excitement could also shift moral judgment compared to a neutral condition, and 
that all of these affective states shifted moral judgment indistinguishably from one 
another. Thus, we examine the role of incidental positive affect, in addition to incidental 
negative affect, in shaping moral risk preferences. 
Our design also affords the opportunity to design an analogous monetary decision 
task, to directly compare the effects of incidental affect on moral and monetary decision-
making. In doing so, we are able to examine whether any observed effect of incidental 
affect is general, applying to both monetary and moral decisions, or domain-specific. 
Some evidence suggests that moral and monetary decisions should be made similarly. 
Moral decisions appear to recruit a general valuation mechanism responsible for 
monetary decisions in fMRI studies (Shenhav & Greene, 2010). Furthermore, distributive 
justice preferences regarding how to allocate resources among orphans correlate with 
gamble preferences (Palmer et al., 2013). Similarly, Landy and Piazza (2019) find that 
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trait disgust sensitivity predicts not only moral judgments, but unrelated judgments 
including aesthetic and competence judgments as well, and thus could potentially extend 
to monetary decisions. 
However, other evidence suggests that monetary judgments may be distinct from 
nonmonetary judgments. Hsee and Rottenstreich (2001) found that affect-rich prizes, 
such as kisses and shocks, do not have the same s-shaped value function that monetary 
rewards and punishments do. Decisions involving lives may inherently be more affective 
than decisions involving money, and as such could be more scope insensitive (Hsee & 
Rottenstreich, 2004), or less sensitive to the specific number of people an action saves. 
Ginges and Atran (2011) found support for this notion in that participants appeared to be 
insensitive to expected value in war-time scenarios, in which participants had to specify 
the minimum number of hostages that would need to be savable to justify military 
intervention in an unspecified foreign country. Consistent with this, McGraw, Shafir, & 
Todorov (2010) found that gambles with non-monetary consumer objects were less 
sensitive to probability range than monetary gambles were. Together, these studies 
suggest that gambles involving lives could be less sensitive to expected value than 
gambles involving monetary outcomes. 
Incidental Affect Outside Morality 
Through comparing the role of incidental affect on analogous moral and monetary 
gambles, we are able examine whether moral and monetary decisions are differentially 
sensitive to incidental affect. There are several competing models of how affect 
influences general decision-making (e.g., Damasio, 2005; Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & 
Johnson, 2000; Forgas, 1995; Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Loewenstein, 1996; Loewenstein, 
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Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001; Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, & Ritov, 1997; Schwarz & Clore, 
1988). One possibility is that affect interferes with decision-making, and makes decisions 
more erratic, or less sensitive to expected value (Easterbrook, 1959; Evans, 2003; Pham, 
1996). A second possibility is that affect has a general main effect on risk preferences, 
shifting them across the entire gamble distribution (Damasio, 1994; Schwarz & Clore, 
1988; Slovic, Finucane, Peters & MacGregor, 2007). A third is that affect only influenced 
decision-making only when the subjective value of the choices is close-to-tied 
(Lowenstein & Lerner, 2003). Recently, negative incidental affect was found to play a 
role in monetary decisions (Hoffree et al., under review), consistent with affect having a 
general main effect on risk preferences for money, but with a more pronounced effect for 
gambles where subjective value is closer to equal.  
Thus, our study examines 1) whether moral decisions involving choices between 
certain and probabilistic outcomes are sensitive to incidental affect; 2) whether any 
sensitivity to incidental affect observed in moral decision-making is unique to moral 
judgment, or reflects a general interplay of affect and cognition that can be observed 
outside the moral domain; 3) whether any observed sensitivity to incidental affect more 
strongly influences decisions between subjectively-tied decisions outcomes; 4) whether 
overall sensitivity to expected value varies between moral and monetary decisions. 
Study 
Methods 
Positive, neutral, or negative affective images were presented incidentally before 
either moral or monetary gambles (the overall logic of the task and stimuli was adapted 
from Studies 4 and 5 in Hoffree et al., under review). The images contained foods that 
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had been previously pretested to be positive (e.g., a chocolate dipped strawberry), neutral 
(e.g., peas), or negative (e.g., monkey meat). Each trial was comprised of two sections, a 
picture segment and a gamble segment, that participants were explicitly told were 
unrelated. Pictures were randomly assigned without replacement to gambles. Participants 
were assigned to either the moral or the monetary condition, and responded to the 
respective gamble following the presentation of the images. 
 Gambles consisted of a loss block, and gain block, presented in a randomized 
order. There were 32 trials: 16 loss trails, and 16 gain trails. Each trial was presented with 
a unique, randomly selected, neutral, negative, or positive stimulus (randomly assigned to 
avoid demand characteristics of each gamble always being presented with one of each 
stimulus), for a total of 96 trails. In the case of moral gambles, participants were 
instructed that, in the context of the outbreak of a rare disease, they needed to pick 
between two outcomes: 10 people definitely survive, or a 50% chance of 10-40 people 
surviving (in increments of 2). In the loss condition, participants picked between the 
certain deaths of 10 people, or a 50% chance of 10-40 people dying (in increments of 2). 
The monetary gambles were analogous to the moral gambles: gain trials consisted of 
choosing between certainly gaining 10 points and a 50% chance of gaining 10-40 points, 
(in increments of 2); loss trials consisted of choosing between chance certainly losing 10 
points or a 50% chance losing 10-40 points, in increments of 2. Participants responded to 
a 1-4 scale of degree to which they accepted the gamble option (strongly accept gamble, 
weakly accept gamble, weakly reject gamble, strongly reject gamble).  
Each trial had the following format: a shape was presented for up to 2 seconds 
that corresponded to the valence of the stimuli (e.g. circle  corresponds to a positive 
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stimulus). Next, the stimulus photograph was presented for up to 2 seconds, with 1.5 
seconds of feedback. In this portion of the task participants had been instructed to press a 
specific key as soon as they saw a shape, and a different key as soon as they saw a 
photograph. Next a gamble was presented for 4 seconds, after which participants had up 
to 5 seconds to respond to the gamble using the 4-point scale, and 3 seconds of feedback 
on their decision.  
Participants were told that their responses would help inform public health policy 
for moral gambles, and economic policy for monetary gambles. Responses were 
collapsed into accepting/rejecting the gamble for analyses. Three hundred sixty five (75% 
female) University of California, San Diego undergraduates participated in the study for 
course credit. Individual trials with missing gamble responses were dropped – 2.1% of 
trials (mean) were dropped. 
Acceptance Rate 
We first examine changes in overall rates of acceptance in the affective conditions 
for moral and monetary decisions. As shown in Figure 1, across the loss and gain 
procedures, contrasting the negative stimuli against neutral stimuli, a two-level linear 
model with subject-level random intercepts revealed that participants were less likely to 
accept gambles following negative stimuli for moral gambles (c = -0.034, p < .01, 
95% CI [-.057, -.011]), and marginally less likely to accept monetary gambles (c = -
0.018, p = .063, 95% CI [-.037, .001]), see Figures 1-2. Gamble acceptance did not 
change following positive stimuli, compared to neutral stimuli (moral gambles: c = -
0.013, p = .289, 95% CI [-0.036, 0.011]; monetary gambles: c = -0.008, p = .800, 
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95% CI [-0.027, 0.11]). Note that these contrast estimates can be directly interpreted as 
percentage point differences (e.g., -0.12 equals an 12%-point decrease). 
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All Monetary Trials 
 
Monetary Loss Trials 
 
Monetary Gain Trials 
 
Figure 4.1. Acceptance rate across affective categories for all trials (collapsed across 
procedure), loss trials only, and gain trials only for monetary gambles. This figure shows 
acceptance rates across affective categories (left) and contrasts in acceptance rate relative 
to the neutral stimuli (right). Reported are adjusted predictions and 95% confidence 
intervals from a two-level linear model with subject-level random intercepts and gender 
as covariate. 
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All Moral Trials 
 
Moral Loss Trials 
 
Moral Gain Trials 
 
Figure 4.2. Acceptance rate across affective categories for all trials (collapsed across 
procedure), loss trials only, and gain trials only for moral gambles. This figure shows 
acceptance rates across affective categories (left) and contrasts in acceptance rate relative 
to the neutral stimuli (right). Reported are adjusted predictions and 95% confidence 
intervals from a two-level linear model with subject-level random intercepts and gender 
as covariate. 
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Next we examined whether sensitivity to incidental affect was limited to either 
losses or gains for moral gambles and for monetary gambles. We observed that the effect 
of incidental negative affect was limited to gains for monetary gambles, (monetary gain 
gambles: c = -.039, p = .003, 95% CI [-0.064, -0.013]; monetary loss gambles: c = .003, 
p = .800, 95% CI [-0.023, 0.029]). Unlike for monetary gambles, we observed an effect 
of incidental negative affect on gambles involving losses, but not gains, (moral gain 
gambles: c = -.025, p = .12, 95% CI [-0.056, 0.007]; monetary loss gambles: c = -.0425, 
p = .009, 95% CI [-0.074, -0.105]).  
We then examined whether the effects of negative stimuli were amplified for 
decisions were more morally ambiguous, see bottom panels of Figure 3 for visualization 
of the confidence bands for the effects of stimuli valence. In order to examine moral 
ambiguity, we looked at distance of a particular gamble from a tied expected value with 
the certain option. If negative stimuli have a stronger effect at more closely-tied expected 
values, we would expect to see an interaction of absolute distance from tied expected 
value and affect. Model comparisons for the significance of this interaction were 
conducted separately for the monetary and moral tasks, with gender entered as a 
covariate. Absolute value of the distance from tied expected value and stimulus valence 
were entered as main effects, and compared with a model containing their interaction 
(note: these analyses assume a linear interaction effect). For both monetary gains and 
moral losses, the interaction of distance from tied expected value and the effect of 
negative stimuli did not yield a significantly improved model, suggesting that the effect 
of incidental affect was not amplified by moral ambiguity:  χ²(2) = 3.32, p = .19 for moral 
losses, χ²(2) = 2.10, p = .35 for moral gains. For monetary gains, there was likewise no 
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interaction of distance and sensitivity to incidental affect:  χ²(2) = 1.13, p = .57 for 
monetary gains, χ²(2) = 4.04, p = .13 for monetary losses. Thus we did not observe 
increased sensitivity to incidental affect at subjectively tied expected values. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Probability of accepting a gamble by expected value, across affective 
categories for monetary gambles. Results for pure loss (top left) and pure gain (top right). 
The top panels show probabilities of accepting a gamble across affective categories. The 
bottom panels show difference from neutral category (shaded areas are confidence 
bands). Reported are adjusted predictions from a two-level logit model with subject-level 
random intercepts and gender as covariate. 
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Figure 4.4. Probability of accepting a gamble by expected value, across affective 
categories for moral gambles. Results for pure loss (top left) and pure gain (top right). 
The top panels show probabilities of accepting a gamble across affective categories. The 
bottom panels show the difference from neutral category (shaded areas are confidence 
bands). Reported are adjusted predictions from a two-level logit model with subject-level 
random intercepts and gender as covariate. The x-axis shows the expected value of the 
gamble option (in lives lost/saved). 
 
 
 
		 172 
 
 
Figure 4.5. Probability of accepting a gamble by expected value, contrasting monetary 
and moral domain for losses (left) and gains (right). The top panels show probabilities of 
accepting a gamble across domains. The bottom panels show a difference between 
domains (shaded areas are confidence bands).  Reported are adjusted predictions from a 
two-level logit model with subject-level random intercepts and gender as covariate. 
 
Lastly, we examined whether participants were more sensitive to expected value 
for monetary gambles than moral gambles, consistent with scope insensitivity for 
affective decisions, see Figure 5 for visualization of the difference between domains 
across the range of expected values. Model comparison using a model that specified the 
effect of decision type (moral or monetary) and  the interaction of expected value and 
gamble type (gain or loss) better fit the data after the inclusion of an interaction of 
decision type (moral or monetary) and expected value, χ²(1) = 15.5, p < .001, β for the 
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interaction of decision type and expected value = .25, SE = .06 (note: model comparison 
assumes a linear interaction effect). 
Discussion 
We found that moral decisions are sensitive to incidental affect: Exposure to 
negative stimuli prior to deciding whether to certainly save or lose 10 individuals, or 
probabilistically save or lose a larger number of individuals, resulted in a decreased 
likelihood of taking the risky option across moral gambles involving losses and gains. By 
moving beyond single decisions, and exploring the effects of negative stimuli on a series 
of decisions with parametrically varied expected values, we see that affect can shift 
decision-making for decisions involving lives across a range of expected values. Our 
results point to a small but consistent effect of incidental affect on moral decision-
making. 
  By examining sensitivity to incidental affect in analogous monetary and moral 
tasks, we were also able to explore whether a general process can account for sensitivity 
to incidental affect in moral decision-making. We found that incidental affect shifted both 
monetary and moral decisions, suggesting a domain-general process, though in somewhat 
different ways. In our monetary decision, incidental affect had stronger effects on 
decisions involving monetary gains than on decisions involving monetary losses. 
However, for the moral decisions, we observed a stronger effect for moral losses than 
moral gains. Why this is the case is unclear. One speculative possibility is that incidental 
affect amplifies integral affect, and that monetary gains and moral losses carry more 
integral affect than monetary losses and moral gains in a task such as ours, where 
decisions are not tied to actual earnings or lives. That is, the gain of money may be more 
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emotionally salient than the loss of money in a task without real payoffs, and the loss of 
lives may likewise be more salient than the gain of lives. Future studies should explore 
whether the difference in sensitivity to incidental affect between moral and monetary 
gambles reflects a difference between monetary and moral cognitive processes despite 
their overall similarity, and also further examine the relationship between incidental and 
integral affect (see Västfjäll et al., 2016 for overview on integration of incidental and 
integral affect). 
Overall, participants were more sensitive to expected value in monetary decisions 
than in moral decisions, showing less agreement for gambles that had extremely high or 
low expected values in moral decisions. This is consistent with prior research showing 
that affective decisions are less sensitive to scope. It is possible that by making the moral 
decision more affective, such as providing pictures of the people to be killed or saved, 
participants could become even more insensitive to scope. 
Our study has several limitations: namely that the task required many trials, and 
could potentially cause participants to attune to features that matter less under single 
evaluation. However, differential sensitivity for losses and gains suggests that responses 
to the negative stimuli were not the result of demand characteristics, as, had they been, 
we would not expect to see differential sensitivity to losses and gains, particularly in the 
monetary condition, where we observer a stark difference between the effect of negative 
valence on losses and gains. 
Incidental affect can influence moral cognition: inducing negative affect in our 
study shifted moral risk preferences. Though we did not find reason to be the slave of 
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passions, that moral decisions are influenced by whether they are made in the context of 
disgusting food suggests that moral decisions are not immune to irrelevant passions.  
 
Chapter 4  is currently being prepared for submission for publication of the 
material. Ryazanov, Arseny; Erner, Carsten; Winkielman, Piotr. The dissertation/thesis 
author was the primary investigator and author of this material.  
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Abstract 
When does it become acceptable to decline to help a cause?  We propose a model 
of moral accounting, which outlines lay theory of how an individual’s prior beneficence 
increases the acceptability of them declining further helping.  We identify two pathways 
through which moral demands decrease: having helped can make further helping more 
costly and can also bank moral credit (Studies 1 and 2).  We then uncover the cognitive 
structure of moral credit: Moral credit is sensitive to effort, luck, domain, and time, and is 
taken into consideration in addition to the increasing marginal cost of continued helping, 
in ways consistent with mental financial accounting (Studies 3-5).  As a result, 
beneficence completed over longer time periods grants extended credit (Study 6).  Study 
7 compares how judgments made in a within-subjects design, which we interpret as 
normative judgments of how much these factors should matter, generalize to judgments 
of individual actions.  
Keywords: morality; helping, altruism; decision-making; prosocial 
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How Enough Helping Becomes Enough: The Moral Accounting Model 
From hungry children to oil-soaked seabirds, countless needs call for benevolent 
action.  What prompts people to beneficence and where people’s moral responsibilities 
lie is the subject of much inquiry in both philosophy and psychology.  A related question 
is when it becomes acceptable to quit.  Is there some point where one has done enough? 
There is intense philosophical debate about the demandingness of duties of 
beneficence (Beauchamp, 2016).  Some argue that such duties are extremely demanding, 
requiring sacrifice even for complete strangers (Singer, 1972; Unger, 1996; Arneson, 
2004).  Such views follow from act-consequentialism, which requires people to do what 
has the most beneficial consequences, impartially considered.  When needs are great and 
individuals have resources to address those needs, the demands of beneficence will be 
extremely high.  Singer (1972) suggests that one ought to give up to the point at which 
further beneficence would make one worse off than it would help the beneficiary.  The 
problem of over-demandingness has been taken by some as an objection to act-
consequentialism (Scheffler, 1994; Vallentyne, 2006).  In response, act-consequentialists 
have found various ways of accommodating the problem (Kagan, 1989; Singer, 2011; 
Arneson, 2004), including distinguishing between ground-level morality and the less-
demanding rules that should be publicly advocated for practical reasons. 
Other philosophers advocate more modest principles of beneficence (Nagel, 1989; 
Murphy, 1993; Scheffler,1994; Herman, 2001; Miller, 2004; Cullity, 2006).  One 
challenge for such views is to explain what justifies departures from full impartiality.  
Another is to provide some principled rationale for where to draw the line between what 
is required in the way of beneficence and what is not.  Various considerations are invoked 
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to explain and justify limits, such as collective responsibility, that it would be wrong for 
individuals to be required to give more than their fair share (Murphy, 1993), and that 
morality must accommodate our natural psychological proclivity to invest in special 
relationships (Nagel, 1989; Scheffler, 1994; Herman, 2001; Miller, 2004).  Complications 
aside, these ethicists share the ordinary conviction that there are limits to the duty of 
beneficence.  
 But if ordinary moral intuition tends to favor a modest principle of beneficence, 
what do people think reduces the moral requirement to make further contributions?  
Beyond what people often explicitly offer as justifications, a large literature shows that 
situational factors can influence whether a person chooses to engage in helping.  For 
example, people care more about single victims than they care about statistical victims 
(Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004; Jenni & Loewenstein, 1997; Small & Loewenstein, 2003; 
Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2007); are less inclined to help those who are, or feel, far 
away (e.g., Touré-Tillery, & Fishbach, 2017); and differentially value lives (Goodwin & 
Landy, 2014).  Given the lack of clear normative guidance about the limits of 
beneficence, we set out to uncover a guiding lay theory of how people actually 
understand the ethical problem of when people have done enough.   
Our model first breaks apart prior beneficence into increased future cost of acting 
and moral credit.  Having acted can make future action more costly: swimming out to 
save the tenth capsized boater will be more difficult than was swimming out to save the 
first.  This increased marginal cost need not be in physical fatigue, but could be in any 
finite resource.  Cost to the agent is frequently cited in explaining limits on the demands 
of beneficence (Scheffler, 1994; Cullity, 2006; Vallentyne, 2006; Beauchamp, 2016), 
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with moral demand inversely proportional to cost.  But prior action will not always make 
future action more costly.  Beneficence that does not deplete a finite resource may tap a 
different resource—moral credit. 
Often in work related to moral demands, moral credit from a prior contribution is 
confounded with increased marginal cost of further action (e.g., Bell, Grekul, Lamba, 
Minas, & Harrell, 1995; Barnes, Ickes, & Kidd, 1979).  Many ethicists likewise talk 
about “costs” and “burdens,” without carefully distinguishing between different kinds of 
costs or addressing the question of whether cost and objective prior contribution come 
apart (e.g., Singer, 1972; Murphy, 1993; Unger, 1996; Miller, 2004; Cullity, 2006; 
Scheffler, 1993 and 1994). 
Research on moral licensing suggests that people may endorse a moral credit path 
in moral accounting.  Moral licensing occurs when having done a good thing, people feel 
licensed to misbehave (Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009; Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 2010; 
Blanken, van de Ven, & Zeelenberg, 2015), which could be thought of as a reduction 
below zero in need for further moral action.  For example, participants prompted to recall 
a time when they had behaved morally reported decreased intention to give to charity, 
donate blood, and volunteer, relative to a control group (Jordan, Mullen, & Murnighan, 
2011).  Though research on moral licensing generally concerns what subjects themselves 
feel and do, Effron and Monin (2010) found it to extend to judgments of others. Though a 
mental moral credit account has been discussed as a possible explanation for why moral 
licensing occurs (Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 2010), its structure remains underexplored. 
Moral credit could arise from the effort, or from the effect, of prior contributions.  
From a normative standpoint, one might think that only effort, and not ultimate success or 
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failure, should count toward moral credit: One ought to be assessed only for what is in 
one’s control; the rest is, after all, just luck.  There is a great deal of debate about whether 
moral judgment should depend on the results of one’s actions that are not in one’s 
control.  Many philosophers, and even the authors of the Model Penal Code, take it that 
while we often do assess failed attempts at harm less negatively than successful 
harmings, this is a mistake (e.g., Nagel, 1979; American Law Institute, 1985).  For 
example, once we hold all else fixed in a case (e.g., two equally skilled assassins aim to 
shoot their victim, pull the trigger with equal malice, and by a fluke, one’s gun jams and 
the other’s does not), we see that each is equally blameworthy.  But not all moral and 
legal theorists agree (e.g., Moore, 1997), and participants do factor in moral luck when 
attributing blame (Young, Nichols, & Saxe, 2010; Royzman & Kumar, 2004; Cushman, 
Dreber, Wang, & Costa, 2009; Gino, Shu, & Bazerman, 2010).  No parallel debate about 
moral luck has arisen in discussions concerning obligations of beneficence.  At the same 
time, even simply expressing the intention to help can reduce future helping (Tanner & 
Carlson, 2008), suggesting that outcomes are not all that matters.  Based on such research 
on moral luck, we predict moral credit to factor in success, in addition to effort. 
Subsequently, we examine the generalizability of moral credit.  If moral credit is 
mentally represented the way money is, moral credit for beneficence in one domain may 
not excuse from helping in another. Money is not treated as entirely fungible—mental 
financial budgets consist of buckets, such that an expense incurred in one account does 
not result in another account being depleted (Thaler, 1999).  For example, participants 
told that they had already attended a basketball game that cost $50 indicated being less 
likely to attend a play, compared to participants told that they had received a $50 parking 
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ticket, because only the former had already depleted their mental entertainment budget 
(Heath & Soll, 1996).  There is some evidence to support the idea that people may treat 
money and moral credit similarly.  Moral decisions recruit the same neural circuitry as 
financial decisions (Shenhav & Greene, 2010), gamble preferences correlate with 
distributive justice concerns (Palmer et al., 2013), and lives are susceptible to the same 
framing effects as money (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986).  
The moral licensing literature, however, suggests that there should be some 
domain generalizability of the credit.  The positive intentions that, for example, past 
recall of immoral acts engenders often belong to a different domain than the historical 
deed (e.g., Cascio & Plant, 2016; Mazar & Zhong, 2010, Effron & Monin, 2010).  
Whether moral credit is likely to be greater if that overlap is greater, and reduced if the 
two acts are more disparate, has not been explored.  We hypothesize a domain-sensitive 
limited fungibility of moral credit, similar to the compartmentalization that occurs for 
financial mental accounting, but some generalizability, consistent with moral credit. 
Our model also includes a temporal component to the moral credit—that the 
reduction in demand for future action from prior action should dissipate over time.  
Research on how long financial expenditures endure provides a framework for thinking 
about the temporal generalizability of beneficence: One example comes from a study of 
cab drivers, who drive for longer on days they are making less money, suggesting that the 
intuitive temporal endurance of their earnings is one day (Camerer, 1997).  Another 
example comes from Gourville & Soman’s (1998) findings that gym attendance spiked 
right after payment, enduring just as long after an annual payment as after monthly 
payments.  If a similar process occurs for good deeds done, it is unclear how long that 
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beneficence is thought to endure.  Gourville & Soman’s (1998) findings also suggest that 
the duration of the financial debit seems to be less sensitive to size than it is to recency.  
If moral credit operates similarly, a diffuse prior effort could likewise produce more 
enduring moral credit. 
Research on moral licensing generally involves exploring the immediate effects of 
prompts or experimental manipulations (see Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 2010).  As a 
result, the temporal gradient of moral licensing, or how long such an effect could persist, 
remains underexplored.  While recalling prosocial behavior has been shown to cause 
immoral behavior in the present, whether recency matters is unclear (Jordan, Mullen, & 
Murnighan, 2011).  Our hypothesized model of lay theory, which is shown in Figure 1, 
suggests that prior beneficent acts reduce the moral demands for further action (Study 1).  
Such an effect can occur through two pathways.  First, having acted can make further 
action more costly.  Second, having acted can bank moral credit (Study 2).  Moral credit 
can accrue both from the degree of effort put into the prior action and from the efficacy 
of that action (Study 3).  Moral credit applies most strongly to domains most similar to 
the initial act (Study 4) and decreases over time (Study 5).  Temporally diffuse 
beneficence produces more enduring credit than a single act (Study 6).   
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Figure 5.1. The Moral Accounting Model 
 
Our model concerns how participants think credit should be assigned, and as such, 
we utilize a within-subjects design.  By making the differences salient to participants, we 
see whether participants think these differences should matter.  This approach has been 
used to resolve inconsistencies in moral judgment.  For example, the divergence between 
two versions of trolley problems—whether to drop one person onto a trolley track to save 
others ahead or divert the trolley onto a track with one person on it to save others 
ahead—is reduced when the evaluations are made jointly rather than individually, 
suggesting that participants do not think that the differences are morally relevant (Barak-
Corren, Tsay, Cushman, & Bazerman, 2018).  Rather than exaggerating differences 
between scenarios, the within-subjects design prompts deliberation as to whether 
differences should matter.  Furthermore, between-subject evaluation can sometimes 
obscure preferences that exist when participants are presented with all options 
(Kahneman & Ritov, 1994).  Thus, we uncover a lay theory of moral accounting using a 
within-subjects design.  However, Study 7 compares participant responses when only 
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seeing one level of each scenario used in Studies 1-6 to examine the extent to which 
individual judgments map on to the lay theory of moral accounting. 
 
Study 1: Prior Beneficent Work 
Study 1 Materials 
Study 1 examined participants’ intuitions regarding whether prior beneficence 
reduces the moral demand for further beneficence.  (How these intuitions reflect views 
about the costliness or creditability of the agent’s prior moral acts is examined 
subsequently.)  Participants saw two scenarios, randomly ordered, which varied whether 
the protagonist had already done beneficent work:  
Thousands are homeless and stranded after Hurricane Katrina.  Bill is thinking about 
volunteering by rescuing people in his boat for the next hour.  He would very much like to 
take a nap.  Instead, he could spend the hour looking for people.  By doing so, he could 
rescue about 10 people.             
 
Thousands are homeless and stranded after Hurricane Katrina.  Tony is a volunteer 
helper, who is rescuing people in his boat.  He has spent 12 hours today finding people 
and ferrying them to nearby shelters.  He has probably rescued about 10 people per hour 
or around 120 people today.  Tony is tired and desperately wants to go home to rest.  
Before he goes home, he could spend one more hour rescuing 10 people.             
 
After seeing each scenario, subjects were asked, “How morally acceptable would it be for 
Bill [Tony] to decline spending the next hour rescuing 10 people?”.  Subjects rated the 
demand on a scale from -3 (not at all acceptable) to 3 (completely acceptable). 
We used, here and throughout our studies, a continuous scale of the moral 
acceptability of declining to help, for example, instead of a dichotomous measure of 
whether to help, because  an actual decision about whether action is morally required 
would likely require much more background information.  The moral acceptability of 
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declining an action can be judged weaker or stronger based on the presented information, 
in the absence of background knowledge potentially relevant to moral decision-making. 
We report all measures, manipulations, and exclusions in this and all subsequent studies 
other than additional demographic measures. Sample size was determined prior to data 
collection, and was selected to be similar to other studies using within-subject designs to 
examine moral judgment (e.g., Ryazanov, Knutzen, Rickless, Christenfeld, & Nelkin, 
2018). Sensitivity power analyses were conducted for Study 1(using alpha = .05 and beta 
= 80%) to determine the minimum detectable effect size (MDES; d) using Gpower 
software (Erdfelder, Faul, & Buchner, 1996). 
Study 1 Results  
Eighty-eight American adults were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (9 
excluded for failing a basic attention check; 64.6% female; mean age = 33.6, SD = 10.4).  
Subjects rated the moral demands on Bill (no prior beneficence) as greater than the moral 
demands on Tony (prior beneficence), t(78)= 10.6, p < .001, d = 1.47 (mean prior good = 
1.47, SD = 1.60; mean no prior good = -1.04, SD = 1.81; see Figure 2), MDES d = .30. 
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Figure 5.2. The effect of prior beneficence on increasing the acceptability of declining to 
help. Error bars represent one standard error. 
 
Study 1 Discussion 
 Our first study indicates that people think moral demands for beneficent action are 
reduced for those who have already worked to do good.  We thus have evidence for 
accounting, the most basic aspect of our model, and can next examine how the perceived 
acceptability of declining to help arises.  We begin by testing two potential paths of moral 
accounting: (i) the cost of continuing to help and (ii) the moral credit accrued from prior 
beneficence. 
 
Study 2: Marginal Cost and Prior Contributions 
Study 2 Materials 
Three sets of scenarios explored the cost and prior contribution paths: the boat 
rescue scenario, modified from Study 1, and new scenarios involving volunteering at a 
soup kitchen and donating a kidney.  We started with the same comparison as in the first 
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study – someone who has worked to do good in the area versus someone who has not 
(e.g., worked a long soup kitchen shift versus spent the same time having a quiet day at 
home).  A reduction in the demand on the former to volunteer an hour in the soup kitchen 
might reflect some combination of the moral credit for prior work and increased cost of 
further effort.  We aimed to unconfound these two factors by creating scenarios in which 
the agent has done good in a way that would not make the further effort harder (e.g., the 
agent donated money rather than worked the soup kitchen shift) and scenarios in which 
the agent had not done good but further effort would be costly (e.g., the agent had put in a 
long shift as a chef, but not in a soup kitchen).  If the perceived reduction in moral 
demand from prior work is entirely due to the increase in the cost of future work, then, 
when the cost is eliminated, there should be no reduction.  On the other hand, if the 
perceived reduction in moral demand is due to the moral credit from having 
accomplished good, then there should be no reduction when the prior work was not 
beneficent.  Scenarios were presented in a random order, within-subjects.  For each 
scenario, subjects responded to, “How morally acceptable would it be for NAME to 
decline doing XX?” (-3 to 3; completely unacceptable – completely acceptable).  
Sensitivity power analyses were conducted for Studies 2-6 (with alpha = .05 and beta = 
80%) to determine the minimum detectable effect size (MDES; d) using Westfall’s 
(2015) PANGEA program. 
Study 2 Results 
One hundred fourteen undergraduates participated in the study for partial course 
credit, (22 excluded for failing a basic attention check; 69.6% female, mean age 20.1, SD 
= 2.23). Subject responses were analyzed using a repeated measures ANOVA with 
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scenario set, prior effort, and moral credit entered as factors.  Across the three scenario 
sets, there was a main effect of cost F(1, 91) = 232.5, p < .001, ηp2 = .72 (mean low cost 
= -.03, SE = .08, mean high cost = 1.28, SE = .07), MDES d = .10, such that it was more 
acceptable for people who had already worked, regardless of whether the work was in the 
aid of others, to decline helping, see Figure 3.  There was also a main effect of moral 
credit F(1, 91) = 91.7, p < .001, ηp2 = .50 (mean low prior contribution = .30, SE = .09, 
mean high prior contribution = .95, SE = .07) MDES d = .12, such that it was more 
acceptable for people who had already helped, whether that help was effortful or not, to 
decline helping.  There was a main effect of scenario, F(2, 182) = 68.4, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.43 (mean boat rescue = -.38, SE = .10, mean kidney = .94, SE = .10, mean soup kitchen 
= 1.30, SE = .08), and no interaction of prior effort and prior contribution F(1, 91) = .044, 
p = .83, ηp2 < .001, though there was a significant interaction of scenario and prior effort 
F(2, 182) = 11.8, p < .001; ηp2 = .12 (main effect of effort for each scenario set 
significant, p <.001), as well as a significant interaction of scenario and prior contribution 
F(2, 182) = 28.0, p < .001, ηp2 = .24 (main effect of prior contribution for boat rescue and 
soup kitchen scenarios individually significant, F(1, 91) = 128, p < .001, ηp2 = .58 and 
F(1, 91) = 24.5, p < .001, ηp2 = .21, respectively; trend for kidney scenarios, F(1, 91) = 
2.78, p < .001, ηp2 = .03). 
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Figure 5.3. The effects of cost of further action and prior contribution on the acceptability 
of declining to help.  Error bars represent one standard error. 
 
Study 2 Discussion 
Study 2 provides evidence that people take both increased cost and moral credit as 
reducing the demand to do more good.  That there was no interaction between these 
factors suggests they are additive, with no special reduction in demand if one is tired 
from moral labor.  Our results therefore suggest that most people are not (consistent) act-
consequentialists with a view that moral demand depends on the good left to be done and 
is independent of prior effort. 
 
Study 3: Effort vs. Effect 
We explored the contributions of luck and effort to moral credit, to examine 
whether moral luck applies to positive outcomes, as it does for negative ones. 
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Study 3 Materials 
We adapted versions of the soup kitchen and boat rescue scenarios and varied 
effort (e.g., the agent worked for hours to make enough food for 20 people, or used the 
last few minutes of his shift to prepare enough leftovers for 20 people in the soup kitchen 
scenarios, and luck (e.g., the food actually fed the 20 homeless, or could not be 
delivered).  The moral act inquired about was a new one, related to the first (e.g., giving 
money to the homeless shelter) but different enough that the cost of performing it should 
not depend on the prior effort.  Both scenarios controlled for the total effort (e.g., time 
spent working in a kitchen), as well as the outcomes of further beneficence.  The design 
was entirely within-subjects.  See Appendix B for scenarios. 
Study 3 Results 
One hundred thirteen undergraduates participated in the study for partial course 
credit (13 participants excluded for failing an attention check; female = 67.0%, mean age 
= 19.7, SD = 1.76).   
Analyzed as a 2 (effort) x 2 (luck) x 2 scenario repeated measures ANOVA, the 
impact of effort was significant, F(1, 99) = 41.2, p < .001, ηp2 = .29, 95% CI [.15, .42] 
(mean low effort = -.05, SD = 2.06; mean high effort = .35, SD = 1.96; see Figure 4), 
MDES d = .08.  Likewise, the effect of luck was significant, F(1, 99) = 36.4, p < .001, ηp2 
= .27, 95% CI [.13, .40] (mean unlucky = -.055, SD = 1.97; mean lucky = .35, SD = 
2.05), MDES = .10.  There was also a main effect of scenario F(1, 99) = 142, p <.001, ηp2 
= .59 (mean boat rescue = -.98, SD = 1.70, mean soup kitchen = 1.28, SD = 1.65).  There 
was a significant interaction of scenario by effort, such that prior effort played a larger 
role in the boat rescue scenario than in the soup kitchen scenario, F(1, 99) = 6.00, p = 
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.016, ηp2 = .06 (mean boat low effort = -1.27, SD = 1.67; mean boat high effort = -.70, 
SD = 1.67; mean soup low effort = 1.17, SD = 1.65; mean soup high effort = 1.40, SD = 
1.64; main effect of effort for each scenario set significant—boat:  F(1, 99) = 15.6, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .25; soup: F(1, 99) = 7.06, p = .009, ηp2 = .07).  No other interaction was 
significant (interaction of scenario and efficacy: F(1, 99) = 1.28 p = .26, ηp2 = .01; 
interaction of effort and efficacy F(1, 99) = .02 p = .89, ηp2 < .01; interaction of effort and 
efficacy F(1, 99) = .09 p = .76, ηp2 < .01). 
 
Figure 5.4. The effect of effort and luck on the acceptability of declining to help.  Error 
bars represent one standard error. 
 
Study 3 Discussion 
Study 3 indicates that people take into account both how hard the agent tried, and 
her luck, consistent with our model.  Results of past efforts that are not in the agent’s 
control clearly matter to participants’ judgments, so it appears that luck is taken into 
account.  It is possible that moral luck for blameworthy acts is normatively different from 
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moral luck in obligations of beneficence.  If one rescues people with astonishing ease, the 
demand for further action could be reduced because there are actually fewer people 
needing rescue.  Likewise, trying hard and failing leaves the total need undiminished.  
Such considerations are not relevant in the case of harm.  Thus, with beneficence one 
could argue that moral luck normatively ought to be factored in. 
 
Study 4: The Domain Generalizability of Moral Credit 
We next examine whether moral credit diminishes as the next beneficent need 
becomes less similar.  We tested this by asking about the acceptability of declining to 
help in a way that is different but contributes to the same cause (e.g., whether having 
worked in a soup kitchen reduces moral demand to donate money to the soup kitchen), a 
related cause (e.g., donating to a local homeless shelter), and an entirely independent 
cause (e.g., contributing to wildlife rescue).  This allowed us to explore whether, as in the 
case of financial mental accounting, people have different buckets for different kinds of 
beneficence or a single moral credit account. 
Study 4 Materials 
We adapted versions of the boat rescue, soup kitchen, and kidney scenarios to ask 
about the acceptability of declining to help to a cause that is the same, similar to, or 
entirely different from the original cause helped (3 (scenario) x3 (domain) x2 (helped or 
not)).  The moral act inquired about was new, related to the first (e.g., giving money to 
the homeless shelter) but different enough that the cost of performing it should not 
depend on prior effort, so any reduction in moral demand would be due to some 
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generalizability of the moral credit from prior contributions.  Subjects saw all levels of all 
scenario sets.  See Appendix C for scenarios. 
Study 4 Results 
One hundred fifteen undergraduates participated in the study for partial course 
credit, (26 excluded for failing a basic attention check; 73.0% female, mean age 19.4, SD 
= 2.10).  A repeated measures ANOVA with similarity (same, similar, different domains 
recoded as a continuous) and scenario (boat rescue, kidney donation, soup kitchen) 
entered as factors revealed a main effect difference of acceptability of not helping for the 
different scenario sets, F(2, 176) = 20.1, p < .001. ηp2 = .19 (mean boat rescue = .57, SD 
= 1.84; mean kidney donation = 1.03, SD = 1.60; mean soup kitchen = 1.06, SD = 1.60).  
There was also a main effect of similarity, such that dissimilar causes were ones where it 
would be generally more acceptable to decline helping,  F(1, 88) = 32.5, p < .001. ηp2 = 
.21, (mean same = .62, SD = 1.81; mean similar = .82, SD = 1.72; mean different = 1.22, 
SD = 1.48).  It was also overall more acceptable for those who had already helped to 
decline helping F(1, 88) = 56.6, p < .001, ηp2 = .39 (mean no prior contribution = .45, SD 
= 1.70, mean no prior contribution = 1.32, SD = 1.58).  The central question, however, is 
whether prior helping produced less moral credit for dissimilar appeals, after controlling 
for the main effect differences of the acceptability of declining to help the various causes.  
A significant interaction of similarity and prior helping suggested this, F(1, 88) = 12.9, p 
= .001, ηp2 = .13 (mean same no prior contribution = .11; SD = 1.72; mean same prior 
contribution = 1.29; SD = 1.59; mean similar no prior contribution = .35; SD = 1.73; 
mean similar prior contribution = 1.13; SD = 1.76; mean different no prior contribution = 
.90; SD = 1.55; mean different prior contribution = 1.54; SD = 1.34), MDES d = .22.  A 
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three way interaction revealed that the extent to which moral credit generalizes across 
domains differs for the different scenarios, F(2, 176) = 3.53, p = .031, ηp2 = .04: moral 
credit did not fully generalize for the soup kitchen and boat rescue scenarios, but did for 
kidney donation, see Figure 5.  While the boat rescue cases showed a generalizability 
gradient (F(1, 88) = 19.4, p < .001, ηp2 = .18), and soup kitchen cases trended towards 
this gradient (F(1, 88) = 3.11, p = .08, ηp2 = .03), kidney donation cases did not (F(1, 88) 
= .20, p = .88, ηp2 < .01).   
Overall, the data are consistent with there being some specificity of moral credit, 
rather than a single moral account.  While the credit does diminish for the most dissimilar 
case, some still exists, as revealed by the still-significant increase in the perceived moral 
permissibility of declining to help in the “different” condition, F(1, 88) = 38.6, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .30 (mean no prior contribution = .90, SD = 1.55; mean prior contribution = 1.54; 
SD = 1.34).  Other significant effects included an interaction of scenario by prior helping, 
F(2, 176) = 23.3, p < .001, ηp2 = .21, such that prior helping had an overall greater effect 
on moral credit in boat rescue scenarios than in soup kitchen or kidney scenarios, and an 
interaction of scenario by similarity, F(2, 176) = 11.7, p < .001, ηp2 = .12, such that 
similarity had the greatest effect on overall ratings of the acceptability of declining to 
help in boat rescue scenarios. 
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Figure 5.5. The domain generalizability of moral credit from prior contributions for each 
individual scenario set.  Error bars represent one standard error. 
 
Study 4 Discussion 
 In Study 4 we find limited generalizability of moral credit.  People who have 
helped in a soup kitchen face a reduction in perceived moral demand to help further there, 
and this falls off if the need is helping at a homeless shelter.  Kidney donation does not 
show the same specificity as boat rescues and soup kitchen volunteering, with moral 
credit from kidney donation generalizing across monetary donations to blood banks, and 
even to oil-soaked wildlife.  At first glance, this result might appear in some tension with 
a general moral principle to promote the good of others.  Should the particular recipients 
or causes matter?  However, it is possible that people assume that spreading one’s giving 
among causes is more likely to have greater overall effects.  Thus, if some charities spend 
unwisely, or are unable to get resources to victims, then it might be thought better to 
spread that risk among a variety of causes.  Against such a background assumption, being 
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told that an agent in a scenario has only given in one area might lead to an inference that 
they have only discharged part of their moral debt by contributing in a single area.   
 
Study 5: Temporal Duration of Moral Credit 
 Study 5 explored the temporal endurance of moral credit from prior beneficent 
behavior. Does the moral credit from having donated a kidney last a day? A week? A 
decade? Findings on the endurance of financial expenditures suggest that there could be a 
similar limited endurance to prior beneficence.  
Study 5 Materials 
We adapted versions of the soup kitchen and kidney scenarios to ask about the 
level of moral demand for action that is different from but contributes to the same cause 
(e.g., whether having worked in a soup kitchen reduces moral demand to donate money 
to a homeless shelter), the same day, a week, a year, and a decade later.  Because of the 
temporal specificity of rescuing people in the wake of a hurricane, the boat rescue 
scenarios were replaced by scenarios involving helping at an afterschool program.  We 
chose a different moral request from the initial action, so that having contributed would 
not increase the cost of future action, and there would be no presumption of a necessary 
physical recovery enabling further action.  We also asked about the acceptability of 
declining to help for a person who had not yet contributed, to see at what point people no 
longer have moral credit for an action they have performed.  Subjects saw all levels of all 
scenario sets.  See Appendix D for scenarios.  A power analysis using the correlation 
between measures in Study 1 and the GPower software package revealed that at least 54 
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participants would be needed to detect a small effect (ηp2=.02)  with an alpha of .05 and 
power of .80 (Erdfelder, Faul, & Buchner, 1996). 
Study 5 Results 
 One hundred seventeen participants were recruited for partial course credit from a 
participant pool (13 excluded for failing attention check; 66.3% female; Mage = 20.4, SD 
= 3.25).  Data was analyzed using a repeated measures ANOVA with time specified as a 
continuous factor and scenario set specified as a categorical factor.  There was a 
significant effect of time on the acceptability of declining to help, such that as time since 
the first act increased, the acceptability of declining to help decreased F(1,103) = 29.0, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .23, (mean today = 1.46, SD = 1.65; mean week = 1.31, SD = 1.62, mean 
year .96, SD = 1.74; mean decade = .84, SD = 1.79) , MDES d = .19, see Figure 6a.  
There was no main effect of scenario on the acceptability of declining to help, F(2, 206) = 
2.23, p = .11, ηp2 = .02 (mean soup kitchen = 1.24, SD = 1.72; mean kidney = 1.04, SD = 
1.79; mean school = .93, SD = 1.71).  However, there was an interaction of scenario and 
time, such that moral credit endured more for some scenarios than for others, F(2, 206) = 
9.43, p < .001, ηp2 = .08, see Figure 6b.  Kidney donation moral credit had a slower 
temporal decline (F(1, 103) = 4.17, p = .04, ηp2 = .04) than moral credit from helping at 
an afterschool program (F(1, 103) = 19.0, p < .001, ηp2 = .15) or volunteering at a soup 
kitchen (F(1, 103) = 26.5, p < .001, ηp2 = .20).  We next examined whether there was any 
remaining moral credit a decade later.  For kidney scenarios there was t(103) = 2.22, p = 
.029, d = .38 (mean kidney decade = 1.02, SD = 1.77, mean kidney no prior contribution 
= .654, SD = 1.84), unlike for afterschool helping t(103) = 1.18, p = .24, d  = .21 (mean 
school decade = .740, SD = 1.75; mean school no prior contribution = .596, SD = 1.88), 
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or soup kitchen helping, where there was an effect in the opposite direction t(103) = 2.74, 
p = .007, d = .48 (mean soup decade = .769, SD = 1.87, mean soup no prior contribution 
= 1.12, SD = 1.67).   
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Figure 5.6. The temporal generalizability of moral credit from prior contributions (a) and 
temporal generalizability for each individual scenario set (b).  Error bars represent one 
standard error. 
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Study 5 Discussion 
 Moral credit appears to be temporally sensitive, in that the moral acceptability of 
declining to help a cause to which one had previously contributed diminishes over time.  
Some moral credit appears to be more enduring — a kidney donation continued to give 
moral credit a decade after the donation.  However, moral credit for having helped in a 
soup kitchen or an after school program disappeared entirely.  It could be that donating an 
organ gives indefinite credit because the recipient will spend the rest of their life without 
that organ, which could be viewed as continuing to make a donation.  Testing whether a 
donation that regenerates, such as a liver lobe, or blood, produces less enduring credit 
could explore such a notion.  
 Less clear, normatively, is how long moral credit should extend for acts that are 
not accompanied by a perceived indefinite cost.  At first glance, it might seem that if 
people are morally required to do a substantial, albeit limited, amount of good, then they 
could do all of their allotted good early on in their lives and then be required to do no 
more.  But this seems counterintuitive, and also counter to the findings regarding 
participants’ reactions to particular scenarios.   
One way of reconciling participants’ reactions with normatively plausible 
principles would be to offer normative reasons for adopting a time-sensitive principle.  
Various moral theories have the resources to do this.  For example, on a simple virtue 
theory, according to which one ought to act as a virtuous person would, what is crucial is 
to possess and cultivate virtuous dispositions, and to be oriented toward the good (e.g., 
Zagzebski, 2010).  If one never again acted well when in apparently relevant 
circumstances, then this would cast doubt on the idea that one in fact has the relevant 
		 205 
dispositions.  Even on a Kant-inspired deontological theory that directs us to promote the 
good of others (though not necessarily in a maximizing way), it seems that this should 
always be an action-guiding maxim (Kant, 1785/2002).  It would cast doubt on one’s 
having adopted a maxim of beneficence if one never appeared to act on it after a certain 
point.  Thus, there are resources in moral theory, together with empirical facts about 
humans’ finite capacities and situational factors, that go some way toward reconciling 
participants’ reactions with plausible normative principles.    
Moral credit does appear, as our model suggests, to decay over time.  One 
implication of this is that it might be possible to change the timing of a gift of a given 
size to alter how much credit is received, over time. For example, one could volunteer 
once for ten hours, or for 2 hours per week for 5 weeks.  The latter, more diffuse form of 
beneficence may grant more credit, if the recency of helping outweighs the decreased 
credit for amount of good done, analogously to how monthly payments result in increased 
gym attendance compared to equivalent annual fees (Gourville & Soman, 1998).  Study 6 
thus explored whether smaller amounts of good, done over longer periods of time, give 
more enduring moral credit than a single large amount of good done. 
 
Study 6:  Temporal Diffusion of Donations 
 For this study, we explored temporal diffusion in a domain where it is frequently 
encountered: monthly vs. one-time charitable donations.  If recency matters, it could be 
the case that the recency of continued monthly donations outweighs them being smaller 
than a single lump sum given some number of months ago. 
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Study 6 Materials 
 In Study 6 the soup kitchen and after school helping scenario sets were adapted to 
explore how the moral credit from monthly contributions compares to single 
contributions both when first made (e.g., how does the moral credit from signing up to 
make monthly donations compare to the moral credit for donating a larger amount 
immediately), and several months after the initial request (e.g., how acceptable is it to 
decline helping a soup kitchen if eight months ago one donated $240 to it, vs. signed up 
to make monthly donations of $20/month for a year).  The new moral act inquired about 
was related to the first (e.g., making an additional donation to the soup kitchen).  Subjects 
saw all levels of both scenario sets.  See Appendix E for scenarios. 
Study 6 Results 
Ninety-four participants were recruited for partial course credit from an 
undergraduate participant pool (8 excluded for failing attention check, 70.9% female, 
Mage = 20.2, SD = 2.41).  A 2 (after school help vs. soup kitchen) x 2 (single vs. monthly 
donation) x 2 (time: same day vs. months later) repeated measures ANOVA revealed a 
predicted main effect of time F(1, 85) = 13.7, p < .001, ηp2 = .14 (same day mean = 2.26, 
SD = 1.13; months later mean = 2.06, SD = 1.29).  Regarding our central question as to 
whether monthly donations give more enduring credit than a single lump-sum donation, a 
significant donation type by time interaction indicated that monthly donations, 8-9 
months after commencing, give more moral credit than having donated a lump sum, F(1, 
85) = 5.05, p = .027, ηp2 = .06 (same day single mean = 2.31, SD = 1.04; months-later 
single mean = 1.99, SD = 1.33l same day monthly mean = 2.20, SD = 1.21; months-later 
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monthly mean = 2.12, SD = 1.25), MDES d = .26, suggesting a differential decay of 
credit for the one-time and monthly donations, see Figure 7. 
There was no main effect of scenario F(1, 85) = .57, p = .45, ηp2 = .01 (soup 
kitchen mean = 2.20, SD = 1.21; school mean = 2.11, SD = 1.23), nor was there a main 
effect of type of donation, F(1, 85) = .028, p = .87, ηp2 < .01 (monthly mean = 2.16, SD = 
1.23; single mean = 2.15, SD = 1.21).  The interaction of scenario and time was not 
significant, F(1, 85) = 2.15, p = .15, ηp2 = .02.  There was, however, a significant 
interaction of scenario and type of donation, F(1, 85) = 8.25, p = .005, ηp2 = .09 (the 
monthly donation trended towards more moral credit than the single donation in the soup 
kitchen scenario, F(1, 85) = 2.13 p = .13, ηp2 = .03, and less moral credit than single 
donation in the school scenario, F(1, 85) = 2.57, p = .11, ηp2 = .03).  The 3-way 
interaction between scenario, time, and donation type was not significant F(1, 85) = .92, 
p = .34, ηp2 = .01). 
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Figure 5.7. The temporal generalizability of moral credit from single-instance and 
monthly recurring donations which total the same amounts.  Error bars represent one 
standard error. 
 
Study 6 Discussion 
 In Study 6 we find that spreading out the single donation into monthly 
installments spreads the moral credit from the action, making it more enduring.  Monthly 
donations are generally offered with the thought that they lower the barriers to giving and 
encourage more gifts.  But such an effect could be offset if, by replacing one-time larger 
donations, they give people more enduring moral credit, and so inhibit future giving.  
 It might seem that given any plausible moral principle of beneficence, it should 
make no difference to one’s moral credit whether one donates a lump sum at the 
beginning of the year or spreads out the same donation over twelve months.  But it is 
possible that subjects infer that someone who donates in monthly installments does not 
have as much disposable wealth as someone who donates in a lump sum.  So, we may 
expect more total contribution from the person who has more to give, and demand more 
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from that person nine months later, not (only) because time has gone by, but because we 
believe that they are in a position to add to their initial contribution at a lower cost.  It 
might also be that participants infer from the fact that a person makes regular 
contributions to a good cause that she has made it a goal to be beneficent, and this itself 
might be taken as a sign that she is virtuous and thereby deserves greater moral credit.  
Given these possibilities, it would be premature to conclude from Study 6 that 
participants’ conceptions of moral credit are untethered to normative morality.    
 
Study 7 
We take the prior studies to indicate participants’ normative beliefs regarding the 
requiredness of beneficence, as joint evaluation lets participants decide whether a 
difference between different variants of the same scenario should matter.  Equally 
important is whether those differences actually do matter when evaluating single versions 
of each scenario.  It could be that participants believe that helping a month ago should 
grant less moral credit than helping a week ago, but, assign them equivalent credit when 
not directly comparing actions.  In order to explore whether our model of lay theory of 
moral credit describes how moral credit is assigned to individual actions, we presented 
participants with one level of each scenario set from Studies 2-6.  Participants were 
presented with one scenario from each of the scenario sets used in each study.  Four 
hundred seventeen participants were recruited for partial course credit from an 
undergraduate participant pool (107 excluded for failing attention check, 74.8% female, 
Meage = 20.2, SD = 3.35).   
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All analyses were conducted using two-level hierarchical linear mixed-effects 
models, with subjects specified as random intercepts, and scenario set and the factors of 
interest specified as fixed factors, using the lme4 package in R (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, 
& Walker, 2014).  Model fit was assessed using likelihood ratio tests. Sensitivity power 
analyses were conducted for Study 7 analyses (using alpha = .05 and beta = 80%) to 
determine the minimum detectable effect size (MDES; unstandardized) using the simr 
package in R (Green & MacLeod, 2016) and 1,000 resamples. 
Study 7 Results 
Study 2 Scenarios. Study 2 examined whether prior contribution and future cost 
both matter.  The mixed model yielded a significant difference in acceptability of 
declining to help by cost, χ2(1)=72.8, p < 0.001), β = .956, SE = .120, (mean high cost = 
.93, SD = 1.84; mean low cost = -.05, SD = 1.92), MDES = .30, and by prior 
contribution, χ2(1)=39.3, p < 0.001), β = .700, SE = .111, (mean prior contribution = .77, 
SD = 1.87; mean no prior contribution - .04, SD = 1.96), MDES = .30, see Figure 8.  
There was no significant interaction between prior contribution and future cost, χ2(1)= 
.02, p = 0.90, β = .028, SE = .214. 
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Figure 5.8. The effects of cost of further action and prior contribution on the acceptability 
of declining to help when seeing one level of each scenario set.  Error bars represent one 
standard error. 
 
Study 3 Scenarios. Unlike in our within-subjects study, participants did not think 
amount of effort mattered when moral luck (whether the action was successful or not) 
varied.  The mixed model yielded a significant difference in acceptability of declining to 
help by luck, χ2(1)= 7.16, p = 0.007, β = .341, SE = .127, (mean unsuccessful = .36, SD 
= 1.92; mean successful = .68, SD = 2.04),  MDES = .35, but not by effort, χ2(1)= .32, p  
= .57, β = .350, SE = .127, see Figure 9, MDES = .35 (mean high effort = .61, SD = 1.96; 
mean low effort = .43, SD = 2.00).  There was no significant interaction between luck 
and effort, χ2(1)=1.48, p = 0.22, β = .22, SE = .31. 
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Figure 5.9. The effect of effort and luck on the acceptability of declining to help when 
seeing one level of each scenario set.  Error bars represent one standard error. 
  
Study 4 Scenarios. In Study 4, participants’ normative position was that moral 
credit from prior beneficence should have limited domain generalizability.  A mixed 
model with the interaction of domain (coded as continuous) and prior helping did not fit 
the data better than a model only containing their main effects, inconsistent with findings 
from our within-subject design, χ2(1)= 2.35, p =  0.13, β = .17, SE = .11, MDES = .31, 
(mean help same domain = 1.32, SD = 1.60; mean no help same domain = .62, SD = 
1.74; mean help similar domain = 1.50, SD = 1.50; mean no help similar domain = .69, 
SD = 1.78; mean help different domain = 1.64, SD = 1.52; mean no help different domain 
= 1.15, SD = 1.72) see Figure 10.  We thus did not observe the limited domain 
generalizability of moral credit found in the within-subjects design. 
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Figure 5.10. The domain generalizability of moral credit from prior contributions as 
expressed through difference in acceptability of declining helping for actors who had 
helped, and actors who had not helped, for participants seeing one level of each scenario 
set.  Error bars represent average of one standard error for scores from which the 
difference score is derived. 
 
 Study 5 Scenarios. As in the within-subjects design, the mixed model yielded a 
significant decrease in the acceptability of declining to help as time since prior 
beneficence increased (coded as continuous),  (χ2(1)= 49.3, p < 0.001), β = .342, SE = 
.048, (mean today = 1.59, SD = 1.53; mean week = 1.51, SD = 1.45; mean year = .89, SD 
= 1.71, mean decade = .69, SD = 1.85), MDES = .13 see Figure 11a.  There was a 
significant interaction between time and scenario, χ2(2)= 8.99, p = 0.01, such that kidney 
donation gave more enduring credit than soup kitchen volunteering or after-school 
helping, see Figure 11b. 
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Figure 5.11. The temporal generalizability of moral credit from prior contributions (a) 
and temporal generalizability for each individual scenario set (b), when presenting 
participants with one level of each scenario set.  Error bars represent one standard error. 
 
Study 6 Scenarios. In Study 6 we were interested in whether signing up for a 
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more enduring moral credit.  The mixed model yielded a significant difference in 
acceptability of declining to help by type of donation, such that monthly donations gave 
more credit as a main effect, χ2(1)= 13.09, p < 0.001, β = .332, SE = .112. There was no 
main effect of time since donation, χ2(1)= 2.42, p  = .12, β = .005, SE = .112.  There was, 
importantly, a significant interaction between luck and effort, χ2(1)=3.97, p = 0.046), β = 
.36, SE = .18, (mean monthly same day = 2.18, SD = 1.09; mean monthly months later = 
2.14, SD = 1.26; mean single same day = 1.97, SD = 1.40; mean single months later = 
1.73, SD = 1.31), MDES = .50, suggesting that the observed main effect difference was 
driven by a decline in acceptability of declining to help after having made a lump sum 
donation months earlier. 
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Figure 5.12. The temporal generalizability of moral credit from single-instance and 
monthly recurring donations which total the same amounts, when seeing one level of 
each scenario set.  Error bars represent one standard error. 
 
Study 7 Discussion 
 The lay theory of moral accounting we uncovered over Studies 1-6 is largely 
consistent with how people actually assign moral credit when not seeing side-by-side 
differences for scenario sets.  Participants take into account the increased cost of future 
action, prior contribution, luck, recency, and temporal diffusion.  There are, however, two 
differences between the lay theory of how moral credit should be assigned, and how 
credit appears to be  assigned: the amount of effort put forth appears to not matter for 
actual judgment if effort was not ultimately successful, and moral credit in the case of 
actual judgment seems to generalize equally to unrelated domains. 
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General Discussion 
In six studies we tested the core aspects of the Moral Accounting Model, which 
uncovers the lay theory of how prior beneficence reduces moral demand.  People judge 
that after having helped there is less moral demand to continue helping (Study 1).  Two 
paths contribute to decreased beneficence: The increased cost of continuing to help and 
moral credit (Study 2).  Study 3 reveals that moral credit consists of prior effort and prior 
effect, has some domain specificity (Study 4), and is temporally sensitive (Study 5).  This 
temporal specificity can cause a gift that is spread out over time to produce more lasting 
moral credit than a one-time donation of equal total size (Study 6).  Study 7, which only 
presents one level of each scenario set, finds that the lay theory of which factors should 
matter, uncovered in Studies 1-6, is largely consistent with single-level judgments of 
actors.  The emergent difference between lay theories of moral accounting and how 
participants actually judge others is in amount of effort not mattering to individual 
judgment, despite participants taking the normative stance that effort should matter.  
Our model suggests that people have an intuitive solution to the problem of the 
demandingness of moral action.  The findings suggest that, even with the global need 
unmet, people believe that it is at least possible to have done enough, morally speaking.  
This is not surprising in itself.  At the same time, the findings show that a subtle 
collection of factors informs this judgment.  Some are very plausibly morally relevant in 
themselves on a wide swath of moral theories, such as an increased cost to future helping 
once one has helped already, and a potential decrease in need from successful prior 
efforts.  Others are arguably morally relevant in themselves as well, as long as one takes 
demands to be a function of something other than maximizing well-being, such as prior 
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effort.  And while some others, such as generalizability in domain and time, as well as 
diffusion, appear to be in tension with plausible moral principles, it is possible that 
background assumptions can defuse this tension.  
Evidence for the limited generalizability of the moral credit suggests that mental 
moral credit accounting may function in much the same way as mental financial 
accounting, with moral credit not entirely fungible and time-sensitive.  
While our work has identified a series of factors that are important in determining 
the level of perceived moral demand, exploring how these factors interact could further 
refine the model.  For example, it could be that the temporal decay of moral credit is 
faster in domains that are more different from the original act.  It could also be that bad 
luck in moral efforts does not diminish credit in other domains as much as in the same 
domain, if the significance of bad luck derives from the fact that that particular need is 
still unmet.    
A diminished demand for moral action is clearly not the same as moral action 
becoming less admirable, and likely is even the reverse.  Many ethical approaches 
distinguish between acts that are morally required and acts that are morally 
supererogatory, i.e., beyond what is required.  It could well be the case that the factors we 
have identified as intuitive reasons for reducing the moral demands of beneficence also 
function to increase the praiseworthiness of a person who acts regardless. 
Our results complement moral licensing findings, where previous good done 
excuses future moral lapses.  People seem to regard prior contributions not just as an 
excuse for ethical indolence, but as a general principle that reduces the demands of 
beneficence.  In other words, in some cases, doing good puts one in a position where one 
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needs no excuse; one simply doesn’t violate the demands that would otherwise be in 
place.  Our results also provide empirical evidence for helping being perceived as a finite 
resource outside of the self-regulation domain and methods typically employed in it: 
decreased moral demand is placed on others who have tried to do good, or have even 
incidentally done good without trying.   
Empirical inquiries such as ours can also help inform normative debates regarding 
the factors that determine the moral demands of beneficence.  Inasmuch as moral theory 
is sensitive to people’s intuitions, it should consider incorporating cost, prior effort, and 
prior good done as relevant to fixing what is morally required of us in the way of helping 
others in need.  At least some of these factors have a good claim to be normatively 
relevant on their own.  When it comes to others, there seems to be nothing inherently 
normatively significant in them, but it is possible to explain how they might be seen to be 
systematically, albeit contingently, correlated with normatively relevant features.  
Attention to isolating these factors can help reveal potentially morally relevant factors not 
previously distinguished clearly. 
At the same time, our model can also contribute to increasing the impact of 
philanthropic efforts.  Those in government or in the non-profit sector who are working 
to increase fundraising or volunteerism may find it easier to achieve their aims if they 
take our results on board: a better understanding of the factors that shape perception of 
how much aid to others one is morally required to give could contribute to the 
development of more effective solicitations. 
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Chapter 5 has been submitted for publication of the material as it may appear in 
the Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 2019. Ryazanov, Arseny; Nelkin, Dana; 
Rickless, Samuel; Christenfeld, Nicholas. The dissertation/thesis author was the primary 
investigator and author of this material.  
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Abstract 
Performance measurement is considered useful in guiding donations to charities. 
We investigated whether efficiency rates predominately guide donations relative to 
available alternatives, or influence donation amounts. Across 4 studies (N = 460) 
participants evaluating charity advertisements saw randomly assigned efficiency rates 
presented as background information. Participants could pledge a portion of a gift card, 
offered in return for participation, to their pick of presented charities. Participants were 
sensitive to relative, but not absolute, efficiency, giving more often to more relatively 
efficient charities, but generally did not pledge them more money. Even providing an 
explicit standard of efficiency did not create an absolute sensitivity to efficiency, 
suggesting that efficiency information, steers, rather than encourage, or discourage, 
donations overall. 
 
Keywords: Efficiency, Donation, Performance Measurement, Giving, 
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On the Limited Role of Efficiency in Charitable Giving 
Deciding whether, how much, and to whom to give is a daunting task, as there is 
an overwhelming number of charities vying for philanthropic donations.  They vary in 
their mission, from saving frogs, to providing wished-for experiences to seriously ill 
children, their scope from regional to global, and their budgets from tiny to billions 
annually.  
Charities also vary enormously in the efficiency with which they deliver the 
donations to the targets of the philanthropy, rather than spending the donations on the 
bureaucracy of the charity itself.  The Kids Wish Network, for example, collected 
approximately 18.6 million dollars in 2012, yet used only 240,000 dollars directly on its 
cause of granting sick children’s wishes (Taggart, 2017). In contrast, Direct Relief 
International, in 2016, spent all $1.104 billion of the money they raised from individual 
donations directly on providing humanitarian medical aid, with none going to 
administrative costs (Barrett, 2017).  
Quantifiable performance measurement has become viewed as a particularly 
convincing way of appealing to donors (Cunningham & Ricks, 2004).  Metrics that 
provide greater non-profit transparency and accountability should direct funding towards 
more deserving charities, and may even increase total giving by increasing donor 
confidence (Cunningham & Ricks, 2004). We investigated to what extent performance 
measurement motivates donation. 
A simple way of conveying charity efficiency is through the percentage of money 
collected that is spent on the actual cause, as opposed to the overhead of the organization 
(Stork & Woodilla, 2008). While conceptually simple, determining efficiency becomes 
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more complex in practice, because exactly what counts as overhead is somewhat 
ambiguous. Furthermore, the marginal efficiency rate can differ from the overall 
efficiency rate: the first dollar received likely goes all to overhead, and the last dollar 
much more to the end cause. 
Proponents of efficiency rates suggest they can improve and increase 
philanthropy, believing that donors allocate personal resources by using price and quality 
like they do in private goods consumption (Callen, 1994). High efficiency rates should 
signify a higher quality product that would then solicit greater donations. Several online 
services provide potential donors with ratings of efficiency, such as letter grades similar 
to a school report card, that are predominantly based on financial efficiency (Lowell, 
Trelstad, & Meehan, 2005).  
However, efficiency rates and ratings are not without their opponents. 
Preoccupation with appearing efficient can cause charities to handicap themselves by 
avoiding investments in infrastructure that could increase actual effectiveness, or funding 
the most efficient programs rather than the most effective ones (Gregory & Howard, 
2009; Hager & Wing, 2004). Consequentially, some argue that comparing overheads 
between charities is meaningless (Bowman, 2006; Steinberg, 1986). Furthermore, 
misreporting efficiency is common in the nonprofit sector (Krishnan, Yetman, & Yetman, 
2005). In one estimate, 75-85% of public charities misreport costs in order to appear 
more efficient (The Bedsworth, Gregory, & Howard, 2008). Although opponents of 
efficiency rates argue that overemphasis on efficiency decreases charity effectiveness, 
both sides presuppose that people rely on these financial indicators in philanthropic 
decisions (Gregory & Howard, 2009). 
		 229 
Evidence for high efficiency rates positively affecting donation is limited (Szper 
& Prakash, 2011). Modest correlations have been observed between efficiency and 
donations given to, and volunteering for, particular organizations (Callen, 1994; 
Bowman, 2006). However, other studies have found that efficiency ratings are largely 
ignored. Only one in five donors studied consulted charity watchdog websites before 
making donations in the past year (Cnaan, Jones, Dickin, & Salomon, 2011). Hope 
Consulting (2012) reported that only 3% of donors claimed even to have considered 
alternatives by effectiveness, the information that efficiency rates are supposed to 
convey. Preliminary laboratory studies show more of an effect: when choosing between 
two fictional charities, participants preferred to give to the option with a smaller 
overhead, though overhead was defined as percentage of the donation kept by the 
experimenter, rather than as the efficiency of the actual charity (U. Gneezy, Keenan, & 
Gneezy, 2014; see their field study for evidence of how covering overhead can encourage 
donation). Caviola, Faulmüller, Everett, Savulescu & Kahane (2014) likewise found that 
giving was sensitive to efficiency: participants asked to imagine donating to a particular 
fictional charity stated that they would hypothetically give more to a more efficient 
charity, even if the less efficient charity was actually more effective, and saved more 
lives. 
Expanding on prior work, we explore two ways in which efficiency might 
influence donations to charity. The first is through sensitivity to the actual level of 
efficiency: charities that are highly efficient simply receive bigger donations. The second 
is through relative efficiency: charities that are more efficient than immediately-present 
alternatives garner the contributions, but the amount given is independent of absolute 
		 230 
efficiency. Increased giving to more efficient charities could then be the result of more 
frequent, rather than more substantial, gifts. 
Andreoni’s theory of warm-glow giving suggests that donations are made, at least 
in part, as the result of donors wanting to feel a “warm-glow”(1990). But convincingly 
distinguishing between giving out of desire for that warmth, rather than warmth emerging 
as a natural consequence of giving, has proven difficult. Psychological studies on whether 
helping is done for egoistic reasons or is truly altruistic have been unable to reliably parse 
the two in real-world settings (Batson, 2014; Cialdini, 1991). Without settling the 
altruism debate, we can build on the notion that giving can be associated with a warm, 
affective component, and a colder deliberative component.  
Previous studies suggest that there may be a general aversion to cold statistics in 
charitable donation. Jenni and Loewenstein (1997) found that appeals highlighting 
individual victims garnered larger donations than those emphasizing statistical victims, or 
large groups in need of aid. Informing donors of this single-victim bias did not cause 
increased donation to statistical victims, but instead decreased donation to single-victims 
(Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2007). Small et al. (2007) suggest that this effect may 
exist due to a distinction, first proposed by Zajonc (1984), between a faster, more 
automatic affective system, and slower, more effortful deliberative system. Participants, 
informed of their bias, may have deliberated about identifiable victims just as they 
normally deliberate about statistical victims, and so the affective system did not engage. 
The deliberative information conveyed by efficiency rates may similarly cause people to 
donate less money to charities, even if the efficiency rates are high. 
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Not only do donors respond differently to affective and deliberative information, 
but they also seem to become less sensitive to deliberative information when provided 
with more affective bases for their decisions. In Hsee and Rottenstreich’s (2004) study, 
donation amount was insensitive to number of pandas helped when potential donors were 
shown either a photo of one panda, or photos of four pandas they could help.  When the 
pandas were instead represented by dots, the more abstract and calculated donation 
decision became sensitive to the number of pandas helped. Consistent with Small et al.’s 
(2007) findings that deliberation can suppress affective response, the effect was driven by 
decreased donation to a single panda represented by a dot, relative to one represented by 
a photo, with no difference between photos of four pandas or four dots representing 
pandas. Taken together, these studies suggest that donors not only react differently to 
deliberative and affective information, but that deliberative, numeric, information is 
sometimes overridden by more affective responses, and that donor sensitivity to 
efficiency should be explored in affective contexts as well. 
Another perspective on the potential impact of efficiency information is based on 
general evaluability theory (Hsee, 1996; Hsee & Zhang, 2010; Loewenstien, Blount, & 
Bazerman, 1999). This theory suggests that evaluations made between simultaneously 
available alternatives can differ from evaluations of each alternative made separately. 
Applying evaluability theory to efficiency ratings, sensitivity to efficiency relative to 
available alternatives, but not to absolute level of efficiency, may reflect the difference 
between single and joint evaluation, or between evaluating a single charity’s efficiency, 
and choosing from a selection of charities. Participants without a reference point of how 
efficient a charity should be would use efficiency to choose between available options 
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when presented with a selection, but not base their donation on the actual efficiency 
value. Such an effect could be apparent in their choice of a charity to give to, and in their 
choice of how much to give. 
In four studies, we explore the impact of efficiency rates on charitable giving.  
Study 1 explores the impact of relative rates on how people choose between charities, as 
well as the impact of the absolute rate on decisions about how much to give.  That is, 
would a high efficiency rate make people give more, or would a better relative efficiency 
just attract more gifts? If choosing how much to give is the more affective component, 
and selecting a recipient is the more deliberative component, it might be that efficiency 
rates impact only those latter relative judgments. In Study 2, we expand the range of 
efficiencies investigated and remove affective information about the charities, in order to 
examine whether cold facts such as efficiency become more important in the absence of 
warm, affective appeals, consistent with earlier scale-sensitivity findings. Study 3 and 4 
explore whether providing an explicit standard for charity efficiency causes an increase 
or decrease in donations when the presented charities clearly exceed or fall short of that 
standard. This might be expected if people care about charity efficiency, but do not know 
how to interpret the levels, consistent with general evaluability theory. 
 
 
 
 
Study 1 
Methods  
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Participants. One hundred thirty-eight undergraduates completed the study for 
partial course credit (1 participant excluded for not indicating donation amount; 
demographic info was not collected in Study 1 but was for all subsequent studies; 
participants in Study 1 were drawn from the same participant pool as in Studies 2 and 3). 
Materials. A cover survey stated, as part of the instructions, that participants had 
been entered in a lottery to win a 50-dollar gift card in exchange for their participation. 
The survey then asked participants to evaluate the effectiveness of the advertisements for 
four charities, using a 7-point Likert scale. The charities included in this study were the 
American Red Cross (RC), Save the Children (StC), American Heart Association (AHA), 
and Susan G. Komen For the Cure (SgK). Participants viewed one actual published print 
advertisement per charity, selected for being predominantly visual and relying on an 
emotional appeal, rather than laying out a logical justification for donation. 
Advertisements were selected to contain simple taglines e.g. “a little from you can mean 
a lot to someone else” (American Red Cross), or “imagine a life without breast cancer” 
(Susan G. Komen). A table listing basic background information was provided with each 
advertisement, as context to help evaluate advertisements. The table presented the 
charities’ mission statements alongside one more column, which differed by condition. In 
the two experimental conditions, this column provided the efficiency rates of the 
charities. In the control condition, the year the charity was founded was displayed 
instead. An explanation of how efficiency rates are calculated was provided to those who 
saw them: Efficiency is measured as cents per dollar spent directly on the cause rather 
than on raising more money. E.g. an efficiency of 48% would mean that 48 cents of every 
dollar raised went to the cause, with the remaining 52 cents constituting the overhead of 
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the charity. Participants in the high efficiency condition saw efficiency rates for the four 
charities of 93%, 88%, 84%, and 76% (mean = 85.25%). The low efficiency group was 
provided with efficiency rates that were 20% lower: 73%, 68%, 64%, and 56% (mean = 
65.25%). 
The chosen efficiencies were based on a previous survey of 1,007 American 
adults, which found that they estimate charities to be only 63.7 percent efficient, while 
simultaneously holding that charities should be 77.6 percent efficient (Grey Matter 
Research & Consulting, 2008). Thus, the low efficiency group was intended to be in line 
with typical expectations, and the high efficiency group was intended to exceed the 
typically desired level of efficiency.   
Efficiencies were randomly assigned to charities between participants. The order 
the charities appeared in the table was randomized as well. In the control condition, the 
year each charity was founded was randomly assigned, to control for the amount of 
information presented, but with numbers unlikely to have any consistent impact on 
donation decisions. A page thanking participants for their advertisement evaluations 
asked them to consider pledging a portion of the gift card to any or all of the charities 
presented. The amount pledged would be donated if they won the gift card. The 
instructions also stated that previous participants had pledged to donate 5-50 dollars of 
the total amount to create a social norm of giving, without suggesting an appropriate 
donation amount. 
Procedure. Upon arrival, participants were told that they had been recruited to 
evaluate charity advertisements. After being explained these instructions as a group (up 
to 4 participants), they were seated at separated computer workstations to complete the 
		 235 
survey, which reiterated the gift card details and instructions. Participants were randomly 
assigned to condition: high efficiency, low efficiency, or control. Participants evaluated 
the four advertisements, presented in a randomized order, alongside the background 
information tables. Next, participants saw what appeared to be a concluding screen to the 
experiment, thanking them for their participation. This same page also asked participants 
if they would like to donate a portion of their potential winnings to one of the presented 
charities. The page again displayed the table of background information that contained 
the efficiency rates for the charities, or, for the control group, the year founded. 
Participants specified the recipient and amount they wanted to give. When indicating the 
recipient, participants had the option of selecting “any of the above”. Afterwards, 
participants answered two free response questions: How did you pick the amount you 
chose to donate? and How did you pick which charity you would donate to? to explore 
whether self-reports reflect how efficiency affects donation. Participants were debriefed 
as to the true purpose of the study. A rating of charity worthiness and an estimate of 
average charity efficiency are excluded from analyses. All procedures were approved by 
an IRB. 
Results 
In this experiment, we can look at the impact of both the absolute and the relative 
levels of efficiency on giving. If people only care about relative efficiency, participants 
would prefer to give to the more efficient of the charities they saw, but the average 
donation amount would not differ by whether participants were in the lower efficiency, 
higher efficiency, or control conditions.  If people are also sensitive to the actual level of 
efficiency, then we ought to see markedly more giving when the efficiency rates are high 
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than when low.  Comparison to the control condition would indicate, in this case, whether 
high efficiency increased donations, or low efficiency suppressed it.  
These data allow us first to explore whether people are more likely to donate to 
the higher ranked charities.  Second, they let us examine whether the people who pick, 
for example, the most efficient of the charities presented, choose a bigger gift size than 
people who decide to give to the least efficient charity.  Third, we can see whether people 
who are offered charities with high overall efficiency give more overall than people who 
are given ones with low efficiency. Ninety-seven percent of participants chose to make a 
donation. 
First, we looked at the distributions of donations, in the two experimental groups, 
to the first, second, third, and fourth most efficient charity presented. Participants 
specifying a recipient charity in the efficiency conditions (14 participants gave money 
without preference to whom it went) showed a preference for better ranked charities χ²(3, 
N = 76) = 26.9, p < .001, Cramer’s V = 0.34 (47.4%, 22.4%, 23.7%, 6.58% selected ranks 
1-4 respectively; see Figure 1). Donation patterns did not differ between the Low 
Efficiency and High Efficiency conditions, χ²(3, N = 76) = 1.18, p = .76, Cramer’s V = 
0.07, suggesting that participants in these two conditions were using the efficiency 
estimates similarly in guiding donations (48.4%, 22.6%, 19.4%, 9.68% selected ranks 1-4 
respectively in the high condition; 46.7%, 22.2%, 26.7%, 4.44% in the low condition; see 
Figure 1). Participants in the control condition gave to charities irrespectively of assigned 
charity age χ²(3, N = 40) = 1.01, p =.80, Cramer’s V = 0.09 (8 had no preference; 27.75%, 
30.0%, 20.0%, 22.5% selected charities ranked 1-4 respectively by age). Thus, more 
relatively efficient charities were more often selected as the recipients of the donations. 
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 Next we explored whether there was evidence for increased donation 
amounts to more efficient charities, the second process by which more efficient charities 
may solicit greater total donations. In the two conditions that saw efficiency information, 
donation amount did not differ by relative charity efficiency, F(1, 74) = .003, p = .95, η² 
< .001, indicating that efficiency rank did not play a significant role in determining 
amount given (means: rank 1 = $29.50, SD = 16.7; rank 2 = $28.94, SD = 18.6; rank 3 = 
$25.83, SD = 14.2; rank 4 = $33.00, SD = 23.3). 
Finally, we examined whether seeing charities that, overall, were considerably 
more efficient elicited higher levels of donation.  Average amount donated did not differ 
by condition, F(2, 134) = 1.15, p =  0.32, η² = .017.  Participants pledged to donate an 
average of $27.06 of the 50-dollar gift card to charity: an average of $30.33 in the high 
efficiency condition (SD = 18.1), $26.94 in the lower efficiency condition (SD = 16.0), 
and $24.68 in the control condition (SD = 16.8; see Figure 2). The large variances suggest 
that participants were not simply defaulting to a donation of half of their potential 
earnings. 
While more relatively efficient charities collected more money overall, this was 
the result of increased donation frequency, but not increased donation amount. Across the 
two experimental conditions, the first ranked charities were pledged, from the 90 
participants, a total of $1065 dollars, while the fourth ranked charities were pledged 
$165. 
The two open-ended self-report questions were coded for any mention of 
efficiency. While efficiency did not play a role in deciding amount, with a single 
participant reporting using efficiency information to decide an amount to give, 35.6% of 
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participants reported using efficiency information to select a donation target, χ²(1, N = 
180) =  33.4, p <.001, Cramer’s V = .43. 
Independent of efficiency effects, participants did find the charities differentially 
appealing, F(3, 134) = 4.33, p < .001, ηp² = .036, with Susan G. Komen getting the 
highest ratings.  This charity also received the most donations (36.8%), though the 
magnitude of its average donation was not larger ($23.21, versus the average donation of 
$27.06). 
Discussion 
Donation amounts were not affected by whether low efficiency, high efficiency, 
or control information was presented. Nonetheless, participants preferred to donate to the 
best-ranked charity, albeit without adjusting their donation amount by the relative 
efficiency of the charity they chose. The results of Study 1 demonstrate sensitivity to 
relative charity rank rather than to absolute efficiency values. Furthermore, participants 
were deciding donation amount without sensitivity to the scale of efficiency, while 
choosing a recipient scale-sensitively to relative charity efficiency. This is consistent with 
amount donated being a more affective process, and selection of charity being a more 
deliberative process. These results also suggest that general evaluability theory does not 
entirely account for efficiency insensitivity, because in the joint-evaluation of charity 
efficiency, participant donation amount remained insensitive to relative efficiency. 
In Study 2, we exaggerated low efficiency estimates to explore whether the 
insensitivity to absolute rates in donation amounts would persist even when the difference 
was much greater between the two conditions. One might expect the effect of relative 
rank to be slightly bigger in low efficiency condition in Study 1, as well as the following 
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study, due to the relative difference between two smaller numbers being greater than 
between two larger numbers with the same absolute difference. 
Given the previous findings of differences between affective and deliberative 
processes in donation, we also explored whether affective information, provided by the 
charity advertisements, was dampening sensitivity to efficiency. The nature of the 
selected ads, as is generally the case, was not to provide logical justification for the 
charity or analysis of its effectiveness, but instead to create an emotional appeal through 
bold, catchy graphics.  The advertisement for Save the Children, for example, shows a 
portrait of a frontline health worker made from electrocardiograms of the children he 
saved. Study 2 also compared donation decisions made by participants exposed to 
advertisements with those made by participants not provided this affective information.  
Study 2 
Methods 
Participants. One hundred two undergraduates completed the second study for 
partial course credit (81.3% female; M age = 20.8, SD = 2.40; 74% identified as 
Asian/Pacific Islander, 15% identified as Hispanic/Latino, 9% as White, and 3% as other; 
age not specified by 30 participants). 
Materials. The high efficiency estimates remained 93%, 88%, 84%, 76% (M = 
85.25%). Low efficiency estimates were made to be 60% lower (and 40% lower than the 
low efficiency group in Study 1: 33%, 28%, 24%, 16% (M = 25.25%).  In the non-
affective condition, print advertisements were replaced with a blank page with the name 
of the charity written in a plain font. Participants could still judge charities by their names 
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and mission statements, but no longer by advertisement. The materials otherwise were 
unchanged from Study 1. The condition without efficiency information was eliminated. 
Procedure. The same procedure was utilized as in Study 1, with the addition that 
participants were also randomly assigned to either an affective (containing print 
advertisements) or non-affective (containing blank pages with the names of the charities 
in place of advertisements) condition.  
Design. The design of this study was a 2x2 factorial with efficiency – high (M = 
85.25%) versus low (M = 25.25%), and affect – affective versus non-affective charity 
information – as the two between-subjects factors.  
Results 
As in Study 1, we first explored whether people are more likely to donate to the 
more relatively efficient of the charities they saw.  We then tested for whether donation 
amount differed by relative efficiency.  Third, we examined whether being presented 
charities with high overall efficiency attracted more overall giving than being presented 
ones with very low efficiency. With the addition of affective and non-affective 
conditions, we also tested for whether the removal of affective stimuli influenced any of 
these processes. Ninety-five percent of participants chose to make a donation. 
Donors remained sensitive to relative efficiency: participants preferred to give to 
relatively more efficient charities, χ²(3, N = 77) = 33.2, p <.001, Cramer’s V = .38, 
(excluding 20 selecting no preference; 53.2%, 18.2%, 20.8%, 7.79% selected ranks 1-4 
respectively; see Figure 3a). There was no detectable difference in sensitivity to 
efficiency rank between the low and high conditions χ²(3, N = 77) = 4.15, p =.25, 
Cramer’s V = .13, (40.7%, 22.2%, 22.2%, 14.8% selected ranks 1-4 respectively in the 
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high condition; 60.0%, 16.0%, 20.0%, 4.00% in the low condition). Thus, relatively more 
efficient charities were again more often selected as the recipient of the donations. 
Although non-significant, the slightly increased sensitivity to relative efficiency in the 
lower condition could have been the result of greater relative difference between the 
lower numbers with the same absolute difference as the larger numbers. 
Next, we explored whether this expanded range of efficiency influenced the 
amount donors were choosing to give. Once more, individual donations did not differ by 
the relative efficiency of the charity receiving the donation, F(1, 75) = .87, p = 0.36, η² = 
.01 (means: rank 1 = $25.37, SD = 15.2; rank 2 = $26.07, SD = 14.6; rank 3 = $17.50, SD 
= 15.2; rank 4 = $26.67, SD = 20.2; see Figure 4). Despite participants being sensitive to 
relative efficiency, and the spread of efficiencies between conditions being extreme, 
individual donation amounts were no smaller when participants were presented very low 
efficiencies than when efficiencies were high, t(100) = .927,  p = .36, d = .18. Participants 
donated an average of $25.30 (SD = 16.0) in the low condition, and $21.48 (SD = 14.7) in 
the high condition. As before, the large variances in these values suggest that participants 
were not simply consistently pledging half of their potential earnings. 
As a result of more frequent selection, but not increased donation amount, 
relatively efficient charities again collected more money overall. The first ranked 
charities were pledged a total of $1040 dollars, while the fourth ranked charities were 
pledged $160. 
Next we explored whether the removal of the affective information, conveyed via 
print advertisement, influenced participant sensitivity to efficiency. Participants not 
seeing advertisements were more impacted by efficiency rank than those exposed to 
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advertisements, χ²(3, N = 77) = 7.94, p =.047, Cramer’s V = .32 (38.8%, 25.0%, 22.2%, 
13.9% selected ranks 1-4 respectively in the affective condition; 65.8%, 12.2%, 19.5%, 
2.44% in the non-affective condition; see Figure 3b). Participants in the affective 
condition did not display a strong preference for any of the advertisements, F(3, 48) = 
2.02, p = .11, ηp² = .038, (RC = 4.38, SE = .23; AHA = 4.61, SE = .27; StC = 4.37, SE = 
.17; SgK = 4.72, SE = .26), though participants in the affective condition overall 
preferred certain charities, regardless of efficiency χ²(3, N = 36) = 7.98, p = .046, 
Cramer’s V = .272, (RC = 30.6%; AHA = 13.9%; StC = 13.9%; SgK = 42.7%), while in 
the non-affective condition there was no detectable preference for any charity, χ²(1, N = 
41) = 3.36, p = .34, Cramer’s V = .17, (RC = 14.6%; AHA = 24.4%; StC = 26.9%; SgK = 
34.1%), despite subjects still being provided with the name and mission statement of each 
charity. Average donation amounts did not vary between charities, F(4, 97) = .37, p = .83, 
η² = .014, (RC = $22.06, SD = 14.3; AHA = $22.33, SD = 17.0; StC = $24.19, SD = 14.6; 
SgK = $25.79, SD = 16.5; “any” = $20.72, SD = 18.5). 
We then explored whether individual donation amounts became more sensitive to 
efficiency in the absence of advertisements. Individual donation amounts did not differ 
by whether participants saw advertisements or not, t(100) = .66, p = .51, d = .13 (mean 
non-affective = $24.26, SD = 16.9; mean affective = $22.11, SD = 15.8). An interaction 
of affective condition and relative efficiency on individual donation amount, F(3, 69) = 
3.12, p = .03, η² = .16, however, indicated that the removal of affective information 
resulted in participants basing their individual donation amounts on relative efficiency of 
the charity selected (means: rank 1 =$21.07, SD = 14.4; rank 2 = $25.00, SD = 15.4; rank 
3 = $25.62, SD = 17.0; rank 4 = $22.00, SD = 18.6 in the affective condition; rank 1 
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=$27.59, SD = 15.3; rank 2 = $28.00, SD = 14.4; rank 3 = $9.38, SD = 7.65; rank 4 = $50 
from single donation, in the non-affective condition). However, yet again, participant 
sensitivity to relative charity efficiency was not any greater among participants seeing 
low efficiencies than among those seeing high efficiencies, t(39) = 1.15, p = .26, d = .36 
(mean selected rank high = 1.83, SD = 1.11, mean selected rank low = 1.48, SD = .78).  
The two open-ended self-reports coded for mentions of efficiency showed that 
efficiency was more often mentioned when deciding recipient (31.4%) than amount 
(2.94%), χ²(1, N = 204) =  27.0, p <.001, Cramer’s V = .38. There was no significant 
difference in mentions of efficiency when deciding recipient between the affective (38% 
and non-affective (25%) conditions, χ²(1, N = 102) =  1.44, p = .23, Cramer’s V = .14. 
Discussion 
 Study 2 investigated both the effects of a larger separation in charity efficiency, 
and of the removal of affective context on donations. When participants were presented 
with extremely low efficiencies, donation amount was not reduced. However, efficiency 
relative to available alternatives did influence charity selection. In the high efficiency 
condition, the 76% efficient charities garnered as few donations as the 16% efficient 
charities did in the low efficiency condition, as a result of both being presented as the 
least efficient charity. However, participants did use relative efficiency to compare the 
charities they were presented with, and more often chose the best-ranked charity. 
In the absence of affective stimuli, participants became more sensitive to relative 
efficiency. However, that one group of charities was on average 25% efficient, while the 
other was 85% efficient, played no role in determining donation amount, even in this 
more deliberative decision context. Donation amount did become sensitive to relative 
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efficiency in absence of the print ads, suggesting that more deliberative contexts may 
cause donors to rethink the amount they donate, but that these effects remain relative 
rather than absolute. Again, the participants’ lack of sensitivity to relative efficiency in 
the affective condition suggests that donation insensitivity is not simply the result of a 
difference in joint/single evaluability. However, once advertisements were removed, the 
donation amounts became sensitive to relative charity efficiency, suggesting that, perhaps 
only in the absence of more emotional stimuli normally present in donation decisions can 
general evaluability theory entirely account for the observed patterns of behavior. People 
choose to donate smaller amounts when choosing less relatively efficient charities in the 
non-affective condition, although one might think that such gifts would need to be bigger 
to compensate for the decreased efficiency. 
 For the next study, we explored the possibility that participants in the previous 
study were not put off by the very low efficiencies because they were unaware of what 
efficiency they could reasonably expect from charities: one might only find a 25% 
efficient charity off-putting if one knew that charities in general are vastly better.  By 
informing participants of average charity efficiency, and showing them charities that 
either failed to meet or exceeded this standard, we explored whether participants could be 
induced to care about poor efficiency, and conversely whether there might be an increase 
in giving when all presented options were more efficient than charities are in general. 
Study 3 
Methods 
Participants. Ninety-one undergraduates completed the third study for partial 
course credit (67.0% female, mean age = 20.5, SD = 1.89; 1% identified as African-
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American, 49% as Asian/Pacific Islander, 18% as Hispanic or Latino, 22% as White, 
10% as other). 
Materials. The materials were unchanged from the affective conditions of Study 
2: half of the participants were exposed to the low condition, where charities were 25% 
efficient on average, and half were exposed to the high condition, where charities were 
85% efficient on average. However, now all participants were also exposed to a page that 
preceded the advertisement evaluations, which stated that the average US charity is 70% 
efficient, alongside an explanation of charity efficiency.  Thus half saw a set of 
efficiencies that exceeded this average, and half saw a set that fell far short of it. 
Procedure. The same procedure was utilized as in Study 2. However, before 
beginning the advertisement evaluations, participants read a statement, which informed 
them that the average US charity is 70% efficient, alongside an explanation of efficiency, 
using the same wording as in the first two studies. 
Results 
As in Studies 1 and 2, we first explored whether participants more often chose to 
donate to more relatively efficient options.  Next we examined whether there were any 
differences in donation amount attributable to relative efficiency.  Lastly, we investigated 
whether an explicit standard of efficiency would induce sensitivity to absolute efficiency. 
Ninety-six percent of participants chose to make a donation. 
As in the prior two studies, participants in both conditions showed a preference 
for relatively more efficient options, χ²(1, N = 77) = 32.83, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .38, 
excluding the 10 people who donated with no preference for the recipient (54.5%, 11.7%, 
20.8%, 13.0% selected ranks 1-4, respectively). There was no significant difference 
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between participant sensitivity to efficiency between the low and high conditions; despite 
the former now being explicitly worse than average, and the later explicitly better than 
average, χ²(3, N = 77) = 2.97, p =.40, Cramer’s V = 0.20, (46.3%, 14.6%, 22.0%, 17.1% 
selected ranks 1-4 respectively in the high condition; 63.9%, 8.33%, 19.4%, 8.33% in the 
low condition; see Figure 5). Again, the non-significant trend towards increased 
sensitivity to relative efficiency in the lower condition could have occurred due to greater 
relative difference between lower numbers with the same absolute difference as larger 
numbers. 
Next we examined whether failing to meet or exceeding average efficiency 
affected donation amount itself. Individual donation amount did not differ by whether 
participants saw high or low efficiency rates, despite having clear information beforehand 
that the charities they were choosing from either exceeded or failed to meet average 
charity efficiency, t(89) = 1.52 p = .13, d =  .32 (mean high = $29.58, SD = 17.2; mean 
low = $24.30, SD = 15.8; see Figure 6). Again, large variances in these values suggest 
that participants were not simply consistently pledging a specific portion of their potential 
winnings. Individual donation amount did not differ by relative efficiency rank, F(1, 75) 
= .38, p = .54, η² = .005, (means: rank 1 = $26.55, SD = 15.5; rank 2 = $26.11, SD = 18.5; 
rank 3 = $26.88, SD = 16.6; rank 4 = $31.00, SD = 17.6) providing further support that 
again, participants were choosing the amount they wanted to donate independently of 
efficiency information. 
The first ranked charities were pledged a total of $1115 dollars, while the fourth 
ranked charities were pledged $310. As a result of more frequent selection, but not 
increased donation amount, relatively efficient charities again collected more money 
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overall. Absolute levels of efficiency, despite now being comparable to an explicit 
standard, did not have a significant effect on overall donation. 
The two open-ended self-reports were again coded for mentions of efficiency. 
While 8.79% reported using efficiency information to decide an amount to give, 39.6% of 
participants reported using efficiency information to select a donation target, χ²(1, N = 
182) =  21.9, p <.001, Cramer’s V = .36.  
Discussion 
 The results of Study 3 demonstrated that being explicitly informed of how 
efficient charities are on average did not create an absolute sensitivity to charity 
efficiency in our study; participants still solely used relative efficiency to select a 
recipient. Surprisingly, participants gave just as much money to charities that fell well 
below what they were told was the national average efficiency, as did those exposed to 
charities that exceeded average efficiency: poor performance relative to the average 
charity did not dissuade overall donation, and conversely good performance did not boost 
overall donation. The results of Study 3 suggest that well performing charities have to 
compete just as hard as underperforming charities do for donors, rather than donors being 
satisfied with the charity having exceeded a particular level of efficiency. That donation 
amount remained insensitive to efficiency information despite an explicit reference point 
provides further evidence that insensitivity to charity efficiency is not entirely the result 
of an evaluability bias, or lack of reference point regarding what an acceptable efficiency 
level is. To verify that these results generalize beyond undergraduates, Study 4 replicates 
Study 3 with a sample of US adults.  
Study 4 
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Methods 
Participants. One hundred and twenty-nine US adults were recruited through 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (58.1% female, mean age = 34.8, SD = 11.6; 8% identified 
as African-American, 7% as Asian/Pacific Islander, 9% as Hispanic or Latino, 1% as 
Native American, 76% as White). 
Materials. The materials were unchanged from Study 3, other than the addition of 
a manipulation check. 
Procedure. The same procedure was utilized as in Study 3. After rating ads and 
making a donation decision, participants were asked to recall the charities’ average 
efficiency to ensure that they were accepting stipulated efficiency rates. 
Results 
Participants recalled the average efficiency of the charities they were presented 
with as a check of whether they had accepted stipulated efficiency rates. Participants 
reported different efficiency rates for the low and high conditions, t(127) = 11.8, p < 
.001, d = 2.09, (mean low = 40.1, SD = 23.0, mean high = 78.4, SD = 13.6).  
As in prior studies we explored whether participants more often chose to donate to 
more relatively efficient options and whether there were any differences in donation 
amount attributable to efficiency. Ninety-three percent of participants chose to make a 
donation. 
Participants in both conditions showed a preference for relatively more efficient 
options, χ²(1, N = 107) = 21.1, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .44, excluding 14 people donating 
to “any”, (39.3%, 31.8%, 16.8%, 12.2% selected ranks 1-4, respectively). There was 
again no significant difference in sensitivity to relative efficiency between the low and 
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high conditions, χ²(3, N = 107) = 2.47, p =.48, Cramer’s V = .15, (42.4%, 32.2%, 11.9%, 
13.6% selected ranks 1-4 respectively in the high condition; 35.4%, 31.3%, 22.9%, 
10.4% in the low condition; see Figure 7). 
Failing to meet or exceeding average efficiency again did not influence donation 
amount in our sample of adults, despite clear information being provided that the 
charities either exceeded or failed to meet average charity efficiency, t(127) = .97 p = .33, 
d =  .17 (mean low = $14.76, SD = 13.0, mean high = $17.18, SD = 14.9, see figure 8). 
Individual donation amount again did not differ by relative efficiency rank, F(1, 106) = 
1.71, p = .19, η² = .016, providing further evidence that donation amount was being 
decided independently of efficiency information (means: rank 1 = $15.97, SD = 15.5; 
rank 2 = $15.74, SD = 10.9; rank 3 = $12.67, SD = 8.55; rank 4 = $25.38, SD = 14.4). 
The two open ended self-reports confirmed that while efficiency played a minimal role in 
deciding amount to give, (6.20% reporting using efficiency), it played a larger role in 
picking a target (28.7%), χ²(1, N = 258) =  21.2, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .30. 
Discussion 
 The results of Study 4 replicate our previous finding that being providing a 
standard of average charity efficiency did not create an absolute sensitivity to charity 
efficiency, generalizing this result to a sample of US adults. Participants nonetheless used 
relative efficiency to select a recipient. Poor performance relative to an average did not 
dissuade overall donation, nor did high performance boost overall donation. Competing 
on efficiency may be a zero-sum game: overall donations do not increase as efficiency 
grows. 
General Discussion 
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The results of four studies provide evidence that efficiency estimates redirect 
donations to relatively more efficient charities, but do not increase or decrease donation 
overall. In all but the most abstracted situation, individual donation amounts were not 
influenced by relative efficiency either. Our results support the notion that deciding 
amount to give, and to whom, are distinct processes when donors are selecting between 
alternatives with varying efficiencies. Our results do not rule out any possible role for 
absolute efficiency in donation, but instead suggest that, consistent with general 
evaluability theory, any effect of absolute level of efficiency that may exist is much 
weaker than that of efficiency relative to available alternatives – even when all of the 
alternatives are explicitly and dramatically sub-par. 
Our findings are also consistent with previous literature distinguishing between 
calculating, scale-sensitive processes and affective processes that are scale-insensitive 
(Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004). Put into this framework, the scale-insensitivity in choosing 
an amount to donate suggests that this decision was predominantly affective. The 
sensitivity to scale in the form of relative efficiency when selecting a recipient may 
suggest that choosing a recipient of one’s donation is predominantly deliberative, even in 
the presence of affective information. Deciding to give, and how much to give, seem not 
to be based on cold efficiency statistics, in the presence of relatively minor affective 
stimuli.  These statistics, however, do guide the targeting of the donation, and do so to a 
much greater extent when people are not provided with an affective basis for that aspect 
of the decision. Further research may explore to what extent these proposed separate 
components of the donation decision can be independently manipulated. 
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These studies also demonstrate the importance of incorporating affective stimuli 
into research on economic decisions that are normally made in the presence of at least 
some degree of affective information. Had this study been run in the absence of 
advertisements and the affective information they convey, we would see only the 
donation patterns from the participants in the non-affective portion of Study 3, and 
incorrectly assume that donors base the amount they give to a particular charity on its 
relative efficiency – a finding which does not generalize to donation decisions made in 
the context of affective cues. 
Our results provide some support for the use of efficiency ratings, albeit with 
strong reservations; while efficiency ratings may direct donations to relatively more 
efficient charities, this is more the result of framing than a response to absolute level of 
charity efficiency. Thus, impartial rankings can direct money to more efficient charities. 
However, outside of impartial rankings, inefficient charities may deceptively boost their 
appeal by portraying themselves as relatively efficient compared to even-less-efficient 
charities. Educating potential donors on what efficiency they should expect from charities 
does not seem to counteract participants relying on available alternatives, and does not 
decrease competition among well-performing charities. More importantly, our results do 
not support the use of efficiency ratings to increase overall donation amounts – 
participants did not donate more money overall when seeing high efficiencies than when 
exposed to low efficiencies, even when explicitly told that these efficiencies were better 
than average. The lack of overall benefit supports the arguments of those concerned that 
the negative consequences of emphasizing nonprofit efficiency outweigh the positives of 
its use. 
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Our studies do have several limitations, perhaps most notably that we employed 
windfall gains, rather than having participants decide whether to donate their own money. 
Future studies may explore the extent to which the observed effects generalize to 
donations made with own money, and could also use larger sample sizes to further 
explore the smaller effects observed in our studies. 
 “To give away money is an easy matter,” Aristotle suggested, “and in any man's 
power. But to decide to whom to give it and how large and when, and for what purpose 
and how, is neither in every man's power nor an easy matter” (Williams, 1869). 
Efficiency rates may generally help decide to whom to give and for what purpose, but 
how large a gift is indeed a more complex process that seems to be outside the reach of 
cold statistics. 
 
Chapter 6, in full, is a reprint of the material as it appears in Nonprofit & 
Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 2018. Ryazanov, Arseny; Christenfeld, Nicholas. The 
dissertation/thesis author was the primary investigator and author of this paper.  
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Figure 6.1. Distribution of selected charities’ relative efficiencies (Study 1). 
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Figure 6.2. Average individual donation by efficiency condition (Study 1). Error bars 
represent standard errors. 
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Figure 6.3: Distribution of chosen charities’ relative efficiencies (a) over the expanded 
range of values and (b) between affective conditions (Study 2).  
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Figure 6.4. Average individual donations across overall efficiency and affective 
conditions (Study 2). Error bars represent standard errors. 
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Figure 6.5. Distribution of selected charities’ relative efficiencies when participants were 
informed of an explicit standard of efficiency (Study 3). 
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Figure 6.6. Average individual donation amount in high and low conditions when 
informed of an explicit standard of efficiency (Study 3). Error bars represent standard 
errors. 
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Figure 6.7. Distribution of selected charities’ relative efficiencies when US adults were 
informed of an explicit standard of efficiency (Study 4). 
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Figure 6.8. Average individual donation by US adult by condition when informed of an 
explicit standard of efficiency (Study 4). Error bars represent standard errors. 
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Abstract 
 
Psychological essentialism, or the belief that individuals contain an underlying 
essence that determines their category membership, has generally been regarded by social 
psychologists as harmful cognitive process that interferes with intergroup harmony at the 
group level. Fixed mindsets, or the belief that people’s trait levels are determined and 
relatively unchangeable, have been regarded as a parallel impediment to self-
improvement at the individual level. However, each of these domains contains findings 
that do not fit this narrative, suggesting that essentialized thinking is not a necessarily 
detrimental process at either the group or individual level, and that its effects may instead 
depend on motivation and context. This reconceptualization suggests shifting efforts 
beyond working towards broad decrements in essentialist thinking regarding groups and 
individuals, proposing that instead, in some instances, essentialism can be strategically 
employed, notably for the absolving of blame and identity formation. 
 
Keywords: essentialism; mindset; morality; identity; true self 
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The Strategic Value of Essentialism 
We are sometimes limited by the actual state of the world, and other times by 
constraints that exist only in our minds. When these limits are real, acting against them is 
futile—a short person cannot, try as he may, stretch his way to being tall. These limits 
can also be psychological—an obese person capable of losing weight may think of 
himself as unable to do so. Identifying which constraints are physical and which are 
psychological is a difficult task: how is the obese person to know whether his obesity is a 
matter of choice or an unalterable condition? Some people, but not all, are able to lose 
weight—and many more try than are ultimately unsuccessful. Is there a point at which 
has one has tried hard enough to be justified in resigning oneself to one’s condition? This 
complex problem has been largely sidestepped in social psychology’s examination of 
essentialism, or the perception of underlying immutable essences defining groups and 
individuals. Essentializing group and individual attributes results in perceiving fixed, 
unalterable differences between people and groups. As such, essentialism has been cast as 
an inequity-justifying process at the group level, (why bother funding exercise programs 
for obese people if they cannot change?) and self-handicapping cognitive process at the 
individual level (why bother exercising?). 
We argue that any anti-essentialist position should also consider the increasing 
evidence of the benefits of essentialism. We outline parallels between essentialism 
regarding social groups, such as towards obese people in general, and mindsets at the 
individual level, such as the extent to which fitness is a perceived as a matter of effort. In 
reviewing the empirical findings that support the dominant position, that essentialist 
thinking is harmful, we emphasize a substantial body of research that suggests a more 
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nuanced stance: essentialism is not always bad, and there are in fact many examples of it 
benefiting individuals and groups. These findings suggest that essentialism can be a 
strategy for decreasing moral responsibility over uncontrollable aspects of the self or 
others, and for identity formation. 
Yet interventions that adopt a changeable view of oneself and groups show 
positive effects. We propose that these interventions work not by broadly de-
essentializing individuals and groups, but through selectively essentializing the good 
aspects of oneself and one’s group, while de-essentializing the negative. 
Psychological Essentialism at Group and Individual Levels 
Humans have an innate tendency to form natural categories in both non-social and 
social domains (Gelman, 2003; Rothbart & Taylor, 1992; Medin & Altran, 2004; Medin 
& Ortony, 1989).  We sense a deep essence within people that accounts for shared 
characteristics of groups, as well as the identity of those belonging to the group. Essential 
categories are thought to share an underlying structure, be biologically based, and have 
well-defined boundaries, in contrast to nonessential groups (Rhodes & Gelman, 2009). 
Children essentialize innate potential by four years old, finding animals, materials, and 
social categories, such as gender, to be inductively potent (Heyman & Gelman, 
2000a,b,c).  Essentialism appears to be at least partially culturally imprinted and 
acquirable through language (Gelman, Taylor, & Nguyen, 2004; Rhodes, Leslie, & 
Tworek, 2012). 
Two partially overlapping domains of research have emerged regarding 
essentializing aspects of people. The first, social essentialism, examines how social 
categories themselves are essentialized, such as race, gender, and sexual orientation. The 
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second, trait essentialism, examines how people’s qualities are essentialized, or how fixed 
one views people’s attributes, such as intelligence, to be. Research on trait essentialism 
has largely been conducted using different terminology, that of implicit person theories, 
where growth mindsets reflect de-essentialized, malleable conceptions of individuals, and 
fixed mindsets reflect perceiving traits levels as essential, or unalterable. Our review will 
shift between these terminologies, but will also step back to draw broader connections 
between the two fields. Each section covers essentialism in various contexts, outlining 
initial findings that supported essentialism being harmful, as well as newer research on 
contexts where essentialism is not, and may in fact be beneficial. 
Social Essentialism 
Perceiving essences in the social domain, where these essences can serve to 
differentiate groups of people into categories, has been a contentious issue. Social 
psychologists generally reject the meaningfulness of group differences, viewing 
perceived differences as a precursor to racism and other forms of intolerance (Prentice & 
Miller, 2007; Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000; Haslam & Whelan, 2008; Verkuyten, 
2003; Hirschfeld, 1996; Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron, 1997). As a result, much effort 
has been focused on reducing essentialized thinking regarding the groups people belong 
to. 
This anti-essentialist position can be traced back to Allport (1954) theorizing a 
prejudiced personality emerging as a consequence of a general cognitive style that 
perceives social categories as rigid and rejects ambiguity in them. Subsequently, the role 
of perceived essences in intergroup behavior was largely neglected by psychologists until 
Rothbart and Taylor (1992) proposed that people could interpret social groups as natural 
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kinds, undervaluing environmental and historical contributions to group differences. 
Rothbart and Taylor (1992) argued that psychological essentialism consisted of viewing 
social categories as unalterable, and as having inductive potential. By this time, social 
constructionists had grown to view perceived group differences as false cognitive 
constructions that supported an unjust status quo (Fuss, 1989; Stein, 1990; Burr, 1995).  
However, holding essentialist beliefs about social categories proved to be quite 
natural: social essentialism was found to emerge early (Medin & Altran, 2004), to exist in 
every culture studied (Gil-White, 1999; Rhodes, Leslie, & Tworek, 2012), and to exist in 
both high and low status groups (Leyens et al., 2001). As empirical research on the 
relationship between social essentialism and prejudice emerged, essentialism was found 
to only weakly correlate with sexism and racism, and that individuals were inconsistent in 
the degree to which they essentialized various groups, (Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 
2002). Furthermore, the same individuals could essentialize an outgroup in one context, 
but not another (Morton, Hornsey, & Postmes, 2011).  
This cognitive flexibility was demonstrated among minority and majority groups 
in the Netherlands, both of whom used essentialism as a conversational resource in 
discussions of multicultural issues (Verkuyten, 2003). While Dutch participants 
essentialized culture in discourses on how different cultures coexisting is inherently 
problematic, when discussing assimilation, they adopted de-essentialist arguments.  
Minority group participants essentialized culture to resist assimilationism, by claiming a 
right to their identity, but used a de-essentializing discourse when challenging the 
majority view that their group is negative and homogenous. Essentializing group 
differences thus appears to be a strategy for justifying potentially conflicting motivations: 
		 270 
identity legitimization and self-determination (Verkuyten, 2003). Identity legitimization 
decreases personal responsibility for a group’s position, whereas self-determination, in 
opposition, is a resistance to being entirely defined by group membership. 
Providing further evidence for essentialism being a motivated process, 
essentialism was associated with an increased tendency to categorize multiracial 
individuals as black only in individuals with negativity bias towards the minority group, a 
distortion in which negative entities weigh more heavily than positive entities (Ho, 
Roberts, & Gelman, 2015). The relationship’s dependence on negativity bias suggests 
that the role of essentialism depends on the valence of the essence, rather than whether an 
essence was surmised. When the valence of the essence is positive or neutral, anti-racism 
efforts rely on essence to emphasize respect for group differences, such as by claiming a 
right to identity (Taylor, 1994). Despite initial theorizing of essentialism as contributing 
to a rigid cognitive style, essentialized thinking thus appears flexible and useful for 
identity formation, Such findings have been paralleled in research on essentializing other 
social groups.  
Essentialism and Gender. Gender is arguably the most essentialized social 
categorization (Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000), and essentialized conceptions of 
gender were found to contribute to sexism (Bem, 1993; Brescoll & LeFrance, 2004). 
Subsequent studies, however, have revealed the context-dependence of essentialism in 
sexism, like in the context of majority and minority group relations. When Morton, 
Postmes, Haslam, and Hornsey (2009) manipulated the stability of gender inequality, 
essentialism was associated with increased sexism only among men, and only when 
inequality between sexes was presented as changing. Subsequently, gender essentialism 
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was found to be endorsed by both genders in response to a system-threat, which 
motivated participants to uphold their social system (Brescoll, Uhlmann, & Newman, 
2013). These studies suggest that essentialism is not necessarily linked to sexism, and 
that, rather than being a stable cognition, essentialism is motivated by threats to the social 
order. 
Essentialism and sexual orientation. Social essentialism has also been explored 
in the context of sexual orientation. While some components of essentialist thinking 
contribute to prejudice against homosexuals, others relate to acceptance (Haslam, 
Rothschild, & Ernst, 2002; Hegarty & Pratto, 2001). Antigay attitudes were associated 
with believing that sexual orientation is discrete, fundamental, and an informative 
category, while tolerance was associated with believing sexual orientation to be 
biologically based, immutable, and universal.   
Here too, essentialism has recently been found to be a flexible resource, rather 
than a rigid way of thinking: Newman, Bloom, and Knobe’s (2014) found that 
conservatives and liberals selectively essentialize a person’s conflicting beliefs and 
feelings to fit with their own political stance. When a person’s homosexual feelings 
conflicted with his beliefs that one should not act on these feelings, conservatives judged 
the person’s beliefs the more essential part, whereas liberals interpreted his feelings as 
more essential. When another person’s negative feelings toward homosexuals were 
inconsistent with his beliefs that homosexuality is perfectly acceptable, liberals 
essentialized his beliefs, and de-essentialized his feelings, while conservatives 
essentialized his feelings, and de-essentialized his beliefs. Non-prejudiced people appear, 
thus, to differ in which aspects of the person they essentialize, rather than in extent. 
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Furthermore, aspects of biological determinism relate to the acceptance of 
homosexuality by absolving people of personal responsibility for their orientation, 
similarly to how outgroups rely on essentialism to resist assimilation. Haslam and Levy 
(2006) caution that biological determinism could be used to medicalize homosexuality or 
to broaden its acceptance, since sexual orientation goes from being viewed as an immoral 
choice to an uncontrollable aspect of the self.  Essentializing homosexuality legitimizes 
the social category (Haslam & Levy, 2006), although potentially at the cost of decreased 
perceived intragroup variability.  It is possible that as acceptance of varied sexual 
orientations becomes increasingly mainstream, the value of essentializing them will 
diminish, as control and choice will become irrelevant.  Such a process may underlie the 
lack of connection in Britain between immutability of homosexuality and homophobia 
(Hegarty, 2002). 
Essentialism and mental health. Paralleling the role of essentialism regarding 
other social groups, essentializing psychiatric problems can both absolve sufferers of 
responsibility for their condition, but also perpetuate pessimism about improvement, 
resulting in inconsistent effects (Kvaale, Haslam, & Gottdiener, 2013). While biological 
and genetic explanations decrease acceptance of depressives and schizophrenics, they 
increase acceptance of alcoholics (Angermeyer, Matschinger, & Schomerus, 2013). 
Likewise, caretakers attribute less blame to schizophrenics when perceiving less control 
in the patients’ delusions (Provencher & Fincham, 2000). Judges give shorter sentences 
when given a biomechanistic explanation for a psychopathic-diagnosed convict 
(Aspinwall, Brown, & Tabery, 2012). Biogenetic explanations may have two competing 
roles – decreasing personal responsibility at the cost of increasing perceived differentness 
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(i.e. entitativity), providing yet another context in which essentialization decreases moral 
responsiblity . 
Genetic essentialism.  Social essentialism has also been explored in the context 
of genetic determinism, or the extent to which one views genetic contributions to 
behaviors, individuals, or groups resulting in them being immutable, homogenous, 
discrete, and natural (Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011). Ascribing an outcome to genetics can 
result in the “naturalistic fallacy”, or viewing the current status as good, particularly 
when evaluating behaviors that may be controllable – such as criminal behaviors or 
obesity (Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011). Viewing obesity as genetic demotivates healthier 
eating and other potentially-effective lifestyle changes: an induction describing obesity as 
genetic lead participants to consume more food (Dar-Nimrod, Cheund, Ruby, & Heine, 
2014). 
While embracing genetic determinism is problematic, undervaluing the actual 
contributions of genetics and other external causes to behavior, or naïve 
environmentalism, can likewise be dysfunctional. If one were to adopt the stance that 
behavior is (almost) entirely controllable, obesity becomes a personally responsibility, 
regardless of whether one actually has much control over. In discussing trait essentialism 
we will outline how turning a behavior into a choice increases moral responsibility for the 
behavior, which can be problematic for behaviors that have biologically or 
environmentally-determined components. Perhaps a slightly-essentialist view of genetics 
in obesity could confer the benefits of motivating obese people to attempt losing weight, 
without obesity becoming a personal responsibility for those unable to do so. 
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Social essentialism contributes to identity formation 
The discourse surrounding social essentialism contains examples of essentialism 
not only absolving blame for status or behavior, but it also contributing to identity 
legitimization and formation for minority groups. We now provide a theoretical basis for 
this process, as well as for its importance. The theoretical basis for how essentialism 
decreases blame will be described subsequently, in the context of trait essentialism, 
within which most research on moral responsibility is conducted. 
 Social identity research suggests that, because individual identity is construed in 
relation to cultural identity, one cannot form a functional individual identity in the 
absence of a clear cultural identity (Usborne & Taylor, 2010; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). 
Interventions focused on decreasing prejudice and stereotyping by rejecting categories 
may not ultimately help members of marginalized groups, whose underachievement 
stems from a poorly defined cultural identity (Taylor & de la Sablonnière, 2013). 
Essentializing a positive group identity instead may thus more effectively decrease 
achievement gaps between groups.   
The need for cultural identity may be encompassed by a more general motivation 
to seek out social identities that reduce personal uncertainty (Hogg, Adelman, & Blagg, 
2010). Personal uncertainty refers to a perceived instability in the self, world, or 
relationship between the two, and differs from informational uncertainty, which involves 
understanding that one has incomplete knowledge (Van den Bos, 2009). Uncertainty-
identity theory posits that one of the most effective ways to reduce personal uncertainty is 
through group identification (Hogg, 2007).  
When deciding which group to align with, Hogg, Sherman, Dierselhuis, Maitner, 
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and Moffitt (2007) found that individuals prefer to identify with groups that are clearly 
defined or high in entitativity. As uncertainty increases, people turn to increasingly 
totalistic groups with comprehensive belief systems, uniform attitudes, and strongly 
enforced boundaries, such as cults (Baron, Crawley, & Paulina, 2003). Low-entitativity 
groups make for poor reductions in self-uncertainty because of their vague structure and 
indistinct boundaries (Hogg, 2007). Blurring boundaries between groups and rejecting the 
meaningfulness of membership may thus ironically push individuals towards intolerance 
and even fundamentalism by increasing self-uncertainty, causing people to seek out more 
extreme entitative groups. A strategic deployment of essentialism, given that people find 
personal uncertainty aversive, will replace dysfunctional identities with more functional 
ones and developing positive identities where they do not exist, rather than rejecting 
underlying essences defining people. 
Uncertainty-identity theory also provides a theoretical framework for the findings 
regarding hostility emerging in social change, consistent with findings on gender 
essentialism contributing to sexism only when gender roles are perceived as changing. 
The minimal group paradigm, a classic demonstration of the biasing effects of group 
membership, fails to increase in-group bias if participant uncertainty is reduced 
beforehand (Hogg & Grieve, 1999).  This suggests that in-group bias emerges not from 
social categorization itself, but from the uncertain context within which the categorization 
is made. 
Our position does not oppose de-essentializing interventions in all contexts, 
particularly those with strong negativity biases between stratified groups, for example 
between Palestinians and Israelis, where describing group membership as malleable 
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increased intergroup cooperation (Goldenberg et al., 2017). Our position does, however, 
limit the contexts in which such interventions will be successful. Beyond not necessarily 
helping minority groups, broadly de-essentializing group differences may not necessarily 
decrease negative attitudes towards these groups: intercultural training has been found to 
increase cultural essentialism alongside increasing openness to other cultures and cultural 
intelligence (Fischer, 2011). 
Essentializing the good. People are predisposed not only to identify with groups, 
but also to essentialize most the idealized, or normatively good aspects of categories 
(Barsalou, 1985; Knobe, Prasada & Newman, 2013; Lynch, Coley & Medin, 2000; Hall, 
1998). For example, De Frietas, Tobia, Newman, and Knobe (2017) found that identity of 
a nation is perceived as more enduring when it is improving by becoming more 
egalitarian, as opposed to when the nation is becoming more discriminatory. Likewise, 
Knobe, Prasada and Newman (2013) found that when people poorly fit groups, the 
normatively good aspects of that person’s membership are most essentialized, rather than 
the aspects that make them a poor fit. People thus seem inclined to think that the essences 
defining categories are good, and as such should be receptive to replacing dysfunctional 
identities with positive ones. The impact of identity valence on attributions will be 
explored through findings that explore this topic in the context of individual trait levels. 
Trait Essentialism 
Essentialism contributes to perceptions of fixed differences not only between 
social groups, but between individuals, as well (Haslam, Bastian, Bain, & Kashima, 
2006). While social essentialism research has moved from a dispositional conception of 
essentialism, to a state conception that is used conversationally, trait essentialism is 
		 277 
generally explored as a disposition, rather than state, though the stability of essentialism 
is orthogonal to whether it concerns groups or individuals. Research concerning trait 
fixedness has been largely conducted through the lens of implicit person theories (Bastian 
& Haslam, 2006), so our discussion of trait essentialism adopts the terminology of this 
line of research. 
Trait essentialism as implicit person theories. Implicit person theories can be 
categorized into one of two assumptions about any particular attribute (Dweck, 1999; 
Dweck & Leggett, 1988). The first is entity theory – that the attribute is a fixed, 
nonmalleable, trait-like entity, reflecting an essentialized view of the trait. The second is 
incremental theory – that the attribute is malleable and developable with effort, reflecting 
a de-essentialized concept of the trait.  
Incrementalists focus on factors, such as effort, that could affect trait levels, 
whereas entity theorists believe trait levels to be relatively stable and unalterable (Dweck, 
Chiu, & Hong 1995; Dweck & Leggett, 1988). For example, a student holding an 
incremental theory of intelligence who earns a poor grade works to improve her 
performance, whereas the entity theorist assumes that the grade reflects an unalterable 
level of intelligence. While some people have a generalized theory for all attributes, 
others hold individual theories for different traits (Dweck, Chiu, & Hong 1995).  
Implicit person theory research has gradually become unequivocal in its support 
for fostering incremental mindsets (Wheeler & Omair, 2016). Teaching that the self is 
malleable is thought to inspire people to tap undiscovered potential. Indeed, targeted 
interventions improve scholastic achievements (Levy & Dweck, 1999; Blackwell, 
Trzesniewski, & Dweck, 2007; Paunesku et al., 2015), social relationships (Dweck, 2012; 
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Kammrath & Dweck, 2006), and health (Yeager et al., 2014).  Entity theories have, 
consequentially, become viewed as maladaptive justification of a self-limited status quo, 
akin to essentializing rigid social groups.  
Essentialism and Moral Responsibility 
Essentializing aspects of social groups shifted blame away from members of the 
group. Likewise, implicit person theories should affect judgments of moral responsibility, 
which often reflect judgments of controllability (Alicke, 2000; Weiner, 1995; Fincham & 
Schultz, 1981).  Indeed, as in the context of mental health, manipulating an agent’s 
capacity for choice affects blame ascriptions, suggesting that capacity for choice may be 
how folk theories of morality operationalize free will (Monroe, Dillon, & Malle, 2014). 
Recent culpability models have increasingly focused on how judgments of moral 
character, or a persons core, can affect these perceptions of control (Alicke, 2000; Malle, 
Gugliemo, & Monroe, 2014). Trait essentialism contributes to character judgments, 
which are critical to understanding blame attribution implicit person theories.  
Traditionally, philosophers, other than Aristotle, and psychologists have focused 
the morality of specific acts, rather than examining how judgments of acts reflect broader 
evaluations of moral character (Pizarro & Tannanbaum, 2011). Virtue ethics instead 
suggests that the morality of an act depends not on outcomes or rule compliance, but on 
how the act reflects character (Pizarro & Tannenbaum, 2011). This better accounts for 
judgments where, despite two actions breaking the same rule and causing the same 
outcome, one is nevertheless consistently viewed as worse. For instance, college liberals 
are less likely to sacrifice a black than a white individual to save a group of people 
because sacrificing a black individual would reflect a racist character (Uhlmann, Pizarro, 
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Tannenbaum, & Ditto, 2009). While morality has generally been examined through 
actions, a fuller depiction of morality emerges from examining how actions reflect 
character, or who one is at their core—their essence.  
The relationship between implicit person theories and morality has likewise been 
largely examined via action-based paradigms, though character judgments may better 
account for attribution patterns. Despite initial excitement that implicit person theories 
regarding morality could account for inclination towards deontology or consequentialism 
(Chiu, Dweck, & Tong, 1997), subsequent research showed that incrementalists blame 
attributions do not neatly fit either act-based model of morality, particularly in moral 
judgments made across multiple failures. Incrementalists, while more self-forgiving after 
single failures, were harsher after multiple failures to improve (Niiya, Brook, & Crocker, 
2010). These findings may reflect character judgments: incrementalists may excuse a 
single failure as resulting from external causes, while entity theorists believe the failure 
reflects an unchangeable trait. However, incrementalists expect themselves to be able to 
overcome the failure, and thus blame themselves more for continued failure. 
Incrementalists likewise exhibit greater negative affect than entity theorists do when 
seeing a person fail to improve after showing effort to do so (Plaks, Grant, & Dweck, 
2005). 
Growth mindset interventions allow people to reappraise attributes they had 
previously seen as fixed, or uncontrollable, as changeable. A person who adopts a growth 
mindset regarding his weight will perceive more control over it and in doing so become 
increasingly responsible for effecting change. Indeed, a growth mindset (or perhaps more 
appropriately, shrinkage mindset) regarding obesity can resemble the naïve 
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environmentalism discussed in the context of genetic essentialism. Theories of moral 
judgment suggest that this expansion of perceived control would necessarily be 
accompanied by increased moral responsibility, and so extreme incrementalists would be 
harsher judges of behavior than entity theorists (Plaks, Levy, & Dweck, 2009).  
Present implicit person theory research appears to be inconsistent with research 
relating perceived control to moral responsibility. Entity theorists, despite seeming to 
ascribe less personal control, make stronger negative moral judgments of people 
behaving undesirably (Molden & Dweck 2006). Entity theorists judge transgressor moral 
character as more negative, ignore mediators such as situational constraints, desire more 
punishment and revenge, and blame the wrongdoer more (Dweck, Hong, & Chiu, 1993; 
Erdley & Dweck, 1993; Gervey, Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1999; Heyman & Dweck, 1998; 
Yeager, Tirri, Trzesniewski, Nokelainen & Dweck 2011). Incremental theorists have 
been found to instead focus on reforming the transgressor.  
While the incongruity between the moral psychological literature and implicit 
mindset literature has been noted (e.g. Plaks, Levy, & Dweck, 2009; Dweck & Molden, 
2008), there exists little empirical support for any of the explanations offered for the 
disparity. One is that although entity theorists reject free will, they maintain the illusion 
of it to keep society functional (Chiu, Dweck, Tong, & Fu, 1997). Another is that 
determinism is ignored in the moral domain, and a third is that entity theorists think there 
exist rare situations in which effort triumphs, and hold people accountable for not having 
been the exception (Dweck & Molden, 2008). These explanations are inconsistent with 
findings regarding the importance of capacity for choice in blame attributions, and 
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greater determinism resulting in less ascribed moral responsibility (Baumeister & 
Monroe, 2014).  
Examining how implicit person theories relate to conceptions of the true self, or 
the degree to which a person is thought to be good or bad at their inner core, may better 
account for the discrepancy between implicit theory findings and free will findings. If 
incrementalists expect people to be able to improve because people are essentially good, 
and entity theorists are pessimistic about improvement because they think people are 
essentially bad, incremental theorist may make more forgiving character evaluations than 
entity theorists, despite perceiving more control. After exploring how improvability is 
based in an assumption of essential goodness, we will return to the contradiction that 
emerges from rejecting innate trait levels while assuming innate potential. 
Trait essentialism contributes to identity: the true self. The true self 
distinguishes a person’s deep essence from their more superficial, inauthentic attributes 
(Newman, De Freitas, & Knobe, 2015), and comprises the perceived innate and 
immutable characteristics that allow a person to live a meaningful life (Schlegel, Hicks, 
King, & Arndt, 2011). Thinking we have discoverable innate attributes facilitates 
psychological well-being by providing a sense of meaning, and seems most closely 
aligned with entity theories, in that the discoverable traits are perceived as unalterable 
(Schlegel, Vess, & Arndt, 2012). The alternative and more incremental theory, that we 
create ourselves, is associated with decreased perceptions of a meaningful life, both 
among college students and adults. Although the contradiction with implicit person 
theory findings has been noted by Schlegel and colleagues (2012), it remains unresolved. 
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This incongruity may be largely overlooked because people essentialize positive 
qualities more readily than negative ones, like they do for social groups. The asymmetry 
is early emergent: children expect both psychological and biological negative attributes, 
even a missing finger, to spontaneously improve over time (Lockhart, Chang & Story, 
2002). Adults may have dampened expectations regarding fingers, but likewise 
essentialize positives more readily than negatives (Haslam, Bastian, & Bissett 2004; 
Newman, Bloom, & Knobe 2014). They find impulsive negative actions to be less 
blameworthy than deliberated ones, yet maintain that impulsive positive actions are just 
as praiseworthy as deliberated ones (Pizarro, Uhlmann, & Salovey, 2003). More 
essentialized traits are also judged as more important to defining identity, and people 
work hardest towards enhancing the traits they see as stable and important (Dunning, 
1995).  As a result, the true self, or core essence, is usually asymmetrically positive. 
Essence Valence and Moral Responsibility. Since entity theorists are thought to 
generally perceive attributes as fixed, the same mechanism that makes a single failure 
diagnostic for entity theorists should also buttress them against the fears of failure after a 
single success. The current literature, however, focuses on entity theorists specifically 
overgeneralizing from negative instances. Wheeler and Omair (2016) have theorized that 
it may be that the entity mindset selectively essentializes negative qualities as stable, and 
positive qualities as transient, whereas the growth mindset selectively essentializes 
positive attributes, while viewing negative ones as transient. If this is the case, then the 
mechanism by which growth mindset interventions work is not by de-essentializing the 
person as a whole, but rather by selectively essentializing a positive core, or true self, 
while de-essentializing negative attributes. Indeed, parents’ mindsets specific to failure, 
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rather than intelligence, affect their children’s intelligence mindsets (Haimovitz & 
Dweck, 2016). 
Thus, like in the case of social essentialism, it may be that some of the difference 
between incrementalists and fixed theorists is not the extent to which they essentialize, 
but rather what they essentialize. Manipulating whether a participant sees an actor’s true 
self as evil or good leads people to interpret the same actions as more or less 
blameworthy, respectively (Newman, de Freitas, & Knobe, 2015). If true self judgments 
influence what is externalized and internalized, developing a positive true self could be a 
strategic intervention that encourages well-being, achievement, and interpersonal 
cooperation in a way that avoids explicit over-ascriptions of control. For example, writing 
about how one could make a positive impact on the world leads to similar scholastic 
improvements to a growth mindset intervention (Paunesku et al., 2015), suggesting that 
mindset interventions work may implicitly rely on developing a positive true self.  
More positive traits being more essentialized also suggests that de-essentializing 
interventions may work because the most readily abandoned traits are negative ones. If 
positive traits ultimately can become de-essentialized when one adopts an extreme 
incremental position, there could be a practical problem of how to stop short of de-
essentializing properties that contribute to positive identities. Alternatively, if positive 
traits are so deeply essentialized that these interventions do not affect them, mindset 
interventions are actually more selective than currently theorized. Those with negative 
true selves may benefit from strategically essentializing a positive true self. Others may 
benefit from growth mindset interventions even if they already have a positive true self 
by further de-essentializing negative attributes. This hypothesis could be examined by 
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exploring whether decreased confidence in perceived trait levels among incremental 
theorists is selective to negative inferences. 
Goal disengagement. Incrementalism may not always be adaptive, yet the 
contexts in which malleability is explored are ones in which goal persistence is rewarded, 
or is itself an operationalization of success, rather than where goal-switching would be 
most expedient (Wheeler & Omiar, 2016). Thus, incrementalists may be less likely to 
give up on potentially futile goals. Disengaging from unattainable goals is associated 
with fewer symptoms of illness and greater well-being, better self-reported health, and 
more normal diurnal cortisol secretion (Miller & Wrosch, 2007, Wrosch, Miller, Scheier, 
and Brun de Pontet, 2007). Directly fostering, or essentializing, a positive identity 
independent of any particular goal may contribute to more functional goal disengagement 
than an incremental mindset by not implying that success is the result of sheer effort. 
Teaching a Properly-Calibrated Psychological Flexibility 
 In its wide range of forms, at both the group and individual level, essentialism has 
been construed as a destructive force, with its benefits largely overlooked as exceptions 
to this general role. Rejecting essentialism outright may strip people and groups of 
identity, if not made specifically selective towards just negative attributes. It may also 
create illusions of control over aspects of the self that one has no control over, which 
could, through continuously failure to live up to perceived capabilities, foster a more 
negative true self. Some researchers are already calling for a closer inspection of the 
limitations of growth mindsets and anti-essentialism in the real world (Wheeler & Omair, 
2016).  
Extending McNulty and Fincham’s (2012) notion of a properly calibrated 
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psychological flexibility, future research should look beyond broad de-essentialization, 
and explore the specific contexts in which essentialization is adaptive. In certain cases, 
individuals may avoid pursuing fruitless endeavors by acknowledging their limitations in 
a particular area, and instead concentrating efforts in a domain they are better suited to. 
Likewise, groups could avoid being held accountable for aspects of themselves that may 
be beyond their control. 
Developing a sensitivity to determining which domains one can and which one 
cannot control may help maintain a positive identity. And likewise a positive identity 
may make one more willing to goal switch in the face of insurmountable obstacles. Given 
the close relationship between self and group identity, it may be reasonable to 
strategically develop identity at both levels. People with unclear social category 
memberships will benefit more from a group level essentialization, whereas those with 
clear memberships, having a foundation in relation to which to construe self-identity, will 
respond most to self-identity essentialization,  
Some interventions already strategically employ the relationship between 
essentialist thinking and positive identity formation: simply labeling an identity with a 
noun, such as “helper”, rather than describing its corresponding action “helping” 
encourages prosocial behavior in children (Bryan, Master, & Walton, 2014). Avoiding 
negative identities similarly decreases behaviors associated with these identities: asking 
people to not be “cheaters”, rather than to not “cheat” discouraged cheating more 
effectively (Bryan, Adams, & Monin, 2013). These studies have not examined how 
individuals labeled as "helpers" react to failure. Positive initial effects of identity striving 
on motivation could result in later negative effects in response to failure, particularly if 
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identity depends on performance (Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1981). Consequentially, it is 
important to distinguish the flexibility we are advocating for—the cultivation of a 
positive identity not reliant on any particular goal—from such identity striving. 
Value-affirming interventions are one strategy for essentializing a goal-
independent positive true self. Walton et al. (2015) tested the efficacy of two value-
affirming interventions on increasing the GPAs of female engineering students: 
emphasizing social-belonging by providing a narrative within which to fit the adversity 
experienced by females in engineering, and affirmation-training that incorporated aspects 
of the self into a self-identity. While both raised female engineer GPAs, affirmation-
training deepened identification with gender by effectively essentializing gender rather 
than rejecting gender categories, a process that would generally be expected to negatively 
affect performance.  Essentializing a broad positive female group identity, as detected by 
increases in self-reported gender identification, allowed these female engineers to be less 
affected by the narrow threat of the “chilly climate” towards women in engineering. In 
another approach to positive identity formation, asking participants to think of the good 
they can contribute to the world by invoking a prosocial, self-transcendent purpose 
improved high school science and math GPAs (Yeager et al., 2014). Expanding beyond 
an anti-essentialist stance expands the possible routes to facilitate positive identity. 
Towards situated freedom. When people over-essentialize attributes, at the 
group level or individual level, they dissolve the possibility of improving and 
transcending their current selves. Conversely, focusing on sheer transcendent will, 
ignoring the facts of the situation, can become equally problematic—both constitute 
acting in bad faith (Sartre, 1956, in Kernis & Goldman, 2006). An unrestrained freedom 
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may leave people uncertain of who they are, hopelessly trying to change things they have 
no control over, and blaming themselves, and others, for failure to change. Optimal 
functioning emerges from accepting the ontological duality of situated freedom, rather 
than from organizing one’s world as limitless.  
Chapter 7, in full, is a reprint of the material as it appears in Social and 
Personality Psychology Compass, 2018. Ryazanov, Arseny; Christenfeld, Nicholas. The 
dissertation/thesis author was the primary investigator and author of this paper.  
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Abstract 
Holding an incremental, rather than fixed, mindset confers wide-ranging benefits. 
Such benefits may, however, be accompanied by increased judgmental harshness of 
others’ shortcomings. Across 3 studies (Studies 1, 2a, 2b; N = 416), after an induction of 
either an entity or incremental view of empathy, aggression, or motivation, participants 
were asked to imagine someone continually failing to show, or showing in abundance, 
the particular trait, and were then asked how blameworthy/praiseworthy each of these 
individuals was. Incremental-induced participants blamed a person showing consistently 
maladaptive levels of the trait more than did entity-induced participants. Increased blame 
was mediated by increased perceived control over behavior. Study 3 (N = 107) extended 
findings regarding lay theories of empathy to protagonists in short narratives.  Study 4 (N 
= 184) attempted to reconcile our findings with previous research, showing that increased 
blame attribution by incremental theorists occurs for continual, but not single failures. 
Overall results suggest that the benefits of an incremental mindset may be partially offset 
by greater judgmental harshness of others.  
 
Keywords: mindset, lay theories, morality, blame, empathy, aggression, motivation. 
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Incremental Mindsets and the Reduced Forgiveness of Chronic Failures 
 Messages of practically unlimited individual potential are ubiquitous, reinforcing 
the notion that with sufficient hours of practice, effort, desire, or even through sheer 
willpower, people can improve just about any aspect of themselves—whether they intend 
to lose weight, gain intelligence, or curb aggressive outbursts. There is a lay theory 
implicit in such messages—that we are not fixed, but changeable and improvable through 
persistent effort. But could such messages also, by emphasizing the efficacy of effort, 
convey that undesirable trait levels are a personal failing? 
Implicit person theories capture the ways in which people organize and interpret 
their own and others’ abilities. These theories are often categorized into one of two 
competing assumptions about a given attribute: an entity theory holds the attribute to be a 
fixed, nonmalleable, trait-like entity, while an incremental theory holds that the attribute 
is malleable and can be developed with effort (Dweck, 1999; Dweck & Leggett, 1988). A 
student with an entity theory of intelligence, for example, believes that she has a certain 
level of intelligence, high or low, and that there is little she can do to change it. A student 
with an incremental view of intelligence, on the other hand, believes that intelligence can 
be improved, for example through extra time spent studying. Because incrementalists 
view trait levels as changeable, they emphasize the behavioral and psychological 
mediators of traits, such as effort and situational constraints, rather than the underlying 
levels of the traits themselves (Dweck, Chiu, & Hong 1995). Incrementalists are more 
likely, then, to work to improve levels of the trait than entity theorists are. Indeed 
interventions that induce incremental mindsets have been shown to result in academic 
improvements (e.g., Yeager et al., 2016), increased willpower (Job, Dweck, & Walton, 
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2010), reduced aggression (Yeager, Trzesniewski, & Dweck, 2013; Yeager, 
Trzesniewski, Tirri, Nokelainen, & Dweck, 2011), and increased empathy (Schuman, 
Zaki, & Dweck, 2014), among other improvements (see Dweck, 2012 for overview). 
Such incremental mindset interventions are often designed to foster incremental 
mindsets towards specific traits. For example, an intervention may induce a growth (i.e. 
incremental) mindset regarding empathy by describing empathic behavior as the result of 
deliberate effort and thus empathy being improvable, rather than fixed and unchangeable 
(Schuman, Zaki, & Dweck, 2014). Exposing participants to an incremental view of 
empathy causes them to subsequently expend more empathic effort towards others 
(Schuman, Zaki, & Dweck, 2014). Whether this increased perceived controllability is 
accompanied by an increased expectation regarding other’s levels of empathy remains to 
be explored. One’s judgments of another’s unempathic behavior may depend on whether 
one believes people have control over their level empathy in the first place. 
Because mindsets have implications for people’s perceived capacity for change, 
generally improvement, they are likely to be connected to how people assign blame for 
shortcomings. Theories of moral responsibility would predict that because incremental 
inductions ascribe more control over traits and actions, they should result in 
incrementalists being harsher judges of poor behavior than entity theorists (Plaks, Levy, 
& Dweck, 2009; Molden & Dweck, 2008). According to these theories, a key component 
to moral judgment is whether the actor could have, or should have known to do otherwise 
(Pizarro & Tannenbaum, 2011). For example, Alicke’s (2000) Culpable Control Model 
suggests that extent of personal control is the primary factor in ascribing blame. The Path 
Model elaborates upon this position, proposing that judgments proceed through stages, 
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from control to morality (Malle, Gugliemo, & Monroe, 2014). Indeed, manipulating 
capacity for choice affects blame attributed by participants (Monroe, Dillon, & Malle, 
2014).   
The predictions of theories of moral responsibility seem to contradict findings 
regarding implicit person theories and moral judgment, where, despite perceiving 
increased control, incrementalists are nevertheless found to be more forgiving (Plaks, 
Levy, & Dweck, 2009; Molden & Dweck, 2006). Children with fixed theories of 
personality showed less empathy toward, and recommended more punishment for a new 
student behaving badly, and emphasized what a behavior revealed about a person’s good 
or bad character, while incrementalists focused instead on mediating factors (Erdley & 
Dweck, 1993; Heyman & Dweck, 1998). Among adolescents, entity theorists desired 
more revenge than incremental theorists did, and exposure to an incremental induction 
reduced this desire (Yeager, Tirri, Trzesniewski, Nokelainen & Dweck, 2011). College 
students who were entity theorists regarding morality made more dispositional 
attributions for social transgressions and experienced greater negative affect in response 
to these transgressions than incremental theorists did (Miller, Burgoon, & Hall, 2007). 
However, the generalizability of these studies is limited in two ways. Firstly, these 
studies examine moral judgment in the context of global personality theories or lay 
theories of morality itself. Moral judgment could also, independently of these more 
global lay theories, depend on the theory of the specific trait along which one evaluates 
another’s behavior. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, these studies typically 
examine singular transgressions, rather than continual patterns of behavior.  
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Though research on implicit person theories’ impact on blame attribution for 
behaviors across longer time spans is sparse, initial evidence suggests that incrementalists 
can be less forgiving than entity theorists when dealing with continual failure. 
Incrementalists become harsher towards themselves than entity theorists do in the face of 
multiple failures to improve (Molden & Dweck, 2006). When a difficult continuous task 
was tied to self-esteem, incremental theorists who continually performed poorly reported 
lower self-esteem than did entity theorists (Niiya, Brook, & Crocker, 2010). Repeated 
failure to improve by others, despite effort to do so, likewise resulted in greater anxiety 
among incremental theorists than entity theorists (Plaks, Grant, & Dweck, 2005). Since 
both incrementalists and entity theorists fit theory-violating information to their 
worldview, instead of adjusting it (Plaks, Grant, & Dweck, 2005; Plaks & Stecher, 2007; 
Xu & Plaks, 2015), it may be that incremental theorists are unable to reappraise an 
attribute as relatively uncontrollable when observing continual failure.  
The entity theorists’ view of limited potential for improvement may be 
accompanied by an acceptance of their own or another’s limitations, be they real or 
imagined. Kammrath and Dweck (2005) found those with an entity theory regarding 
personality were more accepting of the faults of a dating partner following relationship 
transgressions, although at the cost of not working towards making changes that could 
improve the relationship. Subsequent research showed that incrementalist romantic 
partners, though initially more optimistic about their partners ability to change negative 
behaviors, were more likely to attribute failure to lack of effort and were more distrustful 
of partners exhibiting partial success at changing over a two-week period (Kammrath & 
Peetz, 2012). 
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The divergence between blame for singular transgressions and continual failures 
may be reconciled by an approach to moral psychology and philosophy known as virtue 
ethics, which suggests that judgment of specific acts can reflect what the acts reveal 
about the actor’s character (Uhlmann, Pizarro, & Diermeier, 2015; Ryazanov & 
Christenfeld, 2018). It may be that, when evaluating transgressions, incrementalists are 
more likely to assume a positive character that is capable of improvement, while entity 
theorists see the action as more diagnostic of character. Indeed, entity theorists have been 
shown to infer traits from singular actions more readily than incremental theorists (e.g., 
Dweck, Hong, & Chiu, 1993; Miller, Burgoon, & Hall, 2007). If increased perceived 
control is accompanied by expectations of improvement across broader patterns of 
behavior, continual transgressions  may provide evidence against an assumed positive 
character for incrementalists. For incrementalists, a single bad act might not be judged 
negatively, since it does not reflect being a bad person, and can readily be changed. 
However, a series of bad acts, betraying a failure to improve, might be judged more 
harshly. Manipulating whether participants see an actor’s character as evil or good leads 
them to interpret the same action as more or less blameworthy, respectively (Newman, de 
Freitas, & Knobe 2015). For entity theorists, a single bad act and a series of such acts 
might both signal a bad person, albeit one with limited control and, thus, responsibility.  
Alternatively, it could be that the relationship between mindset and blame is not 
mediated by perceived control. In the study of prejudice, changing the perceived 
controllability of stigmatized characteristics does not reduce prejudice regarding those 
characteristics, because here controllability justifies attitudes, rather than causing them 
(Hegarty, 2008). The previously discussed Culpable Control Model likewise 
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acknowledges that sometimes control justifies negative attitudes towards an actor rather 
than causing them (Alicke, 2000). When participants were exposed to a car crash in 
inclement weather in which the driver was rushing home to hide cocaine, as opposed to 
an anniversary present, participants rated the former driver as having more control over 
the car crash (Alicke, 1992). If controllability judgments do not precede blame 
attributions in the context of implicit person theories, we would expect to see no clear 
relationship between controllability induced by growth mindset inductions and blame. 
Given the increasing popularity of growth mindset interventions (e.g., Dweck, 2012), 
whether such interventions can increase blame attribution over longer patterns of 
behavior is a pressing issue. 
If incremental mindsets increase control, and control increases blame, then those 
induced to have an incremental mindset should be more prone to blame for failings.  
However, control may not always be a predecessor of blame, and incremental mindsets 
do seem generally to be combined with a view of the core character as good, so single 
failures may be seen as aberrations (Ryazanov & Christenfeld, 2018). However, continual 
failures may overcome that tendency. Across longer patterns of behavior, those who see 
poor behavior as controllable may ascribe more blame than those who see it as diagnostic 
of bad but uncontrollable character.  In this case, inducing an incremental mindset could 
increase judgmental harshness. To explore whether implicit person theories can result in 
increased judgmental harshness of undesirable behavior, we explore the effects of 
inducing implicit theories of particular traits on judgments of patterns of behavior. We 
hypothesized that consistently undesirable behaviors would elicit more blame and moral 
judgment among those who view the trait as changeable, by increasing perceived control 
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over the specific trait. Thus, people who have been induced to hold an incremental 
mindset about empathy, and are then asked to judge another’s consistent failure in that 
trait, may find that person more blameworthy for their failure. And, conversely, people 
induced to hold an incremental mindset about empathy may find those showing an 
abundance of the trait to be more praiseworthy. We also explore whether such findings 
would generalize to other traits for which the benefits of an incremental mindset have 
been demonstrated. We test incremental inductions regarding aggression, where 
inductions of personality as incremental have shown reductions in aggression (e.g., 
Yeager, Trzesniewski, Tirri, Nokelainen, & Dweck, 2011). We also explore willpower, 
where inductions have shown, for example, more adaptive attention allocation on 
cognitive tasks (Schroder, Moran, Donnellan, & Moser, 2014). 
 
Study 1 – Empathy 
Study 1 Procedure 
 Two hundred and sixty two adults located within the US were recruited as 
participants via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (mean age = 36.2, SD = 12.7; 61.5% female; 
213 participants were retained for analysis after excluding 49 for failing a basic attention 
check regarding the topic of the induction article). They were told they would be 
evaluating the appropriateness of reading materials for a high school audience. 
Participants were randomly assigned to an induction, adapted from Schumann, Zaki, and 
Dweck (2014), which involved reading a putative newspaper article that gave an 
overview of scientific research having concluded that empathy is either changeable 
(incremental) or relatively fixed (entity); all inductions are available as supplementary 
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materials online. Participants were then asked to rate the appropriateness of the article for 
a high school audience on a 7-point scale. Next participants completed a six-item 
theories-of-empathy measure, which served as a manipulation check in Schuman, Zaki, 
and Dweck’s (2014) study (e.g. A person’s level of empathy is something very basic 
about them, and it can’t be changed much; 7-point scales anchored on strongly agree 
and strongly disagree). Afterwards, participants were told about two people: Imagine a 
person, Carol, who consistently behaves in a way that show a complete lack of empathy 
to the suffering of other people. Imagine another person, Jane, who consistently behaves 
in a way that shows an especially high level of empathy to the suffering of other people. 
Participants were asked to respond to five statements using 7-point scales: 1) How much 
of the difference between these two people is under their personal control (none-all), 2) 
This difference in their behavior reflects aspects of these two people that they cannot do 
much to alter (not at all – completely), 3) How much of this difference is the result of 
moral choice? (none – all), 4) How blameworthy/praiseworthy is Carol for failing to be 
empathic (completely praiseworthy – completely blameworthy), 5) How 
blameworthy/praiseworthy is Jane for her high level of empathy?  (completely 
praiseworthy – completely blameworthy).  Questions 1 and 2 (reverse-coded) were 
combined into a perceived-control composite measure for analysis.  
Participants were then asked a series of questions regarding how they expected 
their own and other people’s levels of empathy to change over time1. Participants 
																																																								
1 Four questions regarding expectations of change in the abstract served as a lead-in to 
questions regarding expectations for the self and others. The results of these questions are 
reported in supplementary materials for all studies, but are consistent with manipulation 
check responses. 
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responded to the following questions using 7-point scales: Do you expect your own level 
of empathy to change over the course of your life? (not at all - very much); How do you 
expect your level of empathy to change over the course of your life? (levels of empathy 
will decrease greatly – levels of empathy will increase greatly); Do you expect other 
people’s levels of empathy to change over the course of their lives? (not at all – 
completely); How do you expect other people’s levels of empathy to change over the 
course of their lives? (levels of empathy will decrease greatly – levels of empathy will 
increase greatly). The analyses of this set of questions will be deferred to a general 
analysis of the four studies. Afterwards, participants provided demographic information 
and were debriefed. All measures, manipulations, and exclusions in the study are 
disclosed. Final sample sizes were determined using study sample sizes in previous 
literature (e.g. Schuman, Zaki, & Dweck, 2014), which allowed us to have the same 
power to detect effects of incrementalism increasing blame that previous studies had to 
detect its positive effects. Data collection did not continue after data analysis. 
Study 1 Results  
 The six-item theories of empathy measure indicated that the articles successfully 
influenced participant opinions on the entitativity of empathy, t(211) = 9.04, p < .001, d = 
1.24 (entity-induced mean = 3.74, SD = 1.45; incremental-induced mean = 5.38, SD = 
1.20; Cronbach’s α = .96). Next, we examined whether the participants who had been 
induced to adopt a more incremental view showed increased blame attributions to the 
person behaving unempathically. Indeed, as hypothesized, participants exposed to an 
entity view of empathy found the low-empathy person less blameworthy than those 
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exposed to an incremental view did, t(211) = 3.64, p < .001, d = .50 (entity-induced mean 
= .72, SD = 1.37; incremental-induced mean = 1.38, SD =1.36).  
The relationship between mindset and blame was mediated by perceived control 
(Cronbach’s α for perceived control measure = .68). The regression of mindset induction 
on perceived control was statistically significant (β = 1.64, t(211) = 9.05, p < .001, SE = 
.18), as was the regression of perceived control on blame (β = .27, t(211) = 4.54, p < 
.001, SE = .059), see Figure 1. The standardized indirect effect was (.53)(.30) = .31. The 
significance of this indirect effect was tested using bootstrapping procedures: 
unstandardized indirect effects were computed for each of 10,000 bootstrapped samples, 
and the 95% confidence interval was computed by determining the indirect effects at the 
2.5th and 97.5th percentiles. The bootstrapped unstandardized indirect effect fully 
mediated the relationship between induction and blame (mediated effect = .36, p = .01, 
95% CI [.11, .62]; direct effect = .30, p = .21, 95% CI [-.17, .78]). These procedures will 
be followed for all subsequent mediation analyses. 
Incremental-exposed participants also found the difference in behavior between 
the two people to reflect differences in moral character to a greater degree than entity-
exposed participants did, t(211) = 5.00, p < .001, d = .69 (entity-induced mean = 3.77, SD 
= 1.65, incremental-induced mean = 4.83, SD = 1.43). Incremental participants also 
found the person showing a high level of empathy more praiseworthy, t(211) = 3.23, p = 
.001, d = .44 (entity-induced mean = -.51, SD = 1.26; incremental-induced mean = -1.10, 
SD = 1.42; lower numbers indicate greater praise). 
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Study 1 Discussion 
 Being induced to hold an incremental, as opposed to entity, view of empathy lead 
to increased judgmental harshness of an imagined other with a continually low level of 
empathy. Consistent with theories of moral responsibility, the increase in judgmental 
harshness was mediated by increased perceived control over behavior. Furthermore, the 
difference in behavior was moralized to a greater degree among incremental-induced 
participants. Incremental participants did find empathic behavior more praiseworthy than 
entity theorists did, however, suggesting some symmetry in praise and blame, contrary to 
previous findings that people generally ascribe positive qualities to character more 
readily than negative ones (e.g., Lockhart, Chang, & Story, 2002; Pizarro, Uhlmann, & 
Salovey, 2003).  
In Experiment 2a and 2b, we explored whether increased judgmental harshness 
among incremental theorists would replicate with other traits, namely aggression and 
motivation. Aggression was picked as one of the traits, since its expression so readily has 
moral implications, and since prior studies have used similar article inductions to 
demonstrate increased forgiveness for singular transgressions (Yeager, Trzesniewski, 
Tirri, Nokelainen, & Dweck, 2011). Motivation provides an interesting dilemma for 
mindset interventions and inductions—the incremental view is that one can do better by 
working harder, but this assumes that one has control over how hard one is capable of 
working. What would it mean to not have control over how hard one is willing to work? 
In a sense, motivation forms a meta-trait for lay theory research, in that if it itself is 
unchangeable, then limits are placed upon just how much change can be accomplished in 
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any other trait. Here too, article incremental inductions have shown benefits (Schroder, 
Moran, Donnellan, & Moser, 2014). 
 
Study 2 – Aggression & Motivation 
Study 2 Procedure 
The procedure for Studies 2a and 2b paralleled that of Study 1, substituting 
aggression or motivation for empathy. For 2a, we recruited 116 adults (mean age = 37.3, 
SD = 13.4; 59.8% female; 102 retained for analysis after 14 participants were excluded 
for failing the attention check) via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Participants were then 
randomly assigned to read an article describing one’s level of aggression as changeable 
(incremental) or relatively fixed (entity), adapted from the empathy induction. Next 
participants completed a six-item theories of aggression measure, which paralleled the 
theories of empathy measure. Afterwards, participants read about two people: Imagine a 
person, Thomas, who consistently behaves in a physically and verbally aggressive way 
towards people who do not deserve it. Imagine another person, Robert, who consistently 
does not respond with any aggression, even when repeatedly provoked. Participants were 
then asked to respond the same five statements as in the first study, with aggression 
substituted for empathy. Afterwards participants responded to questions regarding 
expectations of change for the self and others, adapted to aggression. 
For Study 2b, we recruited 136 adults (mean age = 33.7, SD = 10.9; 59.8% 
female; 102 participants retained for analysis after 34 were excluded for failing the 
attention check) via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. The manipulation and measures were 
the same as 2a, but with motivation substituted for aggression. Participants were asked to 
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imagine two people: Imagine a person, Jessica, who consistently fails to take action to 
improve her circumstances because she lacks the motivation to do anything constructive. 
Imagine another person, Rebecca, who consistently improves her circumstance because 
she is sufficiently motivated to do so. After imagining both people, participants were 
asked to respond to five statements, now adapted to motivation. Afterwards participants 
responded to questions regarding expectations of change in motivation for the self and 
others. Sample sizes for Studies 2a and 2b were selected to be consistent with prior 
literature exploring the positive effects of similar inductions. 
Study 2 Results 
 2a:  The six-item theories of aggression measure indicated that the articles had 
successfully influenced participant opinions on the entitativity of aggression, t(100) = 
7.04, p < .001, d = 1.39 (entity-induced mean = 3.82, SD = 1.33; incremental-induced 
mean = 5.54, SD = 1.10; Cronbach’s α = .94). Participants exposed to an entity view of 
aggression found the person showing a high level of aggression to be less blameworthy 
than did those exposed to an incremental view, t(100) = 2.34, p = .021, d = .46 (entity-
induced mean = 1.03, SD = 1.23; incremental-induced mean = 1.68, SD = 1.55). The 
relationship between mindset and blame was mediated by perceived control (Cronbach’s 
α for perceived control measure = .77). The regression of mindset induction on perceived 
control was statistically significant (β = 1.44, t(100) = 9.05, p < .001, SE = .25), as was 
the regression of perceived control on blame (β = .39, t(100) = 4.28, p <.001, SE = .09), 
see Figure 2. The standardized indirect effect was (.51)(.39) = .39. The bootstrapped 
unstandardized indirect effect with 10,000 resamples was significant, thus perceived 
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control fully mediated the relationship between induction and blame (mediated effect = 
.54, p < .001, 95% CI [.20, .91]; direct effect = .11, p = .70, 95% CI [-.45, .69]). 
Incremental-exposed participants also moralized the difference in behavior to a 
greater degree than entity-exposed participants, t(100) = 2.01, p = .047, d = .40 (entity-
induced mean = 4.24, SD = 1.49; incremental-induced mean = 4.85, SD = 1.59). 
Incremental participants did not praise the positive behavior significantly more, t(100) = 
1.61, p = .11, d = .32 (entity-induced mean = -.64, SD = 1.38; incremental-induced mean 
= -1.15, SD = 1.83).  
2b:  The six-item theories of motivation measure indicated that the articles had 
successfully influenced participant opinions on the entitativity of motivation, t(99) = 
8.31, p < .001, d = 1.65 (entity-induced mean = 3.98, SD = 1.25; incremental-induced 
mean = 5.72, SD = .82; Cronbach’s α = .92; 1 blank  response). Participants exposed to 
an entity view of motivation attributed less blame to a person showing a low level of the 
trait than did those exposed to an incremental view, t(99) = 2.78, p < .01, d = .55 (entity-
induced mean = .92, SD = 1.11; incremental-induced mean = 1.53, SD = 1.10; 1 blank 
response). The relationship between mindset and blame was mediated by perceived 
control (Cronbach’s α for perceived control measure = .58). The regression of mindset 
induction on perceived control was statistically significant (β = 1.14, t(99) = 4.94, p < 
.001, SE = .23), as was the regression of perceived control on blame (β = .29, t(99) = 
3.51, p = .001, SE = .08), see Figure 3. The standardized indirect effect was (.44)(.33) = 
.36. The significance of this indirect effect was tested using bootstrapping procedures 
with 10,000 resamples. The bootstrapped unstandardized indirect effect was statistically 
significant, thus perceived control fully mediated the relationship between induction and 
		 313 
blame (mediated effect = .27, p = .01, 95% CI [.05, .56]; direct effect = .34, p = .19, 95% 
CI [-.17, .85]). 
Incremental-exposed participants attributed the difference in behavior to a 
difference in moral character to a greater degree than did entity-exposed participants, 
t(99) = 2.87, p < .01, d = .57 (entity-induced mean = 3.44, SD: 1.61; incremental-induced 
mean = 4.43, SD = 1.86; 1 blank  response). Incremental-exposed participants did praise 
the positive behavior more, too, t(99) = 2.01, p = .047, d = .40 (entity-induced mean = -
.63, SD = 1.76; incremental-induced mean = -1.36, SD = 1.89; 1 blank response).  
Study 2 Discussion 
 As with empathy, being exposed to an incremental, as opposed to entity, view of 
aggression lead to increased judgmental harshness of an imagined other with a 
consistently high level of aggression. Again, the increase in judgmental harshness was 
mediated by increased perceived control over behavior. Furthermore, the difference 
between the person acting aggressively and the person showing a low level of aggression 
was viewed as a moral choice to a greater degree by incremental-exposed participants. 
Study 2a did not find significant differences as a result of induction in praiseworthiness 
of showing a low level of aggression, suggesting that there may indeed sometimes be an 
asymmetry in praise and blame.  
 Exposure to an incremental view of motivation lead to increased judgmental 
harshness of an imagined other with a consistently low level of motivation. Again, the 
increase in judgmental harshness was mediated by increased perceived control over 
behavior. Furthermore, the difference in behavior was viewed as a moral difference to a 
greater degree by incremental-exposed participants. Unlike Study 2a, Study 2b did find 
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differences in praiseworthiness of showing high motivation as a result of induction. Thus, 
holding an incremental mindset regarding motivation was associated with increased 
judgmental harshness of failures along that trait.  
The next experiment explores whether the moral judgments would generalize to 
people described not with traits terms, but rather with a recounting of their behaviors.  
Accordingly, the procedure was repeated with detailed vignettes that described two 
people, one behaving empathically and one unempathically.  
 
Study 3 – Empathy Stories 
Study 3 Procedure 
The procedure from Study 1 was repeated, with 117 college students participating 
for partial course credit (mean age = 20.2, SD = 1.88; 78.5% female; 107 retained for 
analysis after excluding participants failing a basic attention check about the topic of the 
article). In Study 1, participants had been asked to imagine a person with a consistently 
high level of empathy, and a person with a consistently low level of empathy. In Study 3, 
participants were instead given detailed vignettes describing two managers. One had 
responded with a series of highly empathetic behaviors when her subordinate’s daughter 
was involved in a car accident, such as giving the employee her own sick days. The other 
manager had responded with a consistent lack of empathy to a similar event, by, for 
example, not seeing the need for the employee to visit her daughter in the hospital 
because the daughter was unconscious, see supplementary materials for vignettes. Sample 
size was selected to be consistent with prior studies exploring the positive effects of 
mindset inductions. 
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Study 3 Results 
The six-item theories of empathy measure indicated that the articles had again 
influenced participant opinions regarding the entitativity of empathy, t(105) = 4.53, p < 
.001, d = .88 (entity-induced mean = 3.75, SD = 1.31; incremental-induced mean = 4.77, 
SD = 1.00; Cronbach’s α = .91). As in the case of imagined scenarios from the first 
experiment, participants exposed to an entity view of empathy were more forgiving of a 
person showing a low level of empathy than those exposed to an incremental view, t(105) 
= 2.18, p = .03, d = .42 (entity-induced mean = .79, SD = .93; incremental-induced mean 
= 1.19, SD = .93). The relationship between mindset and blame was again mediated by 
perceived control (Cronbach’s α for perceived control measure = .16). While the internal 
reliability of this measure was low in this study, each of the two items independently 
significantly differed by induction type (p = .011, and p = .002), and the results remain 
consistent with prior studies. The regression of mindset induction on perceived control 
was statistically significant (β = .74, t(105) = 4.00, p < .001, SE = .19), as was the 
regression of perceived control on blame (β = .32, t(105) = 3.79, p < .001, SE = .08), see 
Figure 4. The standardized indirect effect was (.36)(.35) = .36. The bootstrapped 
unstandardized indirect effect with 10,000 resamples was statistically significant, thus 
perceived control fully mediated the relationship between induction and blame (mediated 
effect = .21, p < .001, 95% CI [.07, .41]; direct effect = .18, p = .19, 95% CI [-.20, .55]). 
Incremental-exposed participants moralized the difference in behavior marginally 
more than entity-exposed participants did, t(105) = 1.76, p = .08, d = .34 (entity-induced 
mean = 4.36 SD: 1.44, incremental-induced mean = 4.85, SD = 1.46). Unlike in Study 1, 
incremental-induced participants did not praise the positive behavior more than entity-
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induced participants did, t(105) = 1.58, p = .12, d = .31 (entity-induced mean = -1.74, SD 
= 1.26; incremental-induced mean = -1.24, SD = 1.90). If anything, the results trended 
towards entity-induced participants praising more. 
Study 3 Discussion 
Exposure to the incremental, rather than entity, view of empathy lead to increased 
judgmental harshness of protagonists in a vignette showing a low level of empathy. Thus, 
our findings from the first experiment were replicated and extended to judging others 
from more detailed accounts of behavior. While the difference in moralizing behavior 
was marginal, it was consistent with the pattern observed from the first experiment. 
Unlike in that experiment, a significant relationship between induction and praise was not 
observed. 
 
Study 4 –The Consistency of Failure  
The results of the previous studies all suggest that entity theorists can be more 
forgiving than incremental theorists when actors continually fail to improve along 
particular traits. In order to reconcile our results with the literature showing more 
incremental theorists to generally be more forgiving, we directly compare the consistent 
failures we have explored thus far with single instances of failure. It could be that 
incremental theorists more readily excuse singular failures under the assumption that 
actors will work to improve themselves, but become increasingly judgmental relative to 
entity theorists when the failure is consistent and thus signals a lack of effort, or decision 
not to improve oneself. Study 4 explores whether this is the case. 
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One could make the argument that the interventions used in the preceding studies 
cause people to adopt an “impatient” understanding of incrementalism. Indeed, there is 
some evidence that changeability correlates with positive outcomes in empathy 
incremental mindsets, but that controllability correlates with negative outcomes (Tullett 
& Plaks, 2016). Our findings extend beyond empathy, to at least motivation and 
aggression, and we also use the same empathy induction mindset researchers have used to 
demonstrate benefits of incremental mindsets. It could, however, be that, by having 
included control measures, we suggested to participants that control is an important factor 
in attributing blame. To verify that increased incremental-induced blame was not an 
artifact of suggesting that control and character-judgments are factors to consider when 
attributing blame, Study 4 excludes all questions regarding character and controllability. 
The absence of these questions allows for a purer test of whether incremental inductions 
themselves are interpreted as conveying controllability and, as a consequence, increased 
blame. We also incorporated a measure of punishment. There could be many reasons to 
punish including deterrence, “just desserts”, and incapacitation (Carlsmith, Darley, & 
Robinson, 2002). It could be, for example, that, though they view offenders as less 
blameworthy, entity theorists feel a heightened need to keep the offender out of society, 
because of a pessimism regarding their ability to improve. 
Study 4 Procedure 
The procedure for Study 4 paralleled that of Study 1, but no longer included a 
praiseworthy individual, and split participants into either seeing consistent or single 
failure. As in previous studies, half of participants were exposed to an incremental article, 
and half to an entity article. Half of participants now saw Carol’s empathic failure as 
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consistent “Imagine a person, Carol, who consistently behaves in a way that shows a 
complete lack of empathy towards the suffering of other people”. The other half saw her 
failure as a single instance “Imagine a person, Carol, who behaves in a way that shows a 
complete lack of empathy towards another person a single time”. Since a praiseworthy 
individual was no longer included, the seven-point blame scale was now anchored on not 
blameworthy (1) and completely blameworthy (7). Two hundred and fourteen adults were 
recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (184 retained for analysis after excluding 
participants failing an attention check; mean age = 36.2, SD = 13.1; 58.2% female). 
Sample size was selected so that both single and continual failure conditions had similar 
power to prior studies that explored the positive effects of incremental mindset 
inductions. 
Study 4 Results 
The six-item theories of empathy measure (Cronbach’s α = .99) indicated that the 
articles had successfully influenced participant opinions on the entitativity of empathy, 
t(182) = 11.4, p < .001, d = 1.69 (entity-induced mean = 2.93, SD = 1.38; incremental-
induced mean = 5.21, SD = 1.32).  
The primary purpose of Study 4 was to explore whether our results depend on the 
failure being chronic, and so a single failure would replicate previous studies showing 
that incremental theorists are more forgiving. A significant interaction between failure 
(single or consistent) and induction type confirmed that while incremental theorists 
ascribed more blame to consistent failures, this was not the case for single instances of 
failure, F(1, 180) = 6.62, p = .011, r  = .25, see Figure 5. The simple effect of entity 
theorists being more forgiving of consistent failures replicated the effect of increased 
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blame by incrementalists we found in our previous studies, t(86) = 3.29, p = .002, d = .70 
(entity-induced mean = 3.56, SD = 1.93; incremental-induced mean = 4.76, SD = 1.46). 
Contrary to prior research showing that incrementalists blame transgressors less for their 
failures (e.g., Miller et al., 2007), however, we did not find a simple effect of 
incrementalists being any more forgiving of single failures than entity theorists were, 
t(94) = .13, p = .90, d = .03 (entity-induced mean = 4.15, SD = 1.59, incremental-induced 
mean = 4.11, SD = 1.50). There was no main effect of induction type on blame 
attribution, F(1, 180) = .001, p = .92, r = .01, though there was a predictable main effect 
of failure type on blame—chronic failure is worse—F(1, 180) = 5.79, p = .017, r = .17. 
Next we examined whether people’s judgments of punishment showed the same 
effects as their blame attribution did. Punishment was overall correlated with blame 
attribution, F(1, 182) = 62.4, p < .001, r =  .51. However, punishment did not neatly track 
blame attribution differences between inductions, in that we did not observe an 
interaction between failure (consistent or single) and induction, F(1, 180) = .200, p = .66, 
r = .11 (entity-induced consistent mean = 3.00, SD = 1.69; entity-induced single mean = 
2.79, SD = 1.40; incremental-induced consistent mean = 3.02, SD = 1.50; incremental-
induced single mean = 2.61, SD = 1.37).  There was no main effect of induction, F(1, 
182) = .084, p = .77, r = .02, nor an effect of consistency of failure, F(1,182) = 1.91, p = 
.17, r = .10, though consistent failure trended towards being rated as deserving more 
severe punishment. 
Study 4 Discussion 
 Study 4 is a partial reconciliation of our results with the general finding in the 
implicit person theory literature that incremental theorists attribute less blame than entity 
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theorists do. Though we find no evidence for incrementalists being more forgiving for 
failures seen as single instances, we replicate our prior finding that failures that are 
consistent become more blameworthy for incrementalists than entity theorists, and find 
that this effect does not extend to single failures. Thus, our effect of greater blame 
ascribed by those induced to hold an incremental mindset seems to depend on the failure 
being consistent. It may be that incrementalists assume a positive character capable of 
improvement when observing single failures, but grow to view consistent failure as 
reflecting a negative character that is capable of improvement, but has chosen not to do 
so, and attribute more blame to the actor accordingly. While it could be the case that our 
participants endorsed an “impatient” incrementalism rather than a more functional 
“patient” incrementalism, this would appear to be a problem that extends beyond our 
methodology and to the study of inducing growth mindsets more generally, as questions 
regarding control were not asked in this study.  
It is surprising that our single-failure condition, which uses the same induction 
previously used to demonstrate the benefits of incrementalism (Schumann et al., 2014), 
does not increase forgiveness of other’s empathic failures, despite many studies showing 
this effect more generally (e.g., Yeager et al., 2011). Though our own theorizing does not 
entirely account for the lack of effect, neither can implicit person theories as currently 
specified, and future theorizing must reconcile the observed lack of increased forgiveness 
by incrementalists for single failures with theory suggesting they should be generally 
more forgiving. Nonetheless, we do confirm that increased judgmental harshness emerges 
when there is continual failure. Our findings regarding punishment are also unclear: it 
appears that though entity theorists blame consistent failures less than incrementalists do, 
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the decrease in blame does not correspond to a decrease in punishment severity.  This 
may well be due to the various functions of punishment, some of which depend on moral 
blame, and some of which depend on predictions of the improvability of behavior.   
 
General Results 
In all the studies, after evaluating the two actors, participants had been asked their 
expectations of change in trait levels for themselves and others. This permits an analysis 
of whether being induced to hold an incremental mindset not only creates a possibility of 
change, but an expectation of change, and, more specifically, improvement. 
A meta-analytic approach (Schwarzer, Carpenter, & Rücker, 2015) standardizing 
effect sizes across sample sizes for the five studies (N = 669) yielded a significant effect 
of the induction on expectations of change for the self, standardized mean difference 
(smd) = .722, p < .001, 95% CI [.56, .88] (entity-induced mean = 3.64, SD = 1.77, 
incremental-induced mean: 5.05, SD = 1.66; scale anchored at 1 and 7), as well as for 
others, smd = .892, p < .001, 95% CI [.74, 1.05] (entity-induced mean = 3.57, SD = 1.57; 
incremental-induced mean = 5.01 SD = 1.35; all meta-analytic results for self/other are 
also present in the individual studies, across the three traits measured). These findings 
show that, across the five studies, being exposed to an incremental induction not only 
increased perceptions of one’s own changeability, but also fostered an expectation that 
this change will occur. The expected change did not reflect greater variability, but instead 
reflected an asymmetrical expectation of improvement—incremental induced participants 
expected their own change to be in a more positive direction, smd = .436, p < .001, 95% 
CI [ .28, .59] (entity-induced mean = .582, SD = 1.07; incremental-induced mean = 1.16, 
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SD = 1.30, scale anchored on -3 and 3), and others to change in a more positive direction 
as well, smd = .500, p <.001, 95% CI [.34, .65] (entity-induced mean = .293, SD = 1.02; 
incremental-induced mean = 1.01, SD = 1.13; scale anchored on -3 and 3).  This is 
consistent with people generally seeing negative attributes as the more changeable 
aspects of the self, and incrementalists nonetheless maintaining a fixed positivity towards 
which all should be striving. Failure to make progress towards improvement becomes 
more blameworthy than not being capable of making the progress in the first place. The 
effects of incremental inductions appear to be accompanied by an assumed expectation, 
or norm of improvement, which, when not met, may signal character to a greater degree 
to incrementalists than to entity theorists, who may not hold the same expectation.   
Consistent with already-presented findings for each individual trait across the four 
studies exploring consistent praise and blame, a meta-analytic approach shows that 
entity-exposed participants overall attributed less blame to the person showing 
undesirable trait levels, smd = .477, p < .001, 95% CI [.30, .65],  (entity-induced mean = 
.84, SD = 1.21; incremental-induced mean = 1.42, SD = 1.27), and less praise to the 
person showing desirable trait levels than incremental-exposed participants did, smd = 
.255, p = .004, 95% CI [.08, .43] (entity-induced mean = -.81, SD = 1.46; incremental-
induced mean = -1.19, SD = 1.69), see Figure 6.  
Given the numerous studies demonstrating broad benefits of an incremental 
mindset, it may be that those at the extreme of incrementalism are most prone to blame 
others for their failures, and that blame does not linearly relate to incrementality, 
particularly among more restrained incrementalists. Exploratory analyses utilized Akaike 
Information Criteria to compare models (Hurvich & Tsai, 1989). These analyses 
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supported an exponential model with both induction and self-reported incrementality 
entered as factors for data from the first four studies (which examined consistent failures 
only) fitting the relationship between self-reported mindset and blame better than the 
linear model (AICc 1239 vs. 1701, respectively), suggesting that data more 
parsimoniously fit an exponential model than a linear one. This is consistent with a 
stronger effect at the incremental end of the scale: there may be a threshold beyond which 
unrestrained incrementalism begins especially to foster blame attributions. 
 
General Discussion 
 Across empathy, aggression, and motivation, adopting an incremental theory of 
the trait was associated with greater blame of those showing a continually maladaptive 
level of the trait. Consistent with theories of moral judgment, greater blame was mediated 
by increased perceived control over behavior. Thus, the same lay theory mechanism that 
leads people to exert more effort in the face of challenges can lead people to ascribe more 
blame to others who are continually unable to surmount these challenges. 
The seeming inconsistency between implicit theory findings and theories of moral 
responsibility regarding moral judgment may be resolved when lay theories regarding the 
specific attribute are measured, rather than the fixedness of morality or personality more 
generally, and, more importantly, when chronic behaviors are compared to acute ones. 
Growth mindset interventions often target specific traits rather than global meaning 
systems through which one interprets the self and others—our results confirm the 
necessity of not only exploring morality in relation to implicit theory of morality or 
personality, but also morality in relation to implicit theory of the specific trait itself. 
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Consistent failures reveal a negative character that has failed to improve oneself, and 
result in greater blame attributions than entity theorists would make, an effect that is not 
apparent with a single failure. 
There is a certain irony to the finding that teaching an incremental view of 
empathy can result in decreased empathy towards others behaving unempathically. 
Perhaps the most difficult form of empathy involves empathizing with others not feeling 
empathy—our results suggest that incrementalism can move people away from being 
able to do so. Results on aggression extend this relationship to another domain, 
suggesting that incrementalists’ increased judgmental harshness of undesirable trait levels 
is not unique to empathy. The malleability of motivation offers an interesting possibility, 
since a key aspect of the general incremental position, or even more broadly the self-help 
stance, is that with enough effort, great things can be achieved. But it is possible to see 
the amount of effort that people are capable of exerting as fixed.  Thus, one could be 
incremental about various traits, thinking that with enough effort trait levels could be 
perfected, but maintain an entity view of effort itself, and so regard a failure to perfect a 
particular trait as not in itself blameworthy. Perhaps this mixed view would decrease 
blame attributions towards those with certain undesirable trait levels and maintain one’s 
own motivation to improve. 
 There are certainly significant benefits to an incremental mindset. However, the 
same increased perceived control that causes one to work to improve trait levels also 
contributes to increased judgmental harshness of others’ failures, particularly at the 
extremes of incrementalism. Increased blame ascriptions for those with maladaptive trait 
levels could have societal consequences: The same mechanism that suggests that those in 
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underprivileged communities can overcome adversity through effort and determination 
could deleteriously lead to the avoidance of addressing the structural inequity that 
contributes to collective disadvantage, by shifting control away from situational factors, 
to the victim of the situation. Focusing on individual resilience and perseverance implies 
increased personal control over outcomes, and this may be accompanied by decreased 
perceived societal responsibility for providing a supportive environment in the first place. 
In domains such as economics, the propensity to ignore base rates of failure and instead 
focus on examples of success has been labeled the survivorship bias (Brown, Goetzmann, 
Ibbotson, & Ross, 1992). Positing people as nearly-infinitely perfectible, the outer limit 
of an incremental theory, may, by focusing on survivors that overcome the odds, amplify 
a neglect of what those odds actually are. Further exploration may yield a teachable 
psychological flexibility in implicit theory, which confers the benefits of the theory to the 
self without detriment to treatment of others. Future research should also explore growth 
mindsets in older populations, who, after exposure to a culture that does not entirely fit 
their worldview, may develop system-justifying associated meanings for their lay 
theories that, at the surface level, conveyed infinite potential and inspired greater effort. It 
could also be that, rather than truly blaming the actor more, incrementalists are 
misattributing or displacing their own frustration at witnessing a theory-violating pattern 
of behavior (Plaks, et al., 2005; Plaks & Stecher, 2007; Xu & Plaks, 2015). This would 
not be inconsistent with our approach, but could be an additional factor contributing to 
incrementalist condemnation that could be explored in further studies. 
As has increasingly been found throughout positive psychology, one-dimensional 
representations of adaptive traits often obscure the reality that these same mechanisms 
		 326 
can be coopted for detrimental processes (McNulty & Fincham, 2012). Thus, teaching an 
adaptive flexibility, one that views certain traits as uncontrollable in certain situations, 
may prove most advantageous. A more situated incrementalism may confer benefits to 
the self, without attributing greater blame to others, and perhaps excuse oneself and 
others of blame over aspects of the self that that are in actuality beyond individual 
control. This worldview could resemble Helen Keller’s perspective, who, after 
overcoming the limitations of both deafness and blindness to become one of America’s 
most celebrated figures, said, “I had once believed that we are all masters of our fate —
that we could mould our lives into any form we pleased... But as I went more and more 
about the country I learned that I had spoken with assurance on a subject I knew little 
about. I forgot that I owed my success partly to the advantages of my birth and 
environment. Now, however, I learned that the power to rise in the world is not within the 
reach of everyone” (Dreier, 2012). 
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Empathy Theories 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1. Standardized regression coefficients for the relationship between mindset 
induction and rated blameworthiness of a person showing a consistently low level of 
empathy as mediated by perceived control. The standardized regression coefficient 
between mindset induction and rated blameworthiness, controlling for perceived control, 
is in parentheses.  
***p < .001. 
 
 
 
 
 
Aggression Theories 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.2. Standardized regression coefficients for the relationship between mindset 
induction and rated blameworthiness of a person showing a consistently high level of 
aggression as mediated by perceived control. The standardized regression coefficient 
between mindset induction and rated blameworthiness, controlling for perceived control, 
is in parentheses.  
***p < .001, *p < .05 
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Motivation Theories 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.3. Standardized regression coefficients for the relationship between mindset 
induction and rated blameworthiness of a person showing a consistently low level of 
motivation as mediated by perceived control. The standardized regression coefficient 
between mindset induction and rated blameworthiness, controlling for perceived control, 
is in parentheses.  
***p < .001, **p < .01. 
 
 
 
 
Empathy Theories (vignettes) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.4. Standardized regression coefficients for the relationship between mindset 
induction and rated blameworthiness of a person showing a consistently low level of 
empathy in a detailed vignette as mediated by perceived control. The standardized 
regression coefficient between mindset induction and rated blameworthiness, controlling 
for perceived control, is in parentheses.  
***p < .001. 
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Figure 8.5. Interactive effect of mindset induction and failure type on blameworthiness of 
a person showing empathic failure. Responses were along a scale from 1 to 7, anchored at 
not at all blameworthy and completely blameworthy, respectively. 
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Figure 8.6. Relationship across studies between mindset induction and rated 
blameworthiness of a person consistently showing undesirable trait levels (blame) and 
rated praiseworthiness of a person consistently showing desirable trait levels (praise). 
Both responses were along a scale from -3 to 3, anchored at completely praiseworthy and 
completely blameworthy, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-1.6
-1.4
-1.2
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
00
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
Blame Praise
Pr
ai
se
Bl
am
e
entity-induced incremental-induced
		 335 
Conclusion 
This dissertation examined three mechanisms underlying aspects of moral 
cognition: The role of expected value calculation in judgments of actions that harm some 
to benefit many, how mental accounting of prior good deeds excuses further beneficence, 
and how changeability beliefs influence responsibility attribution. Chapter 1 identified 
how intuitive probabilities can override stated outcomes in moral dilemmas, where harm 
to few will result in benefit to many. Chapters 2 and 3 found that participants were 
sensitive to expected value, probability, and where shifts in probability occur in moral 
dilemmas, providing evidence against affective and deliberative paths being competing 
cognitive processes. Additionally, a discrepancy between single evaluations and joint 
evaluations of moral dilemmas was identified, such that participants deviated further 
from expected value under joint evaluation than under single evaluation. Chapter 4 
provided additional evidence for the integration of affective and deliberative paths by 
demonstrating how incidental affect can shift risk preferences in moral decisions. 
Chapters 1-4 thus revealed the affective and deliberative paths in moral reasoning to be 
more interconnected than current dual-system models suggest, and that moral judgments 
are sensitive to expected value, outcomes likelihoods, where shifts in likelihood occur, 
decision-mode, and incidental affect.  
These findings have philosophical implications: People appear to be neither pure 
utilitarians, willing to cause harm as long as the action results in a net benefit, nor 
absolutist deontologists, refusing to cause any harm for the greater good. Instead, 
participant responses are consistent with threshold deontology—a certain amount of good 
must be achieved in order to justify imposing harm or a risk of harm. Our findings also 
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raise the issue of how risks of harm relate to causing definite harm, a topic of interest to 
those subscribing to deontology, which provides less clear guidance regarding imposing 
risks of harm than it does for avoiding causing certain harm. 
Such research will also help inform a variety of applied decisions regarding how 
to trade off risks of harm and probabilistic benefits in a variety of domains, from public 
health policy, to how autonomous vehicle collision avoidance systems should be 
programmed to decide between possible outcomes. Additionally, these findings identify 
that choosing between plans can lead to decision-making less consistent with expected 
value than choosing whether to carry out a single plan. Which of these decision-modes is 
normatively correct cannot be empirically derived. However, our studies do suggest that, 
when deciding between certainly harming few or a causing greater harm, as expressed 
through a lower likelihood of harm but to a greater number people, choosing between 
plans may lead to suboptimal decisions with respect to expected value. Overall, our 
research indicates that findings from single-evaluation studies of moral preferences with 
certain outcomes may not generalize to real-world ethical preferences, where outcomes 
are generally not certain to occur, nor is the range of possible actions necessarily 
constrained to a single option. 
Chapter 5 moved from the judgment of actions in which harm is done for the 
greater good, to examining the cognitive representation of good deeds. The proposed 
Moral Accounting Model outlined how, in addition to the increased cost of further action, 
moral credit from having already done good contributes to the acceptability of declining 
subsequent opportunities for beneficence. Moral credit was found to be sensitive to effort, 
effect, domain, and time since beneficence. Because of the steep depreciation of moral 
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credit, monthly donations resulted in more enduring moral credit than equivalent one-
time donations, suggesting that monthly donation schemes may decrease the amount of 
good that would otherwise done by the people enrolled in them. Our model thus reveals 
an intuitive solution to the philosophical challenge of how much good one ought to do in 
the world. Chapter 6 further examined a specific aspect of beneficence: the extent to 
which donors care about the effectiveness of their donations. Findings suggest that 
participants have limited concern for efficiency, or the proportion of donations going to 
the cause rather than administrative overhead, a metric often used as a proxy for 
effectiveness. 
The final section of the dissertation turned from judgments of actions to 
judgments of people. Chapters 7 and 8 examined how blame attributions of others relate 
to how changeable one views people to generally be. Chapter 7 proposed a theoretical 
account of how the widely-documented benefits of changeable mindsets and the rejection 
of essences underlying groups and individuals may, ironically, rely on a perceived deeper 
positive essence. In contexts of continual failure, however, believing in changeability 
could instead result in increased blame of those unable to improve their circumstance, by 
implying that they are capable of doing if only they tried harder. Chapter 8 provided 
empirical evidence for this perspective by demonstrating that those exposed to 
incremental (changeable) inductions judged continuous failures more harshly than those 
exposed to an entity (fixed) induction. Such research cautions against the increasingly 
widespread adoption of mindset interventions by schools and businesses around the 
world. Since belief in changeability is accompanied by increased perceived responsibility 
for achievement, implementing such interventions in communities and populations facing 
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actual barriers to achievement may not only leave the root causes of underachievement 
unaddressed, but can also shift blame away from structural barriers, and towards 
members of those communities. 
Our exploration of three aspects of moral cognition underscores the close 
relationship between basic cognition, lay philosophy, and moral judgment of specific 
actions and people. Understanding the cognitive processes underlying moral judgment 
thus helps inform practical ethical decisions, such as how to program autonomous 
vehicles, how to encourage beneficence, and how to best address achievement gaps. 
Though our research does not reveal which positions are normatively correct, a closer 
examination of their cognitive bases aids in building consensus on which components 
ought to matter, and which disregarded, in developing normative frameworks for 
addressing the ethical challenges we face. 
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Appendix 
 
Chapter 3 Supplementary Studies 
Chapter 3 Supplementary Study 1 
To verify that the observed lack of effect on the saving side observed in Study 
1was not the result of framing the saving likelihood as a decrease in the likelihood of 
dying, rather than an increase in the likelihood of survival, a separate study compared the 
framing the benefit as an increase in the likelihood of the eight surviving (0-25% 
increase, 75-100% increase), to a decrease in the likelihood of eight surviving (25-0% 
decrease, 100-75% decrease). 
Three hundred and forty six participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk (290 passed an attention check; 55.8% female; mean age = 35.0, SD = 12.9). 
Because results do not differ between the full set of participants and those passing the 
attention check, results are reported for all participants. A 2x2 ANOVA was used to 
analyze the results. There was no main effect of framing, F(1, 342) = .80, p = .37, r = .08, 
nor a main effect of location of shift, F(1, 342) = .35, p = .55, r = .02. The critical test for 
whether “survive” framing would result in location sensitivity was the interaction of 
framing and shift, which was not significant, F(1, 342) = 2.44, p = .12, r = .05 (mean 
decrease likelihood of dying from 25-0% = .53, SD = .326; mean increase in likelihood 
of surviving 0-25% = .77, SD = 2.27; mean decrease likelihood of dying 100-75% = .874, 
SD = 3.14;  mean increase likelihood of surviving 75-100% = 0.00, SD = 3.46;  p = .36 
for participants passing attention check). The results suggest that, regardless of framing, 
participants are insensitive to location shifts for likelihoods of benefit. 
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Chapter 3 Supplementary Study 3a I 
One hundred and thirteen participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk service (100 passed an attention check; 55.8% female; mean age = 35.0, SD = 12.9). 
Because results do not differ between the full set of participants and those passing the 
attention check, results are reported for all participants. Participants were exposed to the 
0-95 vs 95-100 joint evaluation in study 3a, without any preceding single evaluations. 
There was no preference between the 0-95 plan, and the 95-100 plan, t(112) = .84, p = 
.40, d = .08  (mean = -.26, SD = 3.25). Thus, participants were indifferent between a plan 
that raised the likelihood of four bystanders dying from 0-95% and a plan that raised the 
likelihood of a different four bystanders dying from 95-100%, in order to save two 
individuals, consistent with results obtained in Study 3a. 
 
Chapter 3 Supplementary Study 3a II 
One hundred and seven participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk service (100 passed an attention check; 62.6% female; mean age = 34.5, SD = 11.4). 
Because results do not differ between the full set of participants and those passing the 
attention check, results are reported for all participants. Participants were exposed to the 
0-50 vs 50-100 joint evaluation in study 3a, without any preceding single evaluations. 
There was a strong preference for the 0-50 plan over the 50-100 plan, t(106) = 13.9, p < 
.001, d = 2.34  (mean = -2.89, SD = 2.15). Thus, participants had a strong preference for 
a plan that raised the likelihood of four bystanders dying from 0-50% over a plan that 
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raised the likelihood of a different four bystanders dying from 50-100%, in order to save 
two individuals, consistent with results obtained in Study 3a. 
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Chapter 5 Study 2 Scenarios 
Soup Kitchen 
High Cost High Contribution 
Gene has just put in a ten hour shift at the local soup kitchen feeding the homeless and is 
on his way home.  He is approached by a man seeking someone to help for one hour at 
the soup kitchen.  The help does not require any prior experience or expertise. 
 
Low Cost Low Contribution 
John has had a quiet day relaxing at home.  He steps outside his home and is approached 
by a man seeking someone to help for one hour at the soup kitchen feeding the homeless.  
The help does not require any prior experience or expertise. 
 
Low Cost High Contribution 
Geoff has just made a financial donation to the local soup kitchen feeding the homeless.  
His donation is sufficient to hire someone to work a ten hour shift at the kitchen.  He is 
approached by a man seeking someone to help for one hour at the soup kitchen.  The help 
does not require any prior experience or expertise. 
 
High Cost Low Contribution 
Gabe has just put in a ten hour shift as a chef at the restaurant where he works, and is on 
his way home.  He is approached by a man seeking someone to help for one hour at a 
soup kitchen feeding the homeless.  The help does not require any prior experience or 
expertise. 
 
Kidney Donation 
High Cost High Contribution 
Grace has donated one of her kidneys to save a distant relative’s life.  A scientist who is 
on the verge of finding an immunization for malaria – a discovery that could save 
hundreds of thousands of lives – will die if he does not get a rapid kidney transplant, and 
the only viable donor is Grace.  A person can live normally with one kidney, but with 
none they must spend the rest of their life on painful, time-consuming dialysis, and 
mobility is severely limited.   
 
Low Cost Low Contribution 
Jackie has not done organ donation, and still has both of her kidneys.  A scientist who is 
on the verge of finding an immunization for malaria – a discovery that could save 
hundreds of thousands of lives – will die if he does not get a rapid kidney transplant, and 
the only viable donor is Jackie.  A person can live normally with one kidney, but with 
none they must spend the rest of their life on painful, time-consuming dialysis, and 
mobility is severely limited. 
 
Low Cost High Contribution 
Gloria has made a large financial contribution that funded one kidney transplant surgery 
for someone who could not afford the life-saving procedure.  Gloria has not done organ 
donation herself, and still has both of her kidneys.  A scientist who is on the verge of 
finding an immunization for malaria – a discovery that could save hundreds of thousands 
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of lives – will die if he does not get a rapid kidney transplant, and the only viable donor is 
Gloria.  A person can live normally with one kidney, but with none they must spend the 
rest of their life on painful, time-consuming dialysis, and mobility is severely limited. 
 
High Cost Low Contribution 
Gwen recently discovered that she was born with one kidney.  A scientist who is on the 
verge of finding an immunization for malaria – a discovery that could save hundreds of 
thousands of lives – will die if he does not get a rapid kidney transplant, and the only 
viable donor is Gwen.  A person can live normally with one kidney, but with none they 
must spend the rest of their life on painful, time-consuming dialysis, and mobility is 
severely limited.   
 
Boat Rescues 
High Cost High Contribution 
Thousands are homeless and stranded after Hurricane Katrina.  Glenn has spent twelve 
hours today rescuing people using his boat and ferrying them to nearby shelters.  He is 
very tired from his long day.  He is approached by a volunteer who asks him to spend the 
next hour looking for people.  By doing so, he could rescue about ten people.  The help 
does not require any prior experience or expertise. 
 
Low Cost Low Contribution 
Thousands are homeless and stranded after Hurricane Katrina.  Joel has spent twelve 
hours hanging out with his friends.  He is approached by a volunteer who asks him to 
spend the next hour looking for people.  By doing so, he could rescue about ten 
people.  The help does not require any prior experience or expertise. 
 
Low Cost High Contribution 
Thousands are homeless and stranded after Hurricane Katrina.  Greg has made a donation 
sufficient to cover the cost of a hiring a fisherman with a boat to spend twelve hours 
today rescuing people and ferrying them to nearby shelters.  Greg is approached by a 
volunteer who asks him to spend the next hour on a similar boat looking for people.  By 
doing so, he could rescue about ten people.  The help does not require any prior 
experience or expertise. 
 
High Cost Low Contribution 
Thousands are homeless and stranded after Hurricane Katrina.  Gil is a commercial 
fisherman who has just spent twelve hours fishing on his boat. He is very tired from his 
long day.  He is approached by a volunteer who asks him to spend the next hour using his 
boat to look for people. By doing so, he could rescue about ten people.  The help does not 
require any prior experience or expertise. 
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Chapter 5 Study 3 Scenarios 
Soup Kitchen 
Minimal Effort, No Good 
Greg spends the last 5 minutes of his shift as a chef at a restaurant preparing leftover 
ingredients into enough food to feed 20 homeless people.  He arranges for a soup kitchen 
volunteer to pick up the food.  However, the soup kitchen's delivery truck breaks down 
and cannot pick up the food, so the food Greg has prepared does not get served.  When he 
gets home, Greg finds a flyer soliciting monetary donations to the soup kitchen.  
 
High Effort, No Good 
Jerry spends the last 4 hours of his shift as a chef at a restaurant preparing leftover 
ingredients into enough food to feed 20 homeless people.  He arranges for a soup kitchen 
volunteer to pick up the food.  However, the soup kitchen's delivery truck breaks down 
and cannot pick up the food, so the food Jerry has prepared does not get served.  When he 
gets home, Jerry finds a flyer soliciting monetary donations to the soup kitchen in his 
mailbox. 
 
Minimal Effort, High Good 
Gabe spends the last 5 minutes of his shift as a chef at a restaurant preparing leftover 
ingredients into enough food to feed 20 homeless people.  He arranges for a soup kitchen 
volunteer to pick up the food.  The food Gabe has prepared gets served.  When he gets 
home, Gabe finds a flyer soliciting monetary donations to the soup kitchen in his 
mailbox. 
 
High Effort, High Good 
John spends the last 4 hours of his shift as a chef at a restaurant preparing leftover 
ingredients into enough food to feed 20 homeless people.  He arranges for a soup kitchen 
volunteer to pick up the food.  The food John has prepared gets served.  When he gets 
home, John finds a flyer soliciting monetary donations to the soup kitchen in his mailbox. 
 
Boat Rescue 
Minimal Effort, No Good 
Thousands are homeless and stranded after Hurricane Katrina.  George is a commercial 
fisherman who has just spent ten hours fishing on his boat.  He has spent the last 10 
minutes of his fishing trip searching for stranded people. In that time he has been unable 
to rescue anyone. As he is docking his boat, George is approached by a volunteer who 
asks George to spend the next hour using his boat to look for people.  By doing so, he 
would rescue about 5 people. 
 
Minimal Effort, High Good 
Thousands are homeless and stranded after Hurricane Katrina.  Jason is a commercial 
fisherman who has just spent ten hours fishing on his boat.  He has spent the last 3 hours 
of his fishing trip searching for stranded people.  In that time he has been unable to rescue 
anyone.  As he is docking his boat, Jason is approached by a volunteer who asks Jason to 
spend the next hour using his boat to look for people.  By doing so, he would rescue 
about 5 people. 
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High Effort, Minimal Good 
Thousands are homeless and stranded after Hurricane Katrina.  Gil is a commercial 
fisherman who has just spent ten hours fishing on his boat.  He has spent the last 10 
minutes of his fishing trip searching for stranded people.  In that time he has been able to 
rescue 10 people.  As he is docking his boat, Gil is approached by a volunteer who asks 
Gil to spend the next hour using his boat to look for people.  By doing so, he would 
rescue about 5 more people. 
 
High Effort, High Good 
Thousands are homeless and stranded after Hurricane Katrina.  Jim is a commercial 
fisherman who has just spent ten hours fishing on his boat.  He has spent the last 3 hours 
of his fishing trip searching for stranded people.  In that time he has been able to rescue 
10 people.  As he is docking his boat, Jim is approached by a volunteer who asks Jim to 
spend the next hour using his boat to look for people.  By doing so, Jim would rescue 
about 5 more people. 
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Chapter 5 Study 4 Scenarios 
Soup Kitchen 
High Prior Contribution Same Domain 
Gene has just put in a ten hour shift at the local soup kitchen feeding the homeless and is 
on his way home.  He is approached by a man raising funds for the soup kitchen. 
 
Low Prior Contribution Same Domain 
John has had a quiet day relaxing at home.  He steps outside his home and is approached 
by a man seeking monetary donations for a soup kitchen feeding the homeless. 
 
High Prior Contribution Similar Domain 
Gary has just put in a ten hour shift at the local soup kitchen feeding the homeless and is 
on his way home.  He is approached by a man raising funds for a new homeless shelter. 
 
Low Prior Contribution Similar Domain 
Jeff has had a quiet day relaxing at home.  He steps outside his home and is approached 
by a man raising funds for a new homeless shelter. 
 
High Prior Contribution Different Domain 
Gerry has just put in a ten hour shift at the local soup kitchen feeding the homeless and is 
on his way home.  He is approached by a man raising funds for an animal rescue center 
that would help wild animals recover from a recent oil spill.   
 
Low Prior Contribution Different Domain 
Jon has had a quiet day relaxing at home.  He steps outside his home and is approached 
by a man raising funds for an animal rescue center that would help wild animals recover 
from a recent oil spill.   
 
Kidney Donation 
High Prior Contribution Same Domain 
Grace has donated one of her kidneys to save a distant relative’s life.  She is approached 
by a person raising money to fund a kidney transplant for a person in the community in 
desperate need of a transplant who cannot otherwise afford it. 
 
Low Prior Contribution Same Domain 
Jackie has not done organ donation, and still has both of her kidneys.  She is approached 
by a person raising money to fund a kidney transplant for a person in the community in 
desperate need of a transplant who cannot otherwise afford it. 
 
High Prior Contribution Similar Domain 
Gina has donated one of her kidneys to save a distant relative’s life.  She is approached 
by a volunteer from her local blood bank who informs her that the blood bank is raising 
money to fund a second mobile blood donation station that will greatly increase the blood 
bank's supply of blood. 
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Low Prior Contribution Similar Domain 
Jennifer has not done organ donation, and still has both of her kidneys.  She is 
approached by a volunteer from her local blood bank who informs her that the blood 
bank is raising money to fund a second mobile blood donation station that will greatly 
increase the blood bank's supply of blood. 
 
High Prior Contribution Different Domain 
Gloria has donated one of her kidneys to save a distant relative’s life.  She is approached 
by a local group that is raising awareness about the destruction of polar bear habitats and 
fundraising to conserve polar bear habitats. 
 
Low Prior Contribution Different Domain 
Jennifer has not done organ donation, and still has both of her kidneys.  She is 
approached by a local group that is raising awareness about the destruction of polar bear 
habitats and fundraising to conserve polar bear habitats. 
 
Boat Rescues 
High Prior Contribution Same Domain 
Thousands are homeless and stranded after Hurricane Katrina.  Glenn has spent twelve 
hours today rescuing people using his boat and ferrying them to nearby shelters.  He is 
very tired from his long day.  He is approached by a volunteer who asks him to make a 
monetary donation that will fund the rescue of about ten more people. 
 
Low Prior Contribution Same Domain 
Thousands are homeless and stranded after Hurricane Katrina.  Joel has spent twelve 
hours hanging out with his friends.  He is approached by a volunteer who asks him 
to make a monetary donation that will fund the rescue of about ten more people. 
 
High Prior Contribution Similar Domain 
Thousands are homeless and stranded after Hurricane Katrina.  Geoff has spent twelve 
hours today rescuing people using his boat and ferrying them to nearby shelters.  He is 
approached by a volunteer who asks him to make a monetary donation to a local food 
bank that is feeding the stranded. 
 
Low Prior Contribution Similar Domain 
Thousands are homeless and stranded after Hurricane Katrina.  Jason has spent twelve 
hours hanging out with his friends.  He is approached by a volunteer who asks him 
to make a monetary donation to a local food bank that is feeding the stranded. 
 
High Prior Contribution Different Domain 
Thousands are homeless and stranded after Hurricane Katrina.  Gil has spent twelve 
hours today rescuing people using his boat and ferrying them to nearby shelters.  He is 
approached by a volunteer who asks him to make a monetary donation to an organization 
that saves elephants from poachers. 
 
 
		 348 
Low Prior Contribution Different Domain 
Thousands are homeless and stranded after Hurricane Katrina.  Joel has spent twelve 
hours hanging out with his friends.  He is approached by a volunteer who asks him 
to make a monetary donation to an organization that saves elephants from poachers. 
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Chapter 5 Study 5 Scenarios 
Soup Kitchen 
High Contribution Today 
Gene is approached by a man raising funds for a local soup kitchen on his way home 
from putting in a ten hour shift at the local soup kitchen feeding the homeless. 
 
Low Contribution Today 
Jeff has had a quiet day relaxing at home.  He steps outside his home and is approached 
by a man raising funds for a local soup kitchen. 
 
High Contribution Week 
Gary is approached by a man raising funds for a local soup kitchen.  A week ago he put 
in a ten hour shift at the local soup kitchen feeding the homeless. 
 
High Contribution Year 
Gerry is approached by a man raising funds for a local soup kitchen.  A year ago he put in 
a ten hour shift at the local soup kitchen feeding the homeless.  
 
High Contribution Decade 
Greg is approached by a man raising funds for a local soup kitchen.  A decade ago he put 
in a ten hour shift at the local soup kitchen feeding the homeless.  
 
Kidney Donation 
High Contribution Today 
Grace has just donated one of her kidneys to save a distant relative’s life.  She is 
approached by a person raising money to fund a kidney transplant for a person in the 
community in desperate need of a transplant who cannot otherwise afford it. 
 
Low Contribution Today 
Jackie has not done organ donation, and still has both of her kidneys.  She is approached 
by a person raising money to fund a kidney transplant for a person in the community in 
desperate need of a transplant who cannot otherwise afford it. 
 
High Contribution Week 
Gina donated one of her kidneys to save a distant relative’s life a week ago.  She is 
approached by a person raising money to fund a kidney transplant for a person in the 
community in desperate need of a transplant who cannot otherwise afford it. 
 
High Contribution Year 
Gloria donated one of her kidneys to save a distant relative’s life one year ago.  She is 
approached by a person raising money to fund a kidney transplant for a person in the 
community in desperate need of a transplant who cannot otherwise afford it. 
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High Contribution Decade 
Gloria donated one of her kidneys to save a distant relative’s life a decade ago.  She is 
approached by a person raising money to fund a kidney transplant for a person in the 
community in desperate need of a transplant who cannot otherwise afford it. 
 
After School Program 
High Contribution Today 
Glenn is approached by a volunteer who asks him to make a monetary donation to help 
fund local after-school programs while Glenn is on his way home from spending 4 hours 
volunteering for an after-school program. 
 
Low Contribution Today 
Joel is approached by a volunteer who asks him to make a monetary donation to help 
fund local after-school programs while Joel is on his way home from hanging out with 
friends for 4 hours. 
 
High Contribution Week 
Geoff is approached by a volunteer who asks him to make a monetary donation to help 
fund local after-school programs.  A week ago, Geoff spent 4 hours volunteering for an 
after school program. 
 
High Contribution Year 
Gil is approached by a volunteer who asks him to make a monetary donation to help fund 
local after-school programs.  A year ago, Gil spent 4 hours volunteering for an after 
school program. 
 
High Contribution Decade 
Gerald is approached by a volunteer who asks him to make a monetary donation to help 
fund local after-school programs.  A decade ago, Geoff spent 4 hours volunteering for an 
after-school program. 
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Chapter 5 Study 6 Scenarios 
 
Soup Kitchen 
Single Donation Today 
Gene is approached by a man raising funds for a local soup kitchen on his way home 
from having donated $240 to the soup kitchen. 
 
Monthly Donation Today 
Gary is approached by a man raising funds for a local soup kitchen on his way home 
from signing up to make a monthly donation of $20 per month to the soup kitchen for a 
year, automatically withdrawn from his bank account on the first of the month each 
month, so $20 has been deducted from his bank account that month.  His monthly 
donations will total $240 over the course of the year. 
 
Single Donation 9 Months Ago 
Greg is approached by a man raising funds for a local soup kitchen.  Nine months ago he 
donated $240 to the soup kitchen.  
 
Monthly Donation Started 9 Months Ago 
Gerry is approached by a man raising funds for a local soup kitchen.  Nine months ago he 
signed up to make a monthly donation of $20 per month to the soup kitchen for a year, 
automatically withdrawn from his bank account on the first of the month each month, so 
$20 has been deducted from his bank account that month.  His monthly donations will 
total $240 over the course of year. 
 
After School Program 
Single Donation Today 
Jason is approached by a woman seeking volunteers to help out at a local after school 
program on his way home from donating $600 to the after school program. 
 
Monthly Donation Today 
Jonathan is approached by a woman seeking volunteers to help out at a local after school 
program on his way home from signing up to make a monthly donation of $50 per month 
to the after school program for a year, automatically withdrawn from his bank account on 
the first of the month each month, so $50 has been deducted from his bank account that 
month.  His monthly donations will total $600 over the course of year. 
 
Single Donation 9 Months Ago 
Jim is approached by a woman seeking volunteers to help out at a local after school 
program. Ten months ago he donated $600 to the after school program. 
 
Monthly Donation Started 9 Months Ago 
Jacob is approached by a woman seeking volunteers to help out at a local after school 
program. Ten months ago he signed up to make a monthly donation of $50 per month to 
the after school program for a year, automatically withdrawn from his bank account on 
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the first of the month each month, so $50 has been deducted from his bank account that 
month.  His monthly donations will total $600 over the course of year. 
 
